Jul 7, 2015 | Communitarianism, cultural diversity, Culture en, English, Passage au crible (English), Security, Terrorism
By Alexandre Bohas
Translation: Lawrence Myers
Passage au crible n° 128
Source: Wikipedia
With the capture of Palmyra by Islamic State troops in Iraq and in the Levant (ISIL or Daesh in Arabic) in May, one of the most prestigious sites of antiquity is now threatened with extinction. This event testifies to ideological motives of this self-proclaimed caliphate against cultural buildings.
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
In recent years, attacks against religious monuments by various groups claiming radical Islam have multiplied. These include the Buddhas of Bamiyan in 2001, which were blown up by dynamite by the Afghani Taliban regime, or the attacks on Muslim mausoleums in Timbuktu in 2012, by rebels fighting against the Malian regime during their occupation of the city. To these events, we add political instability in Egypt and Libya; a situation which favored the pillaging of numerous museums and archaeological sites, both for economic and religious reasons.
Otherwise, civil wars in Iraq and Syria have created the conditions for the long-term establishment of ISIL in certain parts of both countries. Yet, this group allegedly occupies 4,500 archaeological sites. Its supporters attacked Mesopotamian sites, but also Muslim places of worship like the tomb of Jonah in Mosul. In Syria, 90% of destruction focused on Muslim artifacts such as tombs, altars and mosques, the latter dating from the 13th and 14th centuries.
Since the end of February 2015, the sacking perpetrated in the Mosul museum as well as against the Assyrian and Parthian sites of Nimrud and Hatra have been carefully filmed and broadcast on social networks. These devastations have provoked consternation in the West as well as condemnation by UNESCO. For that matter, UNESCO is proving to be incapable of protecting these buildings classified as World Heritage Sites.
Theoretical framework
1. A reaction against the pluralization of the world. Globalization brings about a “pluralization” (Cerny) of modern societies. By promoting flows and transnational movements in cultural and socioeconomic terms, it provokes isolationism and a reaction against that which is other than oneself, emblematic of a “brutalization of the world” (Laroche). In this case, the vandalism of monuments committed by ISIL aims to do away with specificities and syncretism, both past and present, in the name of a purified, extremist and dogmatic Islam.
2. The transnationalisation of a quest for identity. These cultural destructions in Iraq, Libya and Mali are exploited in order to manipulate individuals who are both poorly integrated and disadvantaged. These individuals therefore embrace a fanatic ideology, which gives purpose to their empty existence (Hoffer). Building on a fundamentalist and antimodernist interpretation of Islam, it offers its supporters, from various backgrounds, a simplified vision of the world and also offers them a transnational identity.
Analysis
Far from being spontaneous, these sackings have been carefully calculated and organized. They are justified by the refusal to commit idolatry, forbidden by all monotheist religions. Modeled after the image of the iconoclastic controversy (8th century) and English Puritanism (17th century) in Christianity, ISIL invokes the idolatrous character of all devotion and of each place of worship, current or past, which is not directly addressed to God. In this perspective, only ISIL can be a religious practice. The sacking of Nimrod and Hatra resulted precisely from the outrageous application of this fundamental principal of Islam, which figures on ISIL’s emblem: «لا إله إلا الله » (“There is no god but God”).
ISIL films showing the devastations of Hatra or the Museum of Mosul are the result of an elaborate strategy. Along these lines, analysts have admitted their doubt regarding the authenticity of certain destroyed statues. Plaster copies were allegedly used since the original statues were supposedly sold beforehand in order to finance the war effort. Otherwise, the combatants appearing in ISIL propaganda films were identified by their accents: they allegedly come from Africa, the Indian subcontinent and the Maghreb. In other words, none of them might actually be from Mashriq, the region from Syria to Egypt. Therefore, this video is purportedly intended to recruit Muslims living far from theaters of conflict and who are often marginalized. In this regard, let us recall that Daesh forces are largely made of foreign fighters.
Besides this, it is important to consider the global attraction that ISIL exerts on certain young Muslims. This appeal can be likened to what secular religions were doing in the 1950s as described by Eric Hoffer. Today these groups of fanatic believers find a favorable echo in the extremist Islam that they advocate. All the more so since globalization reinforces their appeal by increasing their audience. The deterritorialization of relationships that characterize the strength of these communalist movements are made possible by new technologies, notably the Internet. But globalization upsets the traditional frameworks that unite cultures and societies. In so doing, it elicits isolationism that often seek to violently reaffirm undermined dogmas. Thus the cultural destructions by ISIL testify to the will to obliterate the diversity of religious, historical and cultural practices characteristic of Mesopotamia.
References
Cerny Philip G., Rethinking World Politics: A Theory of Transnational Pluralism, New York, Oxford University Press, 2010.
Evin Florence, « L’État islamique met en scène la destruction de la cité antique d’Hatra », Le Monde, 4 avril 2015.
Hoffer Eric, The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements, New York, Harber & Brothers, 1951.
Laroche Josepha, La Brutalisation du monde. Du retrait des États à la décivilisation, Montréal, Liber, 2011.
Schama Simon, « Artefacts Under Attack », Financial Times, 13 March 2015.
May 29, 2015 | Africa, China, Diplomacy, Foreign policy, Globalization, International Political Economy, Passage au crible (English)
By Moustafa Benberrah
Translation: Lawrence Myers
Passage au crible n° 127
Source:Wikimedia
On April 16, 2015, the city of Constantine was declared the capital of Arab culture for one calendar year. During this time, Constantine will welcome theatrical plays, festivals, symposiums, exhibitions, etc. A budget of seven billion dinars (700 million dollars) is earmarked for the organization of this event. For the occasion, the Algerian Prime Minister Abdelmalek Sellal has initiated several large projects including a cultural hub comprised of a cultural center, an urban library, a museum and galleries, alongside an art and history museum, an exhibition center and a 3,000-seat performance hall. The auditorium cost 156 million dollars and rights for its construction were given to the CSCEC (China State Construction Engineering Corp.). This cession revived the controversy over the Chinese monopoly in Algeria’s construction (building and public words) industry.
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
In 2013, the PRC (People’s Republic of China) became Algeria’s largest supplier with 6.82 billion dollars of imports (+14.33%), superseding France (6.25 billion dollars), which had held the position until then. The figure reached 8.2 billion dollars in 2014. Furthermore, China is Algeria’s 10th client at 1.8 billion dollars. We note that trade, which is highly unbalanced, grew from 200 million dollars in 2000 to 10 billion dollars in 2014. This change results from the special relationship between the two countries, which began very early with the Bandung Conference held in 1955. This Asian African summit was the setting for the adoption of a resolution recognizing Algeria’s right to self-determination and independence. Moreover, China is the first non-Arab country to have recognized its provisional government (1958) and its independence in 1962. For its part, Algeria has always supported the principle of One-China, which defines Taiwan as an integral part of China. Subsequently, the non-aligned movement has substantially contributed to the political and economic rapprochement of the two nations.
Today, Sino-Algerian relations cover every strategic area including industry, agriculture, arms, infrastructures, etc. Thus, more than 790 large companies remain active in Algeria and more than twenty cooperation agreements have been signed. The latest one concerns a plan of global strategic cooperation for 2014-2018 (286 billion dollars), which boosts economic relations between the two states. This change has resulted in the influx of thousands of Chinese citizens. Today there number is estimated at 40,000 (contracted workers and CEOs accompanied by their families), including 2,000 who have obtained Algerian nationality. While the law requires focusing on local manpower, these entities are primarily hiring Chinese employees. Therefore they are significantly shaping the urban landscape by actively participating in the construction of infrastructures and by introducing an unprecedented migration in a zone that was cut off from the rest of the world during the black decade .
Theoretical framework
1. The appearance of economic diplomacy. Benefiting from the increase in oil prices on the international market, Algeria has put a recovery policy into place. The plan is based on three primary axes: 1) attracting foreign investors, 2) technology transfers and 3) the construction of necessary infrastructures for economic expansion. Consequently, legal tools have been created that would allow citizens to get more involved in projects lead by Chinese firms. However, these companies rarely respect the provisions, and this situation is leading to the development of a socio-economic debate. Ultimately, the Algerian state finds itself exceeded by and sometimes in competition with these transnational actors who are implementing their own economic logic. Oftentimes these policies even contradict the interests of the country.
2. The construction of transnational communities. Catalyst of integration, the migratory phenomenon remains one of the consequences of the globalization of economic exchanges. The work of Alain Tarrius and Michel Péraldi has explained the construction of the figure of the migrant entrepreneur in the post-Fordist context related to the industrial crisis with rising unemployment and immigration control. In Algeria, this development resulted in a redeployment of merchant channels. From that time, migrant workers were organized into transnational networks.
Analysis
Chinese companies are particularly invested in the Algerian construction sector. Since the beginning of the 2000s, the country has initiated a series of large projects funded by the rise in oil revenues. It has therefore become one of the most attractive markets of the sector for these groups, which have earned the contracts for 60 to 80% of public and private projects.
In the autumn of 2005, the head of government, Ahmed Ouyahia, said that henceforth, his country would no longer “appeal to Chinese companies in construction”. However, directing massive projects such as the East-West highway, the Great Mosque of Algiers, the Algiers opera and thousands of public housing buildings, has led to the arrival of a massive wave of Chinese labor liable to meet the requirements of cost as well as time constraints . Many worker camps have been created since the beginning of the project. Chinese boutiques have flourished in business quarters of Algiers and in other cities where Chinese companies – primarily construction – have been set up. This phenomenon is reminiscent of events in the United States in the mid-19th century following the Burlingame Treaty in 1868. Today, Chinese traders are set up in the center of Algiers, but also in other large metropolitan areas such as Constantine and Annaba. They often sell the same type of products at prices so low the reputation that Made in China connotes is forgotten. Still, this sales strategy draws as many clients as it revives the socio-economic dispute. The high unemployment rate and the competition that Algerians have undergone are at the source of numerous incidents. Last year on August 3, violent clashes between Algiers residents and Chinese immigrants erupted in the suburbs of Algiers. Actually, these endemic collisions testify to the high tensions existing between the two communities.
Several legal and cultural arrangements have been put into place to channel these troubles, to facilitate dialogue between the two societies and to help them overcome the ethnocultural divide that separates them. First and foremost, the Chinese groups are legally obliged to hire Algerians. Besides that, several programs geared towards learning Mandarin have been implemented. Consequently, Chinese is taught at the University of Algiers as well as in private schools opening their doors at increasingly fast rates. Otherwise, the Embassy of China in Algiers organizes cultural activities, like the writing contest opened to the public in 2010. Finally, an Algerian-Sino Friendship Association was created and mixed marriages are becoming more common. In other words, these sovereignty free actors compete with state authority and manage to guide Algeria’s public policies, becoming unavoidable interlocutors whose presence must be taken into account.
References
Hammou Samia, « L’immigration Chinoise en Algérie : Le cas des commerçants Chinois à Alger » consulted on 15/05/2015 and available at :
http://jcea2013.sciencesconf.org/conference/jcea2013/pages/Hammou_Samia.pdf
Rosenau James N., Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1990.
Selmane Arslan, « Constantine capitale de la culture arabe 2015 : Les bobards d’une manifestation de A à Z », available at : www.elwatan.com, 26/02/15.
Strange Susan, Le Retrait de l’État. La dispersion du pouvoir dans l’économie mondiale, [1996], trad., Paris, Temps Présent, 2011.
May 19, 2015 | environment, Global Public Goods, Human safety, Passage au crible (English)
By Valérie Le Brenne
Translation: Lawrence Myers
Passage au crible n° 126
Source: Sea Shepherd
On April 6, 2015, the Thunder sank in the waters of São Tomé and Principe. Accused of illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (IUU) and suspected of human trafficking, this vessel flying the Nigerian flag was the subject of a purple notice given by Interpol in 2003. The captain of the Bob Barker – a Sea Shepherd ship launched in pursuit of the poacher more than one hundred days ago – immediately declared that it was a matter of scuttling.
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
Since 2003, Interpol member states have regularly been solicited by the organization within the framework of the notice published regarding the Thunder. More specifically, Australia, Norway and New Zealand asked authorities to communicate all information concerning its “location, its activities, people and networks and those benefitting from their illegal activities” .
Built in Norway in 1969, this ship – more than 61 meters long – was cataloged under six different names between 1986 and 2013: Arctic Ranger, Rubin, Typhoon I, Wuhan Nº4, Kuko and Thunder. Besides that, it simultaneously sailed under more than six flags: the United Kingdom, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Seychelles, Belize, Togo, Nigeria and Mongolia. For the boats implicated in illicit activities, these incessant modifications aim to escape surveillance by the Regional Fisheries Management Organization (RFMO). Accused of illegally fishing the toothfish – a fish that lives in the depths of the Southern Ocean and whose flesh, popular in Asian countries, is sold at extremely elevated prices -, the Thunder is on the list of smugglers reported by the CCAMLR (Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resource).
Anxious to preserve this species, the NGO Sea Shepherd – an organization that intervenes on behalf of the protection of fishery resources – launched Operation Icefish last September. To do this, two boats were armed to track the poachers. For more than one hundred days, the Bob Barker followed the Thunder in order to intercept it. Simultaneously, activists recovered abandoned nets that contained more than seven hundred toothfish and other dead animals.
While the Bob Barker benefitted from food provisions at the end of March, the Thunder found itself short on supplies and fuel. Unable to dock and also limited in its possibilities of transshipment, the captain allegedly decided to sink his own vessel in the hopes of destroying any incriminating evidence. According to a press release from Sea Shepherd, the organization supposedly kept its valves open to speed up the waterway and empty holds.
Theoretical framework
1. Transnational criminality. Inherited from the Roman res communis, freedom of movement and exploration constitute the fundamental rule of the high seas. Outside of territorial waters, ships are only subject to laws of the states where they are registered. However, the transformation of the registration system after World War II, carried out in order to facilitate maritime transport, fostered the emergence of flags of convenience. In so doing, poachers are able to avoid rules imposed by the RFMO. Given the high value of the most vulnerable fish species, they can therefore count of a monopoly rent that guarantees the sustainability of their criminal activities.
2. The appearance of a sovereignty-free authority. The lack of a means of coercion is prompting some sovereignty-free actors to develop their own means of control. Thus, we are witnessing a growing convergence between international organizations and private actors to fight against illegal fishing.
Analysis
In 1982, the signing of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in Montego Bay marked a major turning point in maritime jurisdiction. By codifying customary practices, the text notably instituted the EEZ (exclusive economic zone) principle, which accords sovereignty over an area of two hundred thousand nautical miles to any state claiming it. The convention also created the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, which is responsible for judging litigation resulting from the delimitation of these areas.
However, the negotiations between maritime powers and new coastal states have not resulted in the creation of a clear status for the high seas. Contrary to the seabed, which no state is authorized to claim ownership over, the overlying waters remain free from traffic and exploitation. Only the RFMO intervenes in the management of fishery resources. But while they establish quotas and adopt technical measures, these international organizations have inadequate means for surveillance and control.
In a context marked by the intensification of global captures, this system has hardly been sufficient to curb illegal practices. Moreover, the rarefication of several species contributes to increase of their value, particularly in illegal networks. The breadth of risks reducing de facto the number of actors liable to engage in this type of poaching, the smugglers benefit from a monopoly rent, which makes this trade very lucrative.
During the 1990s, the increase in IUU captures of toothfish led the CCAMLR to adopt a series of binding measures for fleets fishing in its waters. Six times greater than the authorized volume, these catches seriously endangered stocks, all the while affecting the activity of fishermen respectful of regulations. If the establishment of TAC (Total Allowable Catches) and the obligation to take an observer on board have reduced this phenomenon, multiple pirate ships continue to withdraw from these vulnerable ecosystems. As they sail under several flags and do not respect the rules in matters of satellite signalization, the latter are completely outside the control of the concerned authorities. Moreover, they carry out their campaigns in several regions of the ocean, making operations to apprehend them particularly complex.
In these conditions, many NGOs acting in favor of the preservation of marine resources are involved in the fight against illegal fishing. Like the methods used by Greenpeace, Sea Shepherd developed a repertoire of spectacular action, which consists of tracking ships in order to prevent them from casting their nets. Although some of these actions remain questionable – the founder of Sea Shepherd, Paul Watson, remains within the scope of an international Interpol arrest warrant at the request of Costa Rica -, their impact is involved in the building of a legitimate capital. Within the framework of its program Scale, Interpol has for example partnered with the American foundation the PEW Research Center in preparation for the fight against this transnational criminality. Thus, we are currently witnessing a process of convergence of expertise between private stakeholders and international organizations.
References
OCDE, Pourquoi la pêche pirate perdure. Les ressorts économiques de la pêche illégale, non déclarée et non réglementée, Paris, OCDE, 2006.
Revue internationale et stratégique (Éd.), Mers et océans, 95 (3), 2014, 206 p.
Strange Susan, Le Retrait de l’État. La dispersion du pouvoir dans l’économie mondiale, [1996], trad., Paris, Temps Présent, 2011.
Apr 16, 2015 | Diplomacy, Foreign policy, Théorie En Marche
Author of nearly 30 books in French and English and sometimes translated into other languages (Mandarin, Spanish, etc.), Charles-Philippe David, has published noteworthy books on peace, war, strategy, security questions and American politics. In this publication dedicated to the world’s leading power, he offers the keys to understanding US foreign policy since 1945. Thus the country’s apparently contradictory, even unusual decisions – notably in regards to intervention – take on their full meaning. The book otherwise analyzes the crises that the superpower has gone through (Indochina, Cuba, etc.). It also decodes the secrets of the White House, its advisors, its experts, the United States National Security Council and its rival administrations. Besides these topics, readers will find valuable data concerning Kissinger’s supremacy and the decisional balance sheet of President Obama and his team. This stock of knowledge on the American intelligence system is therefore indispensable.
Charles Philippe David, Au sein de la Maison-Blanche, De Truman à Obama, la formulation (imprévisible) de la politique étrangère des Etats-Unis, fully revised and expanded 3rd edition, Paris, Presses de Sc. Po, 2015, 1182 pages, including 144 pages of references, an index of names and 14 tables as well as appendices.
Mar 15, 2015 | European Union, Global Public Goods, Human rights, International migrations, North-South, Passage au crible (English)
By Catherine Wihtol de Wenden
Translation: Lawrence Myers
Passage au crible n° 125
Source: Wikipedia
The end of 2014 and the beginning of 2015 were the setting for new migratory catastrophes in the Mediterranean. In the South of the peninsula, the Italian coast guard intercepted two cargo ships, abandoned by the smugglers who had chartered them. Yet, nearly 500 asylum seekers from Syria and Iraq were aboard each one. Their numbers are added to the 230,000 migrants who entered Europe via the Mediterranean in one year. More recently, in February 2015, the disappearance of more than 300 people and the deaths of 29 others off the coast of Libya recalled the fact that nothing had changed since 2013. Finally, at the beginning of March, Libya threatened to send cargo ships filled with immigrants to Italy if the southern European country continued with its plans of military intervention against the Islamic state. This data coincides with the end of the Mare Nostrum framework, implemented by Italy in November 2013 and November 2014. Intended to bring aid to migrants who had shipwrecked in the Mediterranean, the Frontex initiative Triton replaced this operation at the end of 2014.
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
A land of confrontations and dialogues between the two shores, the Mediterranean has been at the crossroads of new migratory turbulence since the 1990s. These measures call into question the European migratory policy implemented since then. The first irregular influxes, which caught the attention of public opinion, concerned the arrival of Albanese passengers on cargo ships, attempting to reach the coast of Italy in 1991, following the fall of the Berlin Wall. Other structures loaded down with Iraqi asylum seekers followed them after the first and the second Gulf War. In this instance, it was a question mixed flows. In other words, the refugees were also seeking work. They therefore found themselves piled up on large boats, often chartered by people smugglers, since access to Europe had been restricted by the Schengen visa system since 1986.
Then, clandestine arrivals began to look more and more like small mafia businesses. They mainly involved youth moving between Morocco and Gibraltar, Senegal and the Canary Islands and especially between Libya, Tunisia and the Island of Lampedusa, located 130 km from the Tunisian coast and 200 km from Sicily. Other passageways – like Malta and Cyprus – resulted in the mixing of tourists, asylum seekers and undocumented immigrants looking for work. In addition, these movements also marked other areas. Refugees from the Middle East traveled heavily along the border of the Evros River between Turkey and Greece, and in the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla in Morocco. Bilateral agreements established between Senegal, Morocco and Spanish lessened the number of crossings by way of Gibraltar and the Canary Islands. But passage via Lampedusa was worsened by the fact that Libya, which until then had closed the borders of its territory by the agreements it had made with Italy and France, no longer controlled the flows of people on its territory. As a result, up to one million migrants could arrive from Libya on the Italian coast, declared the director of the Agency Frontex in March 2015. As for the eastern Mediterranean, it is beset by arrivals of Syrian migrants: in Turkey (1.5 million), in Jordan (800,000) and in Lebanon (1.5 million). Faced with this situation, upon each shipwreck and arrival from “harragas” (“border roasters” between the Maghreb and Europe) or families of refugees, European responses were limited to reaffirming the allowance of means to the Agency Frontex, destined to assume the “sharing of the burden”.
Theoretical framework
1. The migration gap. Phillip Martin and James Hollifield have analyzed this question related to the United States and the paradox of the liberal turned safe state. Concerning the European-Mediterranean region, on the one hand, one must consider the distance forming between the convergent analyses done by experts favorable to mobility as an essential factor of human development in the region. On the other hand, European policies driven especially under pressure from nation states plagued by the rise of the extreme right and a safe approach to immigration. But this policy carries an elevated human, financial and diplomatic cost. It especially goes against Europe’s economic and demographic needs that demand a rational choice of voluntary entry and the respect of human rights for forced immigration (refugees) and guaranteed by law (reunited families, unaccompanied minors).
2. Border control methods and their competitive bidding. The first one, the European mechanism results from a piling up of models implemented since the establishment of the Schengen system in 1985. The flows especially affect southern European countries faced with indifference and the default to solidarity of northern countries. This differential leads to separation between European countries concerning the way in which southern European countries handle those who have arrived illegally, leaving them alone in the face of skyrocketing entries, while the majority of illegal immigrants have entered legally and have prolonged their stay. The second system of control, marked by the seizure of sovereign autonomy with respect to the European rigidity, consists of signing bilateral agreements with countries on the South bank of the Mediterranean. For example, European countries have established more than 300 readmission agreements in the world in 2015 alone. For its part, France has confirmed fifteen of them, just like Italy and Spain. These texts ratify the promises made by countries on the South shore – themselves often having become countries of immigration and transit – to take back or to send back migrants who have crossed these countries en route to Sub-Saharan destinations, in exchange for residence for those who are more qualified and for development policies. Aware that they could act as gatekeepers for their European neighbors, certain countries like Libya under Gaddafi had created a migration diplomacy. However, the Libyan crisis and the Syrian drama wreaked havoc on this model, provoking 4 million refugees to flee Syria, a record in the region, only exceeded by Palestinians and Afghans.
Analysis
Among Mediterranean countries, Italy remains the country that has taken the most determined action against the tragedy, which has transformed the Mediterranean into a vast cemetery, and thus a key issue for world security. Europe’s border passing between the two shores of the Mediterranean, this sea, a “middle land”, has always been a place of passage. But due to lack of visas, today crossing it has become highly dangerous for a large number of people. It also represents an active zone where criminal networks exploit the hopelessness of the young, prey to mass joblessness and the absence of a future on the South shore. This situation is proving to be more preoccupying as the public struggles to distinguish immigration from terrorism. Without counting the fact that they hardly deviate from a national or territorialized approach of border control.
The bulk of immigration results from crises that destabilize the region; for example, Syrians and Eritreans make up half of the arrivals to Italy where the Mare Nostrum saved 170,000 people. However, with Triton, saving lives is no longer considered a priority. That is to say that Europe is unable to adopt a common policy. However, its responsibility in the deaths is clearly in contradiction with both its humanitarian approach vis-à-vis countries in the South and its declarations in matters of respect for human rights. How can it otherwise seek to meddle in international competition if it barricades itself within a fortress inhabited by an ageing population? How can it make an impact on the world stage if it refuses to consider migrations as a diplomatic priority?
References
Wihtol de Wenden Catherine, Faut-il ouvrir les frontières ? Paris, Presses de Sciences-Po, 2014.
Wihtol de Wenden Catherine, Pour accompagner les migrations en Méditerranée, Paris, L’Harmattan, 2013.
