Feb 10, 2015 | Africa, Defense, Diplomacy, Human rights, Passage au crible (English), Security, Terrorism
By Philippe Hugon
Translation: Lawrence Myers
Passage au crible n° 124
Source: Wikimedia
The 24th Summit of the AU (African Union) was held in Addis Ababa from January 21-28, 2015. The major issues were related to the “Year of Women’s Empowerment and Development towards Africa’s Agenda 2063”. The question of the Ebola epidemic was addressed with a request for cancellation of debt up to 3 billion US dollars for the three countries concerned: Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone. The Peace and Security Council was held on January 29 with 15 heads of state in attendance, but without the Nigerian President, Good Luck Jonathan. On the authority’s agenda was the fight against terrorism, particularly targeting Boko Haram. Appealing to UN financing, a multinational force of 7,500 was proposed.
However, the highlight was the designation of the president of Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe, as the new president of the African Union. At 90 years old, this autocrat in power for 35 years, hero of the fight against Apartheid, increased criticism of the West. His election symbolizes the contradiction of African countries expressing an anti-western Pan-Africanism, despite member states’ inability to deal autonomously with questions related to peace and security or to solve the problem of epidemics. It also testifies to the constancy of gerontocrats, presidents for life, in the face of the African youth seeking their place in the political game and which, in so doing, opposes constitutional manipulations.
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
The African Union reinforced the political integration of Africa by implementing the NEPAD (The New Partnership for the Development of Africa) and the transformation in 2002 of the OAU (Organization of African Unity) into the AU (African Union). Today the AU is an assembly of 53 African states. Yet, Morocco is not a member due to the position adopted by the OAU, and then the AU, in favor of the independence of Western Sahara. The AU reinforced its institutional strength (Assembly, Executive Council, Permanent Representatives’ Committee and Commission). Initially a coordination organization, it has now turned into an institution of integration modeled after the European Union.
The Action Plan, adopted in Ouagadougou on October 12, 2014, had defined five priorities:
1/ institutional transformation (Pan-African Parliament); 2/ promotion of peace (Peace and Security Council), human security and governance (African Court of Human Rights the Peoples); 3/ regional development and integration; 4/ construction of a shared vision within the continent; 5/ adoption of protocol relative to the Court of Justice of the UA. It otherwise provided for the designation of a president of the UA for one year, while the president of the commission would be elected for a 5-year term.
The UA made two major innovations in relation to the OAU: 1/ It allowed for sanctions to be imposed on member states not respecting policies and decisions by the AU. Besides that, the 2007 charter strengthened the objectives in terms of democracy and governance. 2/ It recognized a right of intervention when legitimate order is threatened; a decision that goes against the principle of non-intervention, protector of sovereignties. Created in 2003 for deployment in the context of peacekeeping or peace support missions, the African reserve force is divided into five regional brigades integrated into the African architecture of peace and security of the African Union.
The reality remains far from these norms since the margins of maneuver of the AU appear slim in the face of the EU and its financing. Yet, it should be noted that with the disappearance of certain African leaders (Gaddafi, Wade) who would have wanted to promote a government of the United States of Africa, the AU has experienced a loss of influence. Especially since this ambition has clashed with the reticence of South Africa, and with the division between Arab-Muslim Africa and Sub Saharan Africa and the weak regional integration.
Ultimately, the election of Robert Mugabe as president of the organization strengthens the weight of South Africa. Like the election of Ms. Dlamini-Zuma in July 2012, as president of the Commission, the election of Mr. Mugabe is a result of alliances formed during the fight against Apartheid. It also confirms the relative unity of the bloc of the SADC (Southern Africa Development Community) in the face of the ECCAS (Economic Community of Central African States) and the ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) and French-speaking countries represented by the OIF (Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie) and especially Nigeria.
Theoretical framework
The weakness of the African Union refers to two main elements.
1. A conflict of interests. The African Union reflects the rivalries between member states. It is marked by the opposition between two rival powers: Nigeria and South Africa. They want to exert a continental leadership and aim long-term to obtain a seat as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council.
2. A poor collective mobilization in favor of security. The pan-African rhetoric of the pax Africana stumbles in the face of weak financing and low-level engagement in favor of peace and security. To the point that the architecture of peace and security functions poorly on the continent. Faced with conflicts, the development of terrorism and jihadism in Libya, Sudan, Somalia, Mali, Nigeria in the region of Lake Chad, in the Central African Republic or else in the DRC, the African Union has not known how or else has been unable to demonstrate its authority. Thus, the African force available to fight Boko Haram finds itself confronted with financing difficulties and the difficult implementation of a multilateral framework. So that the African forces involved in the background, behind armed nationals or bilateral forces before being relieved by United Nations forces.
Analysis
Despite the African Commission of Human Rights and Peoples, the AU continues to remain far behind concerning the infringement of rights taking place in numerous countries, notably in DRC Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Somalia and Zimbabwe. The same goes as to denials of democracy or when it comes to addressing popular uprisings (i.e., the “Arab Springs” taking place since January 2011). Most often, constitutional manipulations aim to free themselves from rules guaranteed by Constitutional Courts or Councils. Thus, a connection exists in Africa between the duration of mandates and the personalization of power and the risk of authoritarian tendencies. This explains that elections of a contentious nature have led to crises in Côte d’Ivoire (2000, 2010), Kenya (2007, 2008), Zimbabwe (2007) or in RDC (2011); identity clientelism having only been exceeded in certain rare cases (Ghana, Senegal, Kenya, in 2013).
The election of a gerontocrat or autocrat Robert Mugabe also presents a challenge to African youth. Certainly, his populism and the fight against British mining interests are still of a certain echo. But his role in the fight against Apartheid is henceforth a thing of the past. Young Zimbabweans today are subjected to the effects of the country’s agrarian reform which – in giving land to war veterans – has ruined their agriculture. This is why they are submitted to a regime controlled by the army. Still, African youth – time bomb or change factor – now intend to participate in the political, social and economic life of the continent. However, demographic majority, the youth remain the social and political minority. A consequence of their lack of perspective, they often waver between resignation and contestation; showing that they are listening to all types of extremists (oppositions to imams and Sunnite brotherhoods, Shiism in Senegal or in Nigeria, evangelical churches).
Mugabe’s victory also underscores the failure of the UA in the domain of peace and security. Of course, this organization recommended an African intervention force against Boko Haram, which continues to commit crimes against humanity. To do this, it sweeps aside the reluctance of Nigeria worried about its national sovereignty. On the other hand, its declaration of intent simply accompanies regional initiatives of countries neighboring Lake Chad, members of The Lake Chad Basin Commission and the logistical support of France or the United States. Finally, it has a serious lack of financing and of consensus, with only 40% of its budget coming from member contributions.
Beyond rhetoric, the AU must develop the principles it has proclaimed in matters of democracy, governance and intervention. But this implies financing by member states, notably those that – mining or oil countries – have significant financial resources. Transfers of sovereignty and production of public goods on a regional scale could be the answer to the overflow of sovereignties in a transnational context. In the same way, regional economic integration could help to counter the economic dependence of state actors. However, a process such as this assumes strong, democratic states that are capable of avoiding territorial fragmentation; a public power that would be based on a civil society equipped with counterpowers and recognizing the rights of minorities. Still, the election of Mugabe radically contradicts this orientation.
References
Nougarel Fou, Briga LMI, L’architecture de paix et de sécurité en Afrique : bilan et perspectives, Actes colloques, Bordeaux, Ouagadougou, Nov. 2012-Oct. 2013.
Philippe Hugon, Géopolitique de l’Afrique, 3e ed., Paris, SEDES 2013.
Romuald Likibi, La charte africaine pour la démocratie, les élections et la gouvernance, Paris, Publibook 2012.
Dec 30, 2014 | Cultural industries, Passage au crible (English), Publications (English), Security
By Alexandre Bohas
Translation: Lawrence Myers
Passage au crible n° 123
Source: Wikimedia
Sony, which just filmed and produced The Interview, was recently threatened by terrorist attacks. The film derides the North Korean regime and ends with the assassination of the current president, Kim Jon-un. Previously, the firm’s IT system had undergone attacks and confidential information that it possesses was compromised. For now, it has stopped the distribution of the production.
Sony studios – known by the name Columbia TriStar before being bought by the Japanese firm – produced a satiric comedy on the North Korean regime in 2014, produced by Seth Rogen and Evan Goldberg. This full-length feature film tells the story of two reporters who, after having obtained an interview with the current dictator, receive orders to assassinate him. Originally set for release next fall, it was censured by North Korea, which threatened to take “merciless” actions against the United States.
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
In November, Sony Pictures Entertainment’s computer systems were hacked by self-proclaimed hackers, The Guardians of Peace. Yet, according to the FBI, the aforementioned group liaised with North Korea. This incursion led to revelations concerning the upcoming productions of the major film studio, the salaries of its top leaders as well as the contents of their Internet communication. This group otherwise threatened terrorist attacks on cinemas where the film would be shown. Following these warnings, which sparked the cancellation of its release in many film operating companies, the studio itself suspended the release and opted for a limited online launch. This decision was then received negatively by numerous critics, including President Barack Obama.
Theoretical framework
1. The coming of a post-international era. Crossed by contradictory trends of integration and fragmentation, the world has left the inter-state era consecrated by the Treaties of Westphalia, signed in 1648. Henceforth, it is characterized by multiple actors, identities superposed and loyalties fragmented. We must also consider the world broadly, in the same way that James Rosenau, Yale Ferguson and Richard Mansbach did, by using the concepts of polities and spaces of power.
2. A political economy of culture. Based on the inseparability of the cultural and social spheres, this new area of research contributes to the enrichment of the analysis of international relations because it integrates the semiotic and ideological aspects of transnational phenomena. According to this approach, collective representations reflect the society in which they are observed, all the while taking part in its creation. In this way, the analysis of culture implies an understanding of the different processes of massive diffusion and symbolic appropriation, which form an essential issue for every actor on the world stage.
Analysis
Governed with an iron fist and in a practically autarkic manner, North Korea may fear, despite its mastery of the means of broadcasting and telecommunication, that this satiric comedy might create internal disorder. Besides that, if the film is an international success, it will help to shape the collective representations of many countries beyond the United States, notably by conveying an exaggerated and devaluing image of the country. It is noteworthy that otherwise, its regime has also used cinema as a means of propaganda and diffusion of ideas. In this respect, we can recall that Kim Jong-il, the current leader’s father, had initiated large-scale film productions – like Souls Protest (2000) -, which experienced limited success outside the country’s borders.
Today the digital era highlights and exacerbates these already existing conflicts. Like the leaderless and non-state network Anonymous, states, whether they be authoritarian or democratic, experience or practice cyberattacks, sometimes taking recourse in the services of professional hackers. North Korea allegedly has an elite unit of 3,000 experts in the matter. In this case, these interventions can target private organizations, – large newspapers – but also intranet servers belonging to administrations, like that of the Department of State, thus harming the targeted entity in multiple ways. It can then become a question of paralyzing its activity, ruining its reputation and/or accessing its secret documents, in order to penalize it economically, symbolically and politically.
In Sony’s case, in addition to the shortfall in earnings of the film The Interview, produced but not marketed in theaters, confidential data as well as email exchanges between top company officials have been rendered public by these operations. Yet, via the correspondence between them, these executives give proof of their character, which alternates between racist, unscrupulous and scornful. In addition, this attack came while Sony had just overcome a massive hacking of its PlayStation network. Clearly, we are far from traditional, inter-state conflicts that oppose two armies on a battlefield, and on which Realist theorists concentrate their analyses.
Quite the contrary, we are witnessing a confrontation which sets a major Hollywood film studio – operating on the world scale and supported by Washington – against a criminal group suspected of being supported by North Korea. In this asymmetrical shock, one of the largest companies in global cinema goes against the opinion of the government of its country by effectively submitting to the blackmail of unknown activists, exploiting individuals’ fears over possible terrorist attacks, which supposedly would be committed in movie theaters. We are witnessing disorder, “turbulence” – in the words of Rosenau – during which a few individuals succeed in destabilizing an American giant with an annual turnover of 8 billion dollars. This demonstrates that from now on, international relations have lost their inter-state character.
References
Best Jacqueline and Paterson Matthew (eds.), Cultural Political Economy, London, Routledge, 2010.
Ferguson Yale, Mansbach Richard, A World of Polities. Essays on Global Politics, Abingdon: Routledge, 2008.
Rosenau James N., Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1990.
Sum Ngai-Lim, Jessop Bob, Towards A Cultural Political Economy. Putting Culture in its Place in Political Economy, Cheltenham, E. Elgar Publishing, 2013.
Dec 23, 2014 | Constructivism, Defense, Europe (English), Human rights, Passage au crible (English)
By Thomas Lindemann
Translation: Lawrence Myers
Passage au crible n° 122
Source: Wikimedia
The drastic fall of the Russian ruble, the plunge of energy revenues, the freeze of leaders’ assets held abroad: Russia has already paid a heavy price for the annexation of Crimea. Western countries have decided to impose various sanctions – military (embargoes on imported and exported weapons from or bound for Russia), economic (for example the impossibility for European citizens to buy or sell Russian stocks), technological or energy-related. Besides that, European states forbid their companies to make new investments in transportation and telecommunications infrastructure and in the energy sector in Crimea and in Sevastopol. The EU has also decided to block the assets of several Russian businessmen in close contact with President Putin. Finally, Russia seems more and more politically isolated. During the 9th G20 Summit in Brisbane, Australia, on November 15-16, 2014, President Putin received a cool welcome from his Australian host. Prior to that, Russia had been excluded from the G8 initially planned for June in Sochi and ultimately replaced by a G7 in Brussels. In these conditions, why has Russia annexed Crimea and why has it supported separatists in eastern Ukraine, despite the high economic and political costs?
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
The crisis between Russia and Ukraine might be understood in four major sequences. The first radicalization of Russia where recourse to armed forces against Ukraine did not seem to be excluded occurred after the bloody repression of protesters in Maidan Nezalezhnosti (“Independence Square”, in Ukrainian) in Kiev and the removal of President Yanukovych by Parliament on the night of February 21-22, 2014. At that time, dissenters rose up against the Ukrainian government’s decision not to sign the Ukraine-European Union Association Agreement. A new government, led by Oleksandr Turchynov then Aresniy Yatsenyuk, declared itself in favor of association with the EU strongly criticized by Russia. The latter then qualified the new government as illegitimate and accorded the right of asylum to the former president all the while brandishing the danger of a new anti-Russian fascism. A second moment of radicalization occurred on February 27, when – to “test its ability to act” – Moscow took military measures with its land army in zones bordering Ukraine. On February 28, armed men took control of the airport in Simferopol. Consequently, a large number of observers suspect Russia of supporting the eastern Ukrainian separatists, especially since a part of the East is not recognized by the new government. Moreover, the ban of the Russian language in 13 of 27 regions in Ukraine does not ease the adherence of the eastern portion of the country to the new institutions. A third stage occurred in the month of March when Crimea, which has a large Russian-speaking population, declared its independence and its re-attachment to Russia. The latter accepted the proclamation despite threats of heavy economic sanctions. Finally, a fourth sequence is still playing out, which is characterized by Russia’s military support of separatists, an assistance which does not exclude recourse to armed forces. During his New Year’s speech, President Putin, all the while placing the responsibility of the situation on Europe’s shoulders, warned his fellow citizens that difficult economic times were ahead.
Theoretical framework
1. Universalist approaches. from appeasement to sanctions. In order to understand the development of Russian policy in light of Ukrainian and western policy, there are three major theoretical orientations, which each have two sub-variants – threat of punishment or promise of reward. 1) Deterrence (offensive realism), 2) reassuring appeasement (defensive realism), 3) sanctions and/or economic rewards (liberalism) or else sanctions or symbolic reward (for example the exclusion of Russia from the G8).
2. Contextual analysis. But we will take a different path, more concerned with the target’s social properties. This contextual process proves to be attentive to the type of legitimacy demanded by the leaders of a political community. Indeed, if they want to maintain their power, decision-makers must first consider the way in which exterior political decisions affect their symbolic capital domestically. According to our thesis – inspired by Weber – the Russian government is currently demanding a charismatic legitimacy to protect Russian minorities and Orthodox Slavs as well as a masculine identity which emphasizes the display of physical strength and contempt of death. Thus, we can better illuminate the failure of western sanctions and the Russian government’s symbolic need to help its brothers.
Analysis
By following the sequences of radicalization of Russian politics, we see that it is first of all reacting to significant challenges that we can qualify as symbolic vulnerabilities in terms of image and self-esteem. The new government’s western anchor and the ban of the Russian language precede the early stages of radicalization. The Russian fear of a Ukrainian association with the EU, or even with NATO, should otherwise be kept in mind. We must also not underestimate the appeals to Russian brothers in Crimea and in eastern Ukraine which are not necessarily inspired by President Putin. Concerning economic and diplomatic sanctions against Russia, it is difficult to affirm that they have aggravated the crisis, but in any case, they have not been favorable to negotiations. Hence, a time-linked logic reveals that Ukrainian and western policies appear to be symbolically costly for the image of the country that Russian leaders intend to project into the world and into their own territory. The motivations of Russian leaders illustrate the burden of symbolic considerations in the decision to support the Russians of Ukraine. The Russian president, friend of motorcyclists and black belt in judo, has always presented himself to be masculine, showing himself bare-chested, even with a tiger, and often in uniform. He is relentless in his affirmation that Russia will remain a great power and that his country will continue to possess – unlike westerners – the qualities of self-denial and sacrifice. Yet, this rhetoric still seems just as popular in Russia, and the president maintains an equally high level of approval amongst public opinion.
Putin’s story of heroism and protection remains incompatible with political concessions under economic pressure, which might risk making him appear cowardly. Yet, western leaders certainly do not ignore these symbolic constraints. Like Putin, they must also be attentive to their legitimacy, which for their part is based on democratic values and the respect of Human Rights. Every exterior decision by policymakers seems to be playing also a role on the domestic scene so that the state’s actions will be congruent with its claimed role.
References
Jego Marie, “Poutine, le mâle absolu”, www.lemonde.fr, January 24, 2014.
Lindemann Thomas, Causes of War. The Struggle for Recognition, ECPR, Colchester, 2011.
Tsygankov Andrei P., Russia and the West from Alexander to Putin. Honor in International Relations, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2014.
Dec 17, 2014 | China, Human rights, Passage au crible (English)
By Justin Chiu
Translation: Lawrence Myers
Passage au crible n°121
Source: Wikipedia
On August 31, 2014, China’s National People’s Congress (NPC) adopted a restrictive plan designed to impede the election of an executive leader of Hong Kong in 2017. At the end of September, this decision sparked a significant mobilization of civil disobedience, henceforth called the umbrella revolution. Mostly students, the protestors demanded the organization of an election with universal suffrage, free and pluralistic, in order to choose the primary leader of the Hong Kong administration. However, the territory’s authorities – and especially those in Beijing – demonstrated their firmness by not ceding to any demand. Ultimately, law enforcement evacuated the occupied sites in mid-December.
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
Democracy has only existed for a short time in Hong Kong. During the colonial era, between 1841 and 1997, Hong Kong’s governors were directly designated by the British monarchy. Chosen from the diplomatic corps, with the exception of the last governor, Chris Patten, former minister of the conservative party. In the 1980s, the principle of an election was gradually introduced in the cantons in the form of a District Council. In 1991, the first ever a direct vote was organized. Its aim was to elect eighteen of the sixty members of the legislative Council.
Signed by the Prime Ministers Margaret Thatcher and Zhao Ziyang, the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984 provided for the retrocession of Hong Kong to China in 1997. It otherwise guaranteed the territory’s political autonomy with the famous principle of one country, two systems. However, the Hong Kong Basic Law adopted in 1990 by the NPC now serves as the territory’s constitution. According to this document, “the permanent residents of Hong Kong have the right to vote and to present themselves for elections” (Article 25). Besides that, it was decided upon that “the head of state [would be] chosen by universal suffrage, after approval of the candidates by a broadly representative nominating committee, in accordance with democratic procedures” (Article 45)
Since 1997, three heads of state have come one after the other over four terms. An electoral committee designated each figure. Leung Chun-Ying, the current head of state, earned a score of 57.8% (689/1193) in 2012. In reality, this result remains very mediocre considering that the electoral committee was composed of pro-Beijing delegates who were obliged to limit themselves to ratifying the choice of an already nominated candidate.
At the end of December 2007, the ANP approved the organization of the election of a Chief Executive of Hong Kong by universal suffrage in 2017. Yet, on August 3, 2014, the ANP tightened the rules for the future election. From now on, two candidates, a maximum of three – would first have to obtain a majority within the election committee that would then become the nominating committee. According to this logic, the CCP will control the election process starting at its earliest stages. Nonetheless, this antidemocratic measure has provoked indignation. Starting at the end of September, the primary roadways in the center of Hong Kong were occupied by students, soon joined by a large part of the population.
Theoretical framework
1. Authority based on a centralized surveillance system. Equipped with a democratic façade, the political structure of China is ruled by the system of nomenklatura, a means of designation borrowed from Bolshevik institutions. This opaque system allows the CCP to force the election of preselected candidates. Otherwise, upper level senior management draws up the list of candidates. Thus the central power in Beijing puts into place a pyramidal system of control on all levels. Yet, wanting to extend its monopoly of political power to Hong Kong, the Chinese authorities enter into conflict with a transnationalized movement of citizen resistance.
2. Citizenship constructed by a transnational network of information. Vector of information and tool of mobilization, social networks have played a decisive role all throughout the demonstration. With Facebook, Twitter and other applications useful for instantaneous sharing, the latest technical innovations appearing in telecommunications contribute to the transformation of social space on a global scale. Indeed, the appearance of these networks of networks allows for the emergence of democratic debates beyond Chinese borders. Benefitting from transnational support, their dynamic lies in the instant willingness of individuals and evolves without a true leader or a developed organization. But, the drawback of this advantage lies in the fact that this spontaneous and hierarchical mobilization remains unstructured and unstable throughout time.
Analysis
Today the world stage is experiencing a succession of popular revolts. Despite diverse socio-political configurations, these movements calling for democracy participate in the emergence of a transnational citizenship made possible by social networks. The demonstrations – in Hong Kong, in Taiwan or in numerous other countries in the Arab world – show, above all else, the tensions between centralized state power and the transnational dynamic of networks of individuals.
These last few years, innovations in telecommunications have transformed the public sphere on at least two major points. 1) By broadcasting and receiving a significant quantity of information and ideas, the capacity of individuals to promote their own views has grown. Brought together, individuals defining themselves as citizens, acquire considerable power to defend the public interest. 2) Social networks reinforce the global interdependence between individuals and communities. The perception of a threat – even if it emanates from the other side of the world -, of the values that we defend, elicits the will to act. Otherwise, the immediate approval by others perceived as being like us, via likes, shares or comments, produces a feeling that legitimizes this desire.
Thus, we are not surprised that following the violent acts perpetrated by law enforcement against Hong Kong students, an international mobilization was quickly organized. On October 1, support rallies were relayed by sixty cities worldwide, each mobilizing hundreds if not thousands of people. In addition, the preoccupations expressed by a large number of western political leaders and the Secretary General of the United Nations, Ban Ki-moon. To such an extent, that the head of Chinese diplomacy, Wang Yi, recalled the principle of non-intervention during his visit to Washington.
However, the mobilization weakened throughout time while the government of Beijing maintained its reform of the election of the Chief Executive of Hong Kong. In other words, the opaque and Leninist system of nomenklatura was established in Hong Kong. Note in this regard that this normalization coincides with the coming to power of the new Chinese leader. From the moment he assumed his role in 2012, Xi Jinping had to first establish his authority in order to then secure a second term. In this case, the number one Chinese leader must continue to establish himself opposite his Prime Minister Li Keqiang, who supports further reforms. As a result, at a time when Xi Jinping is striving to assert his authority, democratic demands must be mastered, or else annihilated.
References
Cabestan Jean-Pierre, « Hong Kong : comprendre la révolution des parapluies», Le Figaro, 10 Oct. 2014, disponible à la page : http://www.lefigaro.fr/vox/monde/2014/10/10/31002-20141010ARTFIG00244-hong-kong-comprendre-la-revolution-des-parapluies.php
Cabestan Jean-Pierre, Le Système politique chinois : Un nouvel équilibre autoritaire, Paris, Presses de Science Po, 2014.
Musso Pierre, Télécommunications et philosophies des réseaux : La Postérité paradoxale de Saint-Simon, Paris ; PUF, 1997.
Rosenau James N., Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1990.
Dec 10, 2014 | Passage au crible (English), Publications (English), Security, Theories of international relations
By Jean-Jacques Roche
Translation: Lawrence Myers
Passage au crible n°120
Source: Wikipedia
One year ago, on December 5, 2013, France launched operation Sangaris1 in the Central African Republic, its 7th since the African nation’s independence in 1960. The French army arrived in Bangui with the mission to remove the militiamen of the Seleka (Muslims) who had taken power and were multiplying the abuses against the anti-balakas (Christians). Another important matter was the preparation of the terrain for an international force that the United Nations had accepted to form on the same day the operation began (the African-led International Support Mission to the Central African Republic or MISCA, French acronym for (Mission internationale de soutien à la Centrafrique sous conduite africaine).
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
Today the specter of the Rwandan genocide has faded. However, 2.5 million Central Africans remain dependent on humanitarian aid. As for the displace persons, they are counted by the hundreds of thousands. At the same time, in Chad, neighboring country to the CAR, other French forces are also deployed within the framework of the Barkhane military presence. This plan furthers Operation Serval put into place in Mali to fight against Islamist terrorists, traffickers and secessionists; their alliance threatens the stability of the entire Sahelian region. All the while objecting to the practices inherited from Françafrique and the role of gendarme of the continent, Paris is justifying its double presence by different considerations: the first intervention allegedly falls within the framework of the R2P (Responsibility to Protect), while the second purportedly complies with cooperation agreements already in place.
Theoretical framework
1. The Responsibility to Protect. Appearing in 2001 following the projects by the ICISS (International Commission of Intervention and State Sovereignty), this concept is a continuation of the former notions of interference, duty and the right to intervene. The semantic progression reflected the maturing process of a project that appeared at the beginning of the 1980s at the meeting point of four phenomena. Firstly, academic research allowed for the convergence of Realist approaches (based on work by Kenneth Waltz then Richard Ullman) and of Scandinavian peace keeping (Johan Galtung) through the idea of “societal security“. United Nations reflections committees (O. Palme, G. Brundtland, W. Brandt…) reclassified it as “global security“, an expression that was then formalized by the Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development in 1987. The third element, diplomacy of Human Rights, which had largely opposed humanitarian law, evolved when by entryism the French doctors steadily became the majority members of the Secretary of State for Human Rights and facilitated the adoption of the first resolutions of the General Assembly on interference (43/131 and 45/100). Finally, the diplomatic positioning of middle powers like Canada in favor of “freedom from fear” (Gareth Evans, Lloyd Axworthy) and Japan favorable to “freedom from need” (Sadako Ogata) substantially contributed to the transformation of the international agenda. The fall of the Berlin Wall, as an emblematic event, served to highlight these four global tendencies that liberal authors interpreted as the coming of a “post-Westphalian world“. By replacing “the billiard balls” – which for Arnold Wolfers symbolized the relations between States likened to Hobbesian gladiators – with John Burton’s cobweb or Norbert Elias’ net, the adherents of this new world thus intended to substitute the Durkheimian solidarity of a civil society, freed from any exclusive citizen allegiance, for the Weberian logic of States. However, considered too radical, interference was quickly replaced by the “right to intervene” (Resolution 770 in 1992), then by the “duty of humanitarian assistance“. The latter qualification seemed to want to abandon the principle by opposing a moral duty (humanitarian assistance) to states’ positive law before the ICISS formalized the conditions of cohabitation between the obligation to assist populations in situations of crisis (“the duty of non-interference stops where the risk of non-assistance begins“, according to François Mitterrand) and the respect of states’ sovereignty. Formalized in 2005 by points 138 and 139 of the final document of the United Nations 60th Anniversary Summit, the concept of R2P was again used in September 2009 by the General Assembly of the United Nations, which by consensus adopted Resolution A/RES/63/308.
2. The conformity of the Realist tradition. As far as they are concerned, Operations Serval and Barkhane led in parallel to the Sangaris intervention are true to the Realist tradition. Their justification falls very clearly within the traditional framework of inter-state relations. The first argument lies in the request for assistance from an allied country and in the right of collective self-defense recognized by Article 5 of the UN Charter. Inasmuch as this support is true to defense agreements concluded by France with a number of its former African colonies; it is not even necessary to resort to a theoretical argument since any lack of interference would have been interpreted as the demonstration of an avoidance strategy and the non-respect of commitments made. At the same time, the historic responsibilities of France with regards to its former colonies explained the recourse to classic rhetoric of “rank” and the defense of “values” by which the French state uses its armed forces both as a “shield” and as a “pavilion“. As such, these distant and expensive intrigues contribute to what John Mearsheimer calls “the fatality of great powers” obliged to intervene in order to justify their status. Finally, the invocation of security risk fits within in the framework of Neorealism that replaced power by security as the keystone of international institutions (C. Glaser, J. Grieco…). The situation of failed states was unanimously considered to be a major source of global insecurity (2013 French White Paper on Defense, European Security Strategy, 2003 and 2008). These interventions can easily be justified by France’s interest in stabilizing grey zones liable to become a direct threat for its own security in the short term.
Analysis
How then do we reconcile these two approaches, theoretically contradictory, but diplomatically comprehensible. We can cite three elements. Firstly, it appears very clear that we are faced with distinct situations that impose different solutions. Just like Canada can pursue different policies based on human security throughout the world and using Realist arguments can defend its maritime rights in the Northwest Passage, France intends to call upon its values and interests in order to undertake operations – more complimentary than really contradictory – in action areas (issues) and zones that do not call for the same responses. Secondly, from now on, the Liberal two-level game is integrated into Realism (Neoclassic) that concedes the influence of interior considerations on exterior practices. Thus, the support of public opinion, necessary for an operation that, like Barkhane, is designed to last, has humanitarian intervention as compensation, like Sangaris in the CAR. Finally, Liberals and Realists have been able to reduce their mutual opposition, insofar as the concept of global security is concerned – of which humanitarian security is a component – and this requires taking the security of each individual into consideration. However, this condition necessary to global security is not sufficient. A new equilibrium between every individual’s natural right to security and the demands of positive law must now be established. Without reference to past practices, this equilibrium must be redefined.
If a problem of coherence persists, it must nonetheless be considered a reverse situation to the extent that the multiplication of humanitarian interventions advocated by Liberals appear henceforth to be a factor of instability, while Realism contents itself with building peace on the balance of threats. By reinventing just war, Liberal causes must from now on be considered as threats to the peace of States, which has however been acquired by forgetfulness (and sacrifice) of civil societies. It is proving to be possible to choose between the lesser of two evils, but it not clear whether peace will result from the convergence of doctrines that consider strength to be vital to peace (Realism); which can be sacrificed when it is a question of offering assistance to populations in a state of emergency (Liberalism). Avoiding the negative effects of this merger may require paying attention to the teachings of critical theory that, via Ken Booth, revise the three major dangers that would allegedly establish for world peace 1) the Cult of Urgency (presentism); 2) transitional justice (culturalism) and 3) alleged scientific neutrality.
References
Booth Ken, « Human Wrongs and International Relations », International Affairs, 71 (1), 1995, pp. 103-126.
Glaser Charles L., « Realist as Optimist. Cooperation as Self help », International Security, 19 (3), Winter 1994-1995, pp. 50-90.
Jeangène-Vilmer Jean-Baptiste, La Guerre au Nom de l’Humanité. Tuer ou Laisser Mourir, Paris, PUF, 2012.
Roche Jean-Jacques, « La Société Civile et la Guerre », in : Josepha Laroche, Yves Poirmeur (Éds.), Gouverner les Violences. Le processus civilisationnel en question, Paris, L’Harmattan, 2013, pp. 231-246.
Ullman Richard, « Redefining Security », International Security, 8 (1), Summer 1983, pp. 129-153.
1 Name of an African butterfly
