By Klaus-Gerd Giesen
Translation: Justine Davis
Passage au crible n°34
On December 17, 2010, the European Union granted Montenegro official candidate status. This was the only nation authorized by the European Council to join the group that included Croatia, Iceland, Macedonia, and Turkey, whereas the Albanian and Serbian requests were postponed. A few days after this decision, the Prime Minister, Milo Djukanovic, left the post that he had occupied almost completely without interruption since 1991. And yet, the two events are intimately connected.
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
At the age of 29, Milo Djukanovic took the reins of power when Montenegro was still part of Yugoslavia. With the support of his mentor, Slobodan Milosevic, he achieved success in the Anti-bureaucracy revolution within the Communist League. Ever since, Djukanovic has constantly ruled over the little Balkan state, with the lone exception of a 16-month interruption (October 2006-February 2008). He served five terms as chief of government and two as president. Beginning his political career as a dogmatic communist, he was quickly converted to Serbian nationalism during the civil war that unsettled Yugoslavia in the 1990s. Afterwards, he turned against his old ally, Milosevic, before finally embodying a freedom fighter leadership, which was fulfilled by Serbia’s secession in 2006.
As for the European Union enlargement process outside of the 27 current member states, it appears to be at a complete halt since the 2005 referendums on the European Constitution, and further weakened by the severe economic crisis of 2008-2009. A certain enlargement fatigue has been felt; for example, Croatia still has not succeeded in finalizing its membership. In this context, it is all the more surprising that Montenegro succeeded in passing the first step in the membership process, namely the Stabilization and Association Agreement.
There are two combining explanatory factors:
1. The unilateral mastery of all the stages of the European Union membership process raises an efficient lever of soft power. It allows the European Union to influence the domestic politics of the countries desiring to join.
2. Nevertheless, certain endogenous forces remain in a position to structurally resist Brussels guardianship and to adapt themselves to pressure.
Official membership status was given to Montenegro in exchange for the departure of Milo Djukanovic from his state functions. Djukanovic, who benefited from the support of his friend, Silvio Berlusconi, became, over the years, an embarrassing figure for the majority of other heads of state or for Western European governments. As the head of a progressively transforming nation, under his neo-patrimonial leadership, he also led a clan that was qualified by numerous observers as a mafia. Additionally, implicated in countless corruption scandals, Djukanovic has been considered a pariah since enormous cigarette smuggling took place that he supported, or even supervised, between 1995 and 2002, causing the loss of billions of Euros worth of taxes of the member states of the European Union. Finally, his regime, though elected with all of the appearances democratically, regularly intimidates the independent media. For example, Italian and German judges took interest in his case, but were hindered in their investigations by his immunity thanks to his status as Prime Minister or president.
Dominating the local structures of power, which are profoundly flooded with corruption and vote-buying, Djukanovic’s departure – at the age of only 48 – could only have been imposed from the outside. Supported primarily by Germany, the European Commission discretely made Montenegro understand that it would not gain candidate status as long as its leader remained in power. His promise to depart was thus able to drive the European Council’s decision on December 17, 2010.
In reality, Brussels exerted pressure due to the problems that were encountered during the last enlargement, which went into effect January 1, 2007. Indeed, admitted to the EU even though reservations were expressed about the integrity of their judicial systems, their level of corruption and the governmental will to fight against organized crime, Bulgaria and Romania have since been the object of an absolutely new European follow-up. Four years later, the results remain insufficient. Regularly reprimanded by the Commission for the passivity of their political elites, the two newcomers are still as tainted by corruption and organized crime. This is a true affront for the European institutions, and all the more so since the freezing of important subsidies to Bulgaria has not succeeded in changing the situation. This is the reason that the European Commission decided to change its strategy and require, henceforth, an acceptable level of combat against corruption and organized crime, occurring preferably long before any membership negotiation or at the latest just before negotiations begin. This is the credibility of a European integration project where the core remains the demonstration of a unique and completely transparent market which functions without illegal obstacles. Croatia has already been subjected to these expenses (rather belatedly), because the former Prime Minister, Ivo Sanader, has been imprisoned since December 10, 2010 in Austria, after being accused of being directly implicated in several corruption scandals that shook Croatia.
It remains to be seen whether the European Commission’s new approach will really allow for encouragement of structural reforms. In Montenegro’s case, one could express serious doubts due to the fact that the former Prime Minister, Milo Djukanovic, will not at all step down from politics and will remain at the head of the principle governmental party, DPS, which followed the old Communist League.
Accordingly, he will continue to control the government of the new Prime Minister, Igor Luksic, a 34-year-old, young technocrat. One might say that the maneuvering margin of the latter to modernize the country and initiate membership negotiations appears to be narrow. We must see here the proof that though the European Union Soft Power is perhaps successful at influencing these events, it does not succeed in modifying the structures – especially in occurrences of neo-patrimonial organizations – that are within the nations on its outskirts.
Giesen Klaus-Gerd, « La crise économique et l’érosion de la souveraineté monténégrine », Le Courrier des Balkans, 31 mars 2009, http://balkans.courriers.info/article12586.html
Krifa-Schneider Hadjila (Éd.), L’Élargissement de l’Union européenne, Paris, L’Harmattan, 2007.
Sajdik Martin, Scwarzinger Michael, Europen Union Enlargement, New Brunswick, Transaction Publishers, 2008.
Telo Mario, Europe: A Civilian Power?, Basingstoke, Palgrave/Macmillan, 2007.
