Feb 26, 2010 | European Union, Foreign policy, Passage au crible (English)
By Elsa Tulmets
Passage au crible n°16
After the failure of the Copenhagen climate conference in December 2009, the new president of the European Council, Herman Van Rompuy, summoned the representatives of the member states of the EU (European Union) to a special summit on 11th February 2010, a summit devoted to boosting the economy. This was the first publicized event of an EU now governed by the Lisbon Treaty. However, despite some innovations, foreign policy did not attract attention. Hardly has it been enshrined in treaties than EU foreign policy seems destined to remain in the background.
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
Since the end of the Cold War, the EU has constantly had to redefine its role in a multi-polar world in which it shows itself to be incapable of responding to crises, including those in its immediate vicinity (the Balkans). In 2002, the European Convention, which was to simplify the treaties and bestow upon it the status of subject of international law, proposed advances concerning foreign policy. After the rejection of the constitutional treaty in 2005, a redrafted version – adopted in Lisbon, on 23rd December 2007 – finally came into force on 1st December 2009. However, this first European summit completely occulted international issues by choosing to focus on aid for Greece and the plan for boosting the economy for growth and employment – Europe 2010.
Theoretical framework
The act affirming a new authority – that of the President of the EU – implicitly reveals the weaknesses of EU soft power and the limits of its spill over.
1. Soft power. When he created this concept, Joseph Nye meant to characterize the power of attraction which the United States had abroad. With this term, he also wanted to designate their ability to influence their partners through means other than coercion. Based on the economy and social and cultural resources, it is defined in opposition to hard power which is military in nature.
For its part, to a great extent, the EU uses the projection of its more integrated policies (internal market) and the attraction exerted by the euro zone in order to impose itself on the international scene. The very term, soft power, has recently been used in EU political speeches to legitimize the strategy of expansion in the East. In this particular case, the ongoing negotiations for membership reiterate this approach which, moreover, has been adapted to the ENP (European Neighbourhood Policy) that, since 2004, has been intended for the countries South and East of the enlarged EU.
2. Spill over. This expression was conceptualized by David Mitrany and taken up by the theoreticians of European integration. It refers to the close cooperation existing in apparently non political sectors of shared interest, such as agriculture or transport. Then, secondly, it conveys the process of diffusion towards more openly political areas. Following this logic, the creation of a single currency – the euro – represents the states renouncing one of their exclusive prerogatives, the archetypal symbol of their sovereignty. The spill over of one sector into another also leads to better integration in the area of foreign policy. For example, the common trade policy was created through the integration of the domestic market. As for the means mobilized for the prevention of crises, they come, in part, from the Schengen zone. Certainly, the European summit of 11th February 2010 illustrated the close ties between the various actions of the EU; however, it also revealed a lack of coherence.

Analysis
1. Protecting European soft power. In a period of crisis, the EU intends to preserve its international credibility and protect the essentials of its soft power, by exploiting its economic and institutional assets. The Lisbon Treaty provided the EU with a telephone number, taking up the famous challenge of the former American Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger. By virtue of this same treaty, the president of the European Council – Herman Van Rompuy, the holder of this new post, created in addition to the revolving presidency – was able to organize this summit: “If international developments so require, the President of the European Council shall convene an extraordinary meeting of the European Council in order to define the strategic lines of the Union’s policy in the face of such developments.” (art. 26 of the consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union). However, although this agreement has endowed the EU with certain essential functions, for all that, it does not make provision for a functional distribution capable of improving its visibility. In this respect, the new president must come to terms with the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy – post occupied by Catherine Ashton, who is highly criticized abroad – whereas the diplomatic service, which has just been instituted, represents a structure which is not yet fully operational. Moreover, the heads of state and government retain significant power since “The European Council shall identify the Union’s strategic interests, determine the objectives of and define general guidelines for the common foreign and security policy” (art. 26).
The financial crisis, a global crisis since 2008, has otherwise revealed the flaws of EU economic soft power. The priority given to the euro zone and the labour market thus express the inability of the European states by themselves to confront the forces of a non regulated global market. If, however, the euro zone weakens, a negative spill over might destabilize the internal market and the capability of the EU for external action. Consequently, the EU must confront the challenges of its internal functioning before being able to express itself as a single actor.
2. France and Germany, the motor of European spill over no more. For a long time during the process of European construction, the Franco-German tandem provided the ultimate means of elaborating a political consensus. Nevertheless, the summit of 11th February underlined the fact that these two founding countries were no longer able to create European compromise. In the areas of growth and employment, for instance, the measures to be implemented did not obtain unanimous support from the twenty-seven member countries. Likewise, although France and Germany called for the creation of an economic government of the EU, the idea was not retained. Finally, the importance both countries gave to external action had little effect upon the European agenda.
From now on, Franco-German cooperation can be seen to be powerless to stimulate political integration in order to affirm the EU on the international scene. Undoubtedly, this arises from the dividing lines which have changed since the end of the Cold War and the expansion of the EU to the East. These lines have indeed moved and settled, not on the division between “old” and “new” Europe – as some American conservatives claim – but on political divisions. Today, one can note that to the dissensions about the institutional mechanism of European construction – the inter-state or federal dimension – one can also add profound disagreements on the relationships to be established between the economic and political areas.
References
Laïdi Zaki, La Norme sans la force: l’énigme de la puissance européenne, Paris, Presses de Sciences Po, 2005.
Mitrany David, A Working Peace System, London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1943.
Nye Joseph, “Soft Power and American Foreign Policy”, Political Science Quarterly, 119 (2), 2004, pp. 255-270.
Tulmets Elsa, “A ‘Soft Power’ with Civilian Means: Can the EU Bridge its Capability-Expectations Gap in the ENP?”, in : Delcour Laure, Tulmets Elsa (Eds.), Pioneer Europe? Testing European Foreign Policy in the Neighbourhood, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2008, pp. 133-158.
Feb 18, 2010 | Climate change, environment, Multilaterism, Passage au crible (English)
By Simon Uzenat
Passage au crible n°15
Organised under the aegis of the UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change), the aim of the negotiations was to reach a legally binding agreement at the 15th CP (Conference of the Parties), held at Copenhagen from 7th to 19th December 2009. The objective was to prolong and intensify the efforts programmed at Kyoto, which reach their term on 31st December 2012, and to thus establish the future multilateral regime of climate regulation.
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
In December 1997, at Kyoto, the delegates of the 3rd CP agreed upon a protocol, which formally came into force in 2005, and which committed the industrialized countries, mentioned in Annex 1, to reducing, by 2012, their global emissions of GHG by an average of 5.2%, below their 1990 levels. Furthermore, this agreement organized an international system of verification and provided for the institution of sanction mechanisms. Moreover, the discussions held at the Bali conference of December 2007 (CP 13) lead to the adoption of the BAP (Bali Action Plan) as well as a biennial process – the Bali Roadmap – which set a deadline for the end of negotiations during CP15 at Copenhagen.
In this respect, the direction pursued followed a super-national approach, marked by the strength of transnational expertise (IPCC), the legitimacy of the UNO system and European unity; to such an extent that the Clinton administration signed the Kyoto protocol without, for as much, obtaining ratification by Congress. Today, this treaty counts 189 signatories; and although the United States today recognizes the effects of GHG on climate and health, it still refuses the Kyoto logic which demands a global objective shared between the countries in proportion to their past and present responsibilities. As for the emerging countries, in the forefront of which are Brazil, China and India, and the LDC (Less Developed Countries), they intend, above all, to uphold their right to development. To achieve this, they have no hesitation in using international organizations to correct economic, social and territorial disparities between the industrialized and developing countries. Therefore, the Copenhagen agreement mainly appears to be the product of these power struggles and registers the pursuit of a global redistribution of political authority.
Theoretical framework
The conclusion of this agreement and the commitment made by the states on 31st January 2010 echo two closely linked concepts.
1. Multilateralism. Far from being limited to the description of a new inter-state configuration, this designates the emergence of a new global governance which is fragmented and hybrid. This associates private and public sector actors, states and civil societies, superimposes micro and macro, and remains the focus of research into and discourse on a so-called democratization of international relations. However, it turns out that this process includes several equivocal processes and thus involves extremely heterogeneous visions of the world. Multilateralism can thus be better apprehended as an ideological and operational resource at the disposal of international actors.
2. Global Public Goods. Before they represented a major stake in international relations, global public goods seemed to be the original product of a social construction which drew its meaning from an integrated, even sacralized, vision of development, in both space and time. In this respect, transnationalized expertise and knowledge would constitute both a condition of possibility and the privileged tools of evaluation of an objective approach. Nevertheless, this contemporary rationality sometimes enters into violent conflict with the historical frameworks of closely circumscribed public and private sovereignties.
Analysis
A large number of observers consider that the Copenhagen summit only lead to a minimalist agreement which sacrifices the general interests of Humanity. Indeed, it brutally breaks away from the spirit of Kyoto. Admittedly, it conforms to the 7th principle of the Rio Declaration (1991) relating to the “shared and differentiated responsibilities” of states, but it goes no further than to register the IPCC proposition to limit temperature increase to 2°C. Otherwise, it provides for no international verification procedures and no sanctions. Furthermore, it must be noted that, in December 2009, no country formally signed it and the plenary assembly of the UNFCCC merely took note of it.
However, one should go beyond these normative approaches in order to better identify the organizing principles and the lines of force of global governance – of the environment, in particular – which is still very largely in the making. Generally, the Copenhagen Agreement, which was reached 16 months after the fall of Lehmann Brothers, indicates an important stage in the redefinition of the public and private spheres. Instead of stigmatizing state-national individualism, it would be more fitting to analyze how the economic and financial crisis – as well as the new relationships formed between international organizations, banking systems and governments – has accelerated the hybridization of governance frameworks and contributed to the increased heterogeneity of the interests of more and more numerous and competent actors. In so doing, the negotiation strategies of states express visions of the world which are more specific and, consequently, more difficult to reconcile. Finally, the lack of transparency during the Copenhagen negotiations – developing countries were excluded, while NGOs could not access the conference centre – largely contributed to making all positions more rigid and the more ambitious ones more fragile.
This is less the failure of an interstate system proposed by the UNO than the difficulty of establishing a multilateral regime integrating all the concerned parties: firms, local authorities, or NGOS. Moreover, even if, since the CP held in Berlin in 1995, the thinking of the UNFCCC has been based on the work of the IPCC, its legitimacy crisis has considerably weakened its authority. In this context, the adoption of a legally binding measure applicable to all states was quite improbable. Inverting the logic which prevailed at Kyoto – and drawing lessons from its failure, the failure to reach even the 5% objective – the Copenhagen Agreement thus defines a framework for cooperation based on flexibility and voluntarism alone. This is illustrated by the diversity of the commitments made by the states as transmitted to the UNFCCC on 31st January 2010. Taken together, these commitments enable the a reduction of between 13.30% and 17.9% over the 1990 levels to be envisaged for the emissions of the industrialized countries by 2020 – a far cry from the 25% to 40% judged necessary by the IPCC in its 4th report (2007). Europe has planned a reduction of 20% compared to 1990, the United States 17% compared to 2005 (that is, 4% compared to 1990), Russia 25% compared to 1990 (up by 13.5% compared to 2007), China a reduction in its carbon footprint of 45% compared to 2005 and India 24%.
Multilateralism should therefore be considered as a new window of opportunity and the expression of singular strategies. In this respect, the Copenhagen summit traced a new architecture for the global scene and the Agreement a global process of consent.
References
Kaul Inge, Grunberg Isabelle, Stern Marc (Ed.), Global Public Goods. International Cooperation in the 21st Century, New York, Oxford University Press, 1999.
Keohane Robert O. (Ed.), International Institutions and State Power, Boulder, Westview Press, 1989.
Kindleberger Charles P., The International Economic Order. Essays on Financial Crisis and International Public Goods, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1986.
Knight Andy, A Changing United Nations: Multilateral Evolution and the Quest for Global Governance, New York, Palgrave, 2000.
Petiteville Franck, Le Multilatéralisme, Paris, Montchrestien, 2009.
Feb 11, 2010 | Global Public Health, North-South, Passage au crible (English)
By Clement Paule
Translation: Melissa Okabe
Passage au crible n°14
On January 29, 2010, during the Annual Meeting of the World Economic Forum in Davos, Bill and Melinda Gates announced that their foundation would finance the research, development and distribution of new vaccines in developing countries, at the level of 10 billion local dollars in 2020. According to the ex-CEO of Microsoft, this investment should allow for the considerable reduction of infant mortality tied to infectious diseases. So, the richest man of the world – Ranking Forbes 2009 – wishes to contribute to the amelioration of global public health by means of his foundation created in 1999. Indeed, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, represents the first philanthropic organization in the world, with donation funds estimated at 34 billion dollars in September 2009. In the space of a decade, this private actor has imposed itself on the international scale as a major stakeholder in health policy. So much are its’ annual contributions in this domain – which already exceeded 1 billion dollars in 2007 – exceed henceforth the budget of the WHO and the bilateral financing of numerous States.
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
This type of philanthropic organization, associated with the patrimony of a captain of industry, has particularly developed in the United States for more than a century. Certain specificities of this country, such as the place occupied by the state, the non-profit sector or third sector, or better yet the Protestant work ethic, are not foreign here. In fact, the massive enrichment of a generation of American industrialists at the end of the 19th century allowed for the emergence of these of private actors. The big three embody this first philanthropic moment; this concerns the Carnegie, Rockefeller and Ford foundations established respectively in 1911, 1913, and 1936. These last foundations differentiate themselves from traditional charitable works by their will to rationalize the donation and by the amplitude of their endowments. Investing by means of their subsidies granted to education, to the preservation of peace or to medicine, they have quickly acquired world influence. At first suspected as a means of tax evasion, they have also been accused of diffusing American cultural imperialism. Case in point, researches conducted on the big three have particularly shown the weight of these members on United States foreign policy. Today, these foundations continue to endure and have even increased their donation funds; in 2008, for example, the Ford Foundation had more than 11 billion dollars.
However, if this first philanthropy knew to adapt to evolutions of the 20th century, it is at present exceeded by another generation of private foundations. This progression comes from a recently formed financial aristocracy, made up of entrepreneurs taking advantage of new technologies and economic deregulation: Bill Gates, the Walton family or Eli Broad, constitute the emblematic paragons. As for Warren Buffet, in 2006 he committed himself to give the largest part of his fortune to the Gates Foundation, amounting to about 30 billion dollars over several years. Such a true concentration of finances permitted the ex-CEO of Microsoft to massively invest in a health program directed toward developing countries. However, let’s recall that the implication of these philanthropic actors in this domain isn’t a novelty. Isn’t it in the Rockefeller foundation laboratories that Max Theiler – Nobel Prize laureate in medicine, 1951 – created the vaccination for yellow fever in 1937? However, Gates’ massive financing over the decade marks a considerable quantitative jump.
Theoretical framework
1. Philanthropic-capitalism (venture philanthropy). The new social entrepreneurs, including the Gates, rationalized the third sector by importing entrepreneurial techniques of capital risk firms. This doctrine opposes itself to traditional philanthropy, cancelling out the bureaucratic burden imposed on the traditional sector. In fact, this doctrine is insistent on flexibility, evaluation and social return on investment.
2. Diplomacy of a private actor. Since its creation, the Gates Foundation has found itself at the origin of major innovations in the health domain. If the international organizations and the states remain as principal actors in the sector, the financial contributions of the philanthropic giant allow it to pave the way for true diplomacy. It just so happens that this normative impact induces effects on the forms and contents of the international policies in matters of health.
Analysis
The rise in power of the Gates Foundation cannot be explained without taking into consideration the repositioning of the WHO (World Health Organization) which has been in operation since the 1990’s. Confronted by budgetary difficulties and internal dissections, this international organization has therefore opted for a strategy open to private actors who would associate the grand philanthropic foundations with international institutions in the frame of public-private partnerships. However, this being the case, these new entities have determined the definition and the establishment of health programs at the global level, specifically in the fight against infectious disease. For its part, the Gates Foundation has shown itself to be omnipresent at the heart of these organisms, participating in global funds in the fight against AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria. It has equally played a decisive role in the creation of GAVI (Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization), endowing it with 750 million dollars. However, the Gates’ investment does not reduce itself to financial involvement for its’ sitting experts to the committee of partnership directors. In addition, the Foundation supported the creation of new financial mechanisms – such as the IFFIm (International Finance Facility for Immunization) – specific for interesting the pharmaceutical industry in the research of new vaccinations.
The health strategy promoted by Bill Gates in fact resides in a generalized immunization to benefit developing countries, a solution judged to be profitable and efficient. In doing so, the ex-leader of Microsoft relaunches initiatives which have fallen short in the past, very reminiscent of the possible eradication of malaria in 2008. However, this angle has been qualified to be too narrow by specialists of public health and development, who reject a technological ideology. According to these specialists, this vertical vision neglects the political and socio-economic aspects of local realities. Moreover, certain key scientific figures are concerned about private actors, likely to use their weight to impose priorities. The head the WHO program against malaria complained in this manner of the 2007 pressures exerted by the Gates Foundation in favor of adopting the controversial program IPT (Intermittent Preventive Therapy). More generally, the intrusion of the philanthropic giant in the governance of global health risks wrecking havoc on the national health policies in developing countries. In this respect, such a gamble on the vaccination isn’t without consequence, as it can lead to imbalance in health offerings to the point of detriment, for example, less publicized obstetrics or nutritional care.
While the financial contributions of the Gates Foundation are welcomed by numerous observers, they also arouse certain reservations already appropriated to established organizations, at the time, by Rockefeller or Ford. Following this logic, the technological and entrepreneurial discourse of philanthropic-capitalism could conceal a redeployment of American soft power. Without presuming about the Gates and their intentions, it is strongly noted that their contribution has lead to encourage public-private partnerships and hybrid mechanisms of financing. Now, such a system constitutes a true re-legitimization of the market.
References
Abélès Marc, Les Nouveaux riches. Un ethnologue dans la Silicon Valley, Paris, Odile Jacob, 2002.
Guilbaud Auriane, Le Paludisme. La lutte mondiale contre un parasite résistant, Paris, L’Harmattan, 2008. Coll. Chaos International.
Muraskin William, « The Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization: is it a New Model for Effective Public-Private cooperation in International Public Health? », American Journal of Public Health, 94 (11), Nov. 2004, pp. 1922-1925.
OCDE, Fondations Philanthropiques et Coopération pour le Développement, Tiré-à-part des Dossiers du CAD, 4 (3), 2003.
Piller Charles, Smith Doug, “Unintended Victims of Gates Foundation Generosity”, Los Angeles Times, Dec. 16th 2007, web: http://fairfoundation.org/news_letter/2008/01march/criticism_of_gates_foundation.pdf [Feb. 6th2010].
Feb 2, 2010 | Defense, Passage au crible (English), Security, Terrorism
By Hervé Pierre
Passage au crible n°13
“We must reach out to all of our countrymen, especially our disenchanted brothers, who are not part of al-Qaida, or other terrorist networks”, Hamid Karzaï declared before the delegates from 70 countries assembled in London on 28th January 2010. The reconciliation option was announced by the Afghan president as early as 2003, when it already distinguished between the good and the bad Talibans, and became a political priority for Kabul in 2009. In spring 2010, this strategic change of direction should lead to the summoning of a major traditional gathering (Loya Jirga). It should also lead to the creation of a 358 million euro fund aimed at dissuading the poorest Afghans from joining the rebellion.
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
In 1979, the Soviet invasion followed the overthrow of President Daoud by the communist insurrection. It provoked the emergence of numerous resistance groups which – in the Cold War context – received substantial support from the United States. However, the relative unity of the various mujaheddin movements did not outlast the withdrawal of the Red Army which began in 1989. The situation rapidly became anarchic and the rivalry between the chiefs caused numerous civilian victims. From 1992, students (taleb), who claimed to re-establish order and justice, gathered in Pakistani tribal areas around Mullah Omar. Their military successes culminated in the taking of Kabul in 1996. The new regime, which, initially, was not necessarily anti-occidental, rapidly became more radical through contact with Ben Laden. It then developed a political program exclusively based on the sharia and clearly favoured the Pashtun ethnic group.
Dominated by Tadzhiki elements, the Northern Alliance – supported by the United States – overturned the Taliban government in 2001 with the fall of Kandahar in 2002 representing its end. From 2003, the rebellion progressively took over the struggle. It is made up of a myriad of competing groups sharing only the will to resist any form of external interference. The orientation of these groups remains highly diverse and the pragmatism of certain leaders – the latecomers to the Taliban movement – is blatant. In 2003, The Economist evoked for the first time the existence of neo-Talibanism to describe what researchers such as Amin Tarzi then considered to be a totally new phenomenon.
Theoretical framework
Paradoxically, the performative discourse aiming to demonize the enemy serves the interests of both sides engaged in this fight to the finish. Consequently, it leaves little place for a third way seeking to distinguish the good from the bad.
1. Performative discourse. J.L. Austin demonstrated how certain discourse types do not fulfil a descriptive or informative purpose, but, instead, constitute acts in themselves. To call the Afghan rebels Talibans presupposes both the de facto existence of a unity between the combatant groups and the possibility of establishing a historical link with the movement which ruled Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001. Moreover, the strong emotional content of the term represents a political weapon which serves in equal measure those claiming to adhere to the movement and those fiercely combating it.
2. Demonization. The enemy is perceived as a homogenous, negatively defined block in opposition to another model. As classically analyzed by Robert Jarvis, at the base of this simplistic and deformed vision of reality there exists a tendency to overestimate one’s own referents which, through lack of empathy, leads to denying the pertinence or even the very existence of different rationalities. Once reduced to a supposed essence, the other incarnates solely the Enemy – irreducible, the catalyst of every fear, anguish and fantasy.
Analysis
The process of reconciliation through the reintegration in the national political interplay of a fraction of the Talibans marks a notable evolution which illustrates a more astute appreciation of this rebellion without unity. Should it materialize, this outstretched-hand policy could sound the death knell for the Talibans both literally, with diminishing numbers of combatants, and figuratively, with the disappearance of any unicity in its discourse. However, this evolution encounters two major difficulties.
1. The credo of the war against terrorism. The promotion of a policy of national reconciliation shows the weakness – perceived by all the actors on the Afghanistan scene – rather than the strength of President Karzaï, whose weakened popularity and credibility greatly suffered from the pretence of democratic elections in August 2009 and whose relations with the Obama administration are highly strained. Consequently, the perspective of drastic reductions to the Coalition forces by 2011 leaves him no choice other than to reinforce his own numbers.
More than disarming the Dushman (rebel), the Afghan executive intends, above all, to conquer a power capable of modifying the balance of power. Within this line of reasoning, the reconciliation for peace appears to be a decoy, a political calculation by President Karzaï, solely destined to reinforce his personal position in a war context.
Demonizing the enemy justifies the combat, the appeals for funds and the troop reinforcements. It also supposes the unconditional support of public opinion since the local enemy is linked to transnational guerrilla warfare of which Mullah Omar, or even Ben Laden would be the instigators. In reply to President Karzaï’s propositions, the American Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has chosen to brandish the spectre of a return to religious obscurantism preferring to essentialize the Talibans rather than to grant them some portion of rationality. In support of this policy of rapprochement, she ultimately declared that “you don’t make peace with your friends”. Committed to total war against terrorism, the United States divides the world into two mutually exclusive groups leaving no room for a third way.
2. Contesting, a profitable resource. At the micro level, the marginal who proclaims himself Taliban cheaply obtains local visibility out of all proportion to the reality of his power. In this way the Dushman of the Tagab Valley places his local and opportunist struggle within a wider mythical whole. Such a stance provides him with logistical support and an echo for his demands. At the macro level, the global jihad leaders, from their refuges in the tribal zones of Pakistan, catalyze and appropriate various forms of social violence which they then turn into a profitable resource on the global scene. So it is that the propositions of the London conference are rejected as a whole by those who have turned the struggle against the Occident into a business. In this respect, on 28th January 2010, the commanding council of the Talibans clearly indicated that the enemy’s attempts to buy the mujaheddin with offers of money and work so that they abandon the jihad were vain.
The solution to the Afghan problem through national reconciliation conceals its ambiguities with difficulty. Indeed, this policy is promoted out of self-interest, supported by default, even refused as a whole by its principle protagonists. As it happens, the final communiqué of the London conference seems to be highly revealing since, despite the number of discussions of the subject, the very term reconciliation is only mentioned once.
References
Tarzi Amin, Crews Robert D., The Taliban and the Crisis of Afghanistan, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2008.
Austin John, Quand dire, c’est faire, translation, Paris, Seuil, 1970.
Ledgard Jonathan, “Taking on the Warlords…”, The Economist, 22nd May 2003.
Jervis Robert, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1976.
Jan 26, 2010 | Global Public Goods, Global Public Health, North-South, Passage au crible (English)
By Clément Paule
Passage au crible n°12
The PACE (Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe) should begin an investigation into the threat of false pandemics end of January 2010. In a motion voted on December 18, 2009, the Health Committee of this institution accuses the pharmaceutical industry and WHO (World Health Organization) experts of potential collusion. In this case, this inquiry should evaluate the management of the H1N1 flu pandemic and more specifically the recommendation for a global immunization campaign. This controversy seems to be reinforced by the last epidemiological reports confirming a strong decline of the virus activities in many countries, especially in the United States and in the main parts of Europe and Asia. Main pharmaceutical laboratories – or big pharma – are under suspicion of having participated in the setting-up of a psychosis allowing them to sell insufficiently-tested products; moreover, these companies seem to benefit massively from the national policies of vaccination. Thus, on January 15, 2010, the firm GSK (GlaxoSmithKline) that had been extensively marketing the vaccine Pandemrix™ announced a 945-million-euro revenue for the last quarter of 2009.
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
Since its outbreak in spring 2009, the H1N1 virus is suspected to have caused more than 14 000 casualties in 209 States. The transnational struggle against the flu pandemic shifted rapidly towards immunization measures recommended by the SAGE (Strategic Advisory Group of Experts on Immunization). National preventive strategies were nevertheless diverse and heterogeneous. Some states like France, Canada or Switzerland decided to target a high rate of immunized population – more than 75% – whereas a low-profile policy was chosen by Germany or the United States. Only 5% of the Chinese population – around 65 million people – had been vaccinated at the beginning of 2010. At that stage, vaccination campaigns were beginning in Vietnam and Saudi Arabia. But Poland took a unique stance by refusing from November 2009 onwards the purchase pharmaceutical products which it estimated unreliable. The fact that many states could not access immediately the vaccine market should be noted. In fact, extensive orderings by Northern countries – more than 1 billion vaccines in September 2009 – had been prioritized.
Then, the immunization scheme started changing during November 2009 with the reduction to one shot instead of the two initially planned. This dramatically disrupted national policies and created surplus. The situation worsened with the populations’ reluctance regarding the vaccine that was injected to date to only 8% of the French – 5 million – almost half a million of Moroccans and less than 4 millions of British. 62 million Americans followed the recommendations of WHO, in spite of the 1976 precedent during which the suspicion of an outbreak of flu epidemic caused a large-scale vaccination campaign.
Theoretical framework
1. The precautionary principle. Included in the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development in June 1992, this norm aims to meet the uncertainty provoked by health or environment risks. It was written down in the French Constitution in 2005 after the infected blood scandal and the mad-cow disease crisis, and was invoked to justify massive preventive campaigns against the H1N1 virus.
2. Socio-technical controversies. Proposed by Michel Callon, Pierre Lascoumes and Yannick Barthe, this concept tries to reconstruct the struggles concerning the definition of hardly-governable situations. The pandemic management take place in a context of uncertainty in which a scientific authority discourse is challenged by other expertise.
Analysis
The WHO leadership in the struggle against the H1N1 virus showed the normative power of this international institution and its ability to define the contents of local preventive policies. However, the legitimacy of this health organization was weakened when its Director-General recognized on January 18, 2010 an excess of prudence towards the pandemic which she justified by public health imperatives. This resort to the precautionary principle opened a policy window – according to the concept of John Kingdon – for many dissenting actors claiming alternate or even profane expertise. It should be noted that from the beginning some physicians have taken a skeptical stance towards vaccination campaign in spite of the advices of the SAGE. For instance, one of them evoked in July 2009 the financial and industrial interests likely to overestimate the threat of flu viruses. But WHO have also been the target of conspiracy theories which blamed the institution for having purely and simply created the pandemics. Austrian journalist Jane Burgermeister notably pressed charges against the health organization and the laboratory Baxter in June 2009, accusing them of bioterrorism and attempt of genocide.
Up to then without any media coverage, these denunciations were reinforced by the failures of immunization campaigns often depicted as disproportionate – 13 millions of doses ordered by the Swiss government for 7.7 million citizens – considering an actually moderate pandemic. Thus, the fifteen experts of SAGE soon were at the center of collusion suspicions with the pharmaceutical industry well-known for its lobbying capacities. WHO officials were forced to several public justifications under the pressure of member-States: such as India or Vietnam. The health organization tried furthermore to provide guarantees of transparency and in the same time – in spite of the confidentiality of the debates – to detail safeguards which are supposed to avoid conflicts of interest involving SAGE experts. It seems nevertheless that those scientists have partly lost their legitimacy as they have been getting out of the monopoly of the authority discourse they had been maintaining on their specialty. The latter configuration of knowledge – conceived in its absolute form as a real ideology by Jürgen Habermas – appears disputed by that kind of overt accusations and by a sort of passive resistance expressed by the low rates of people willing to be immunized despite the SAGE recommendations.
The proliferation and growing audience of alternative discourses in the form of multiple and rival expertise are going together with the weakening of the vertical system of decision and information. Such a process reminds other examples of socio-technical controversies, like the infamous infected blood scandal or the mad-cow crisis, which involved both scientific uncertainty and divergent actors’ strategies. However, a specificity of the present case relies in a particular side effect of the precautionary principle. It can be observed in the way governments stood up for their management of pandemic risk. The French Health Minister answered thus to her detractors by the invocation of the precautionary principle. According to François Ewald, this norm would lead to overestimate risk but it seems to be a necessary justification for decision-makers, especially in a context of uncertainty. Indeed, the political costs of a potential catastrophe would make stakeholders systematically picturing the worst. Therefore public policies would be more and more depending of a blurred responsibility shared by both governments and their specialized advisers, this pattern carrying the risk of a global delegitimization. The failure of an official expertise suffering from lack of transparency would then add to health risks the social threat of an easily exploitable market of anxiety.
References
Abécassis Philippe, Coutinet Nathalie, « Caractéristiques du marché des médicaments et stratégies des firmes pharmaceutiques », Horizons stratégiques, (7), 2008, pp. 111-139.
Hamdouch Abdelilah, Depret Marc-Hubert, La Nouvelle économie industrielle de la pharmacie : structures industrielles, dynamique d’innovation et stratégies commerciales, Paris, Elsevier, 2001.
Juès Jean-Paul, L’Industrie pharmaceutique, Paris, PUF, 1998. Coll. Que sais-je ?
Pignarre Philippe, Le Grand secret de l’industrie pharmaceutique, Paris, La Découverte, 2003.
PwC (PricewaterhouseCoopers), Pharma 2020 : the Vision – Which Path will you Take ?, 2007, consulté le 14/01/2010 sur le site de PwC : http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/pharma-life-sciences/pharma-2020/pharma-2020-vision-path.jhtml
