By Clément Paule
Translation: Davina Durgana
Passage au crible n°39
Source : Flickr
According to the May 3rd edition of the Asahi Shimbun journal, the Japanese government has evaluated the sum of compensations to be paid by TEPCO (Tokyo Electric Power Company) to be nearly 50 billion dollars. Nearly three months after the earthquake of May 11th, 2011 the accident that took place in the middle of Fukushima-Daiichi did not always seem to be mastered by the first Asian electrician. For now, the question of the indemnification of victims – individuals and collective localities – has already incited controversies so that the industry authorities have remained very criticized for their handling of the crisis. Thus, the President of the powerful parental organization Nippon Keidanren (Federations of Japanese Economic Organizations), Yonekura Hiromasa has challenged the responsibility of the State, which is supposed to ensure the entirety of compensations. For now, according to the group JP Morgan Chase, the financial cost of the catastrophe has risen by 24 billion dollars for TEPCO while Bank of America-Merrill Lynch evokes a figure five times greater.
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
As the third global producer of nuclear energy – behind the United States and France – today, Japan has fifty active reactors generating nearly 30% of the electricity of the country. In order to reduce their strong dependence to fossil fuels, the Japanese State has opted since the 1970’s for a strategy that privileges the atomic industry. Stimulated by gigantic investments and American cooperation, this sector was considerably developed through Toshiba, Hitachi and Mitsubishi Heavy Industry. In 2006, the METI (Ministry of Economy, Commerce and Industry) has reaffirmed the objective of producing by 2030, 50% of electric needs through this technology. Towards this end, the construction of a dozen new structures has been planned for the coming decades.
Recall equally that TEPCO, leader of the Japanese market and the fourth global firm – after RWE., EDF. (Electricity of France), and EON – was created in 1951 in the framework of the end of a State energy monopoly. In the 1960’s, business saw great growth and invested in nuclear energy: the complex of Fukushima-Daiichi became operational in March 1970. In little time, TEPCO has become the first multinational producer of electricity in Asia. Additionally, this dazzling ascension has been marred by numerous scandals: in August 2002, authorities revealed the falsification by the operator of dozens of documents in order to hide incidents in their installations since the 1970’s. In a general manner, these controversies implicating the industry have multiplied with the accidents of Tokaimura in 1999 or in Mihama in 2004. As for TECPO, the earthquake of Chuetsu in 2007 has induced the closing of their large central location – Kashiwazaki-Kariwa, located 250 kilometers North of Tokyo – within 21 months. The company has thus incurred their first loss in 28 years, estimated at 4.4 billion dollars.
1. Network of Allegiances of the Nuclear Sector. Denounced by ecological movements under the term of oligarchy, the collusions that unite the public and private nuclear actors seem structured in the sequencing of the crisis. Characterized by their political and judicial irresponsibility, the decision-makers seek to maintain solidarity, facing the rise of profane criticism.
2. Strategies of Avoiding Blame. Then, the handling of the crisis became equally the theatre of tensions between the same stakeholders in terms of the accusation of fault. In this respect, the government, made more fragile since the earthquake, tends to attribute the responsibility of the accident to TEPCO.
For the first time, relating the similarities of this event with the implication of the major gas company BP with the oil slick in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010 is relevant. In fact, the stigmatization of a deviant multinational firm, the questioning of subcontracting or the price drop of the firm seems now to be the common elements of these post-accident economic activities. Additionally, TEPCO does not seem to be capable of controlling the situation because their first crisis exit plan was not presented until April 18th, 2011, though the disaster happened April 7th. As for its directors, they have simply taken refuge in public contrition. Also, the communication of the company has proven lacunal, that is to say erroneous. These repetitive losses, which have achieved the destruction of the reputation of this actor critiqued by the State, has stimulated the development of socio-technical controversies and alternative evaluation. All the same, inversely of BP in 2010, it imported and retained the failure of national agencies of regulation, in particular the NISA (Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency), in charge of inspections of METI, and the commission of the NSC (Nuclear Safety Commission). Despite the actions of whistleblowers such as seismologists Katsuhiko Ishibashi and Kiyoo Mogi who have denounced conflicts of interest, noting that norms have not been revised. Precisely such as certain recommendations of the AIEA have been equally ignored, through the moratorium of five years on enrichment and reprocessing, publicized by former Director Mohamed El Baradei.
Noteworthy is the ambiguous attitude of the government towards TEPCO, which has threatened nationalization, but has simultaneously been supported by the State. To this regard, the sidelining of the NGO Greenpeace – to proceed to measuring radiation or the development of indemnification funds destined to avoid the bankruptcy of the enterprise – can translate this support. Recall that in the past the authorities have covered the accidents that compromise the operator, and that the scandal of 2002 has not had but a very limited impact on the group. Then, emphasized are the effects of internationalization of Japanese nuclear actors, which have accompanied increased deregulation since the 1990’s. For example, the JINED accord (International Nuclear Energy Development of Japan Co. Ltd.) established in October 2010 between the State and Industry on the export of technology abroad. Additionally, one mentions the central role of TEPCO in the framework of the Kyoto Protocol, in order to attain the objectives of the country in terms of the reduction of carbon dioxide emissions. One sees here that institutional and strategic proximities are reinforced by the network of allegiances unifying the top administration and the leaders of electricity, crystallized in the METI, charged with the promotion of atomic energy, but also in security controls.
For now, this configuration has lead to a closing of the managing spaces of the catastrophe, notably in the production of evaluations of radioactive leakages. As evidenced by the resignation at the end of April by Professor Toshiso Kosako – scientific advisor to the Prime Minister – who was in disagreement with the measures taken by the Cabinet. Furthermore, critical commentators have castigated the circular circulation of information – according to the expression of P. Bourdieu – disclosed by loyal leaders of the nuclear sector. Contrary to the United States with respect to BP, the Japanese authorities have thus turned towards a certain solidarity with TEPCO and a strategy of blame avoidance caused by the stigmatization of an actor that was already deviant. In any case, the collusion and the straddling between the public and private are not questioned as such. Seemingly there is the risk of free-riding – or a lone-rider – of a State participating in control, that is to say the concealment of information on behalf of its strategic priorities. This secret organization – which cannot be attributed to an alleged Japanese specificity – represents a danger not only to the population, but in this precise case, also for global public goods. Additionally, this has now proven to be more problematic than international instances of regulation – such as the AIEA – which is more concerned about the military advantage of this technology than its civil use which is, however, particularly risky.
Chateauraynaud Francis, Torny Didier, Les Sombres précurseurs : une sociologie pragmatique de l’alerte et du risque, Paris, EHESS, 1999.
Ishibashi Katsuhiko, “Why Worry? Japan’s Nuclear Plants at Grave Risk from Quake Damage”, International Herald Tribune, 11 août 2007.
McCormack Gavan, « Le Japon nucléaire ou l’hubris puni », Le Monde diplomatique, avril 2011.
Poirmeur Yves, « Qu’est-ce qu’une information loyale ? », in: Josepha Laroche (Éd.), La Loyauté dans les relations internationales, 2e éd., Paris, L’Harmattan, 2011. Coll. Chaos International.
Weaver Kent R., « The Politics of Blame Avoidance », Journal of Public Policy, 6 (4), 1986, pp. 371-398.
