Jun 28, 2016 | Africa, Global Public Goods, Global Public Health, Human safety, Passage au crible (English)
By Clément Paule
Translation: Lea Sharkey
Passage au crible n° 142
Source: France Bleu
On March 4, 2016, a study published in the Cell Stem Cell Review specified the relation between the Zika virus and specific neurological disorders, such as GBS (Guillain-Barré Syndrome), characterised by progressive paralysis. While this research describes the destruction of brain cells by this pathogen, its responsibility in the occurrence of microcephaly – head circumference of the newborn inferior to average, with serious and irreversible damages – has not been clearly and positively demonstrated. Though, this risk of congenital malformation appears to be at the heart of the concerns raised by the epidemic disease that has been spreading in the last few months on the American continent and the Caribbean. As such, about twenty countries and territories might be facing the spreading of this arbovirus, among which we may quote Brazil, Colombia, Guyana or Venezuela. Millions of contaminations are expected before the end of 2016, to such extent that the WHO (World Health Organisation) declared a PHEIC (Public Health Emergency of International Concern). On a global basis, health authorities are once again exposed to a major crisis, just when the Ebola risk had come under control in Western Africa.
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
Investigations carried on the yellow fever identified the Zika flavivirus in 1947 for the first time on tropical forest apes in Uganda. Akin to other arboviruses such as dengue or Chikungunya, this pathogen is transmitted by Aedes type mosquitoes – especially the Aegypti type – and has similar epidemiological characteristics. It must be underlined that the infection remains benign: during the following decades, only a few cases have been recorded on the African continent, such as Tanzania, Nigeria or Egypt – and some Asian countries such as India, Thailand and Indonesia. This relative innocuousness – 80% of the patients do not show any symptoms – might explain the little knowledge accumulated on this virus, whose genome has been sequenced only in 2006.
Only in 2007 appears the Asian viral strain of Zika in some Pacific territories, starting with the Yap Archipelago part of the Federated States of Micronesia. In the following years, the virus spreads to New-Caledonia and Cook Islands. It should be noted that the urban outbreak that hit French Polynesia from 2013 is unheard of: 180 000 people – two thirds of the population – would have been infected. More than 40 GBS are recorded retrospectively, more than 20 times the usual occurrence. Moreover, this rise comes along with cases imported by North-American, Japanese or European tourists. Spring 2015 marks a turning point, as local transmission of Zika virus is observed on a large scale in South America. In May, the first contamination is being confirmed in Brazil, the pathogen spreading even more quickly as the affected societies are not immune to it. A few months later, doctors of the Pernambuco State (North-East) report an unusual number or neurological disorders and microcephaly, alerting the authorities about potential links with arbovirus propagation. As the epidemic progresses towards other countries of the region, health monitoring intensifies and leads the WHO to declare a PHEIC on February, 1st, 2016. For now, more than 1.5 million Brazilians have been infected, as well as dozens of thousands of citizens from other States, such as Colombia which recently declared three deaths imputed to this new plague.
Theoretical framework
1. The cautious consideration of weak and unmarked signals. Long considered as secondary to dengue or Chikungunya, the Zika virus was not under close monitoring before its recent outbreak. New risks unknown before put the light onto this pathogen, in a situation of uncertainty structured by the legacy of previous epidemics.
2. A controversial framing of the problem, between ethical conflict and public health. Without precise knowledge of viral transmission mechanisms, experts’ recommendations are partly facing a re-characterisation of the problem by local authorities.
Analysis
It may be recalled that the Zika virus epidemic develops in a context still marked by recent failures of global health governance. As such, the arduous management of the Ebola crisis in Western Africa shows a lack of leadership from the WHO, overwhelmed by the events and branded as passive. The organisation mobilised quicker on this occasion, bordering on an alarmist stance which was severely pointed out during the last AH1N1 flu outbreak in 2009. Following this line, the health organisation advocates a precautionary approach and declares a PHEIC on February, 1st 2016: this decision is not taken upon available data – low or non-existent mortality, benign symptomatology – but upon foreseen consequences of the arbovirus. By doing so, the WHO activates a strategic framework enabling quicker diagnosis and therapeutical research, while ensuring coordination of the monitoring scheme. In a well-mastered communication process, Director-General Margaret Chan evoked in January 2016 « concerning circumstantial proofs » yet to be scientifically supported. This wording refers to GBS and especially to microcephaly, suspect of being linked to contamination of pregnant women by the Zika virus, which caused panic amongst the media in 2015.
Because of their visible impact on cognitive and sensory functions of the newborns, these malformations tend to concentrate the fears and tend to epitomize the epidemic. However, etiology of these fetal anomalies may involve environmental factors – risky maternal behaviour, diabetes, malnutrition, etc. – infectious factors – rubella, toxoplasmosis or cytomegalovirus – or even genetic factors. Then, data collection is rather uncertain and hardly harmonized, which leads to distortion: on more than 4000 suspect cases – mainly localised in Brazil – 641 would have been confirmed as microcephaly. These figures show a marked increase compared to average – estimated to 160 occurrences a year – which shows greater vulnerability among pregnant women. Since then, circumstances led the United States and some NGOs (Non Governmental Organisations) to advocate abortion, even though it being illegal and criminalized in many Latino-American countries. A call for more flexible regulation immediately faced strong political opposition from the conservatives and Churches, in spite of the repeated tragedy of clandestine abortions. Several governments, such as Colombia, even advised their female citizens to “delay their pregnancy” until further notice. These clumsy and irrelevant political contortions illustrate how difficult is the enforcement of a top-down, strictly health-oriented approach in a context of overall uncertainty paired with social tensions. In Brazil, mistrust and development of alternative theories – putting the blame on Monsanto insecticides or faulty vaccines – must be understood in relation to the authorities de-legitimisation, repeatedly caught into corruption scandals. This situation might appear detrimental and likely to hamper the seemingly consensual vector control efforts, aiming however to minimize the epidemic and reduce it to a mere mosquito problem. The quick propagation of the Zika virus, quite similar to the recent spreading of Chikungunya, may seem related to the colonization of a wide part of the planet by Aedes Aegypti and Albopictus. But it most importantly highlights issues related to human mobility – Brazil hosted the Football World Cup in 2014 and gets ready to organised the Olympic Games this summer – and the growing exposure of populations to low-key pathogens which until now, were confined to their natural breeding-grounds. Since IHR (International Health Regulations) has been reworked in 2005, this type of health crisis shows the complexity lying behind the formulation of well-balanced answers to cope with risks that may evolve abruptly and sometimes unnoticed. In this perspective, global health governance may not rely only on increasingly technical tools and anticipation of emerging diseases: the challenge lies ahead, in the ties that link societies to their environment.
References
Gilbert Claude, Henry Emmanuel (Éds.), Comment se construisent les problèmes de santé publique, Paris, La Découverte/Pacte, 2009.
Heymann David L. et al, « Zika Virus and Microcephaly: Why is This Situation a PHEIC », The Lancet, (387), Feb. 20th 2016, pp. 719-721.
OMS, « Épidémiologie et manifestations cliniques potentiellement associées à l’infection à virus Zika : mise à jour mondiale », Relevé épidémiologique hebdomadaire (91), 7, Feb. 19th 2016, pp. 73-88, check following web address : http://www.who.int/wer [March 3rd 2016].
May 28, 2016 | Climate change, English, environment, Global Public Goods, North-South, Passage au crible (English)
By Weiting Chao
Translation: Lea Sharkey
Passage au crible n° 141
Source: Flickr
The Paris Climate Conference (COP21) opened in Le Bourget on November 30, 2015. The conference reunited 147 State Leaders, negotiators representing 195 countries and 50 000 participants. On December 12, a global agreement replacing the Kyoto Protocol has been adopted. The member States envisioned a limitation of the rise of global temperatures well below 2°C and sought to keep up the actions undertook to stop the temperature rise at 1,5°C in relation to pre-industrial levels.
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
Global warming is today one of the main threats to the survival of the human kind. In order to cope with this issue, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was signed in 1992 by 153 countries. With respect of equity, this document had been drafted to identify, both for industrialised and developing States, a principle of common and differentiated responsibility. Five years later, the UNFCCC signatory countries adopted the Kyoto Protocol, first legally binding global instrument meant to compel developing countries to reduce their GHG emissions (GreenHouse Gas). Or, the United States pointed out an infringement to the development of the American economy and hence opposed the ratification of the treaty. The protocol was nonetheless enforced when ratified by Russia in 2005. As the protocol was to expire by the end of 2012, the post-Kyoto period had been considered from then. According to the roadmap signed in 2007 in Bali, the States had to finalise a new document in Copenhagen in 2009 (COP 15). But if that summit successfully gathered a large number of leaders, NGOs and civil societies, no significant progress had been made then. In Copenhagen, the final draft had been negotiated in a closed session by a small group composed of the USA, and the BASIC group of emerging countries (Brazil, South Africa, India and China). However, the text did not pass. At COP 18, which took place in Doha in 2012, the Kyoto Protocol has been extended until 2020, while postponing the adoption of a new treaty to year 2015. Two weeks before the opening of COP21, Paris was hit by unprecedented attacks, on November 13 2015, which resulted in 130 killed and 352 injured. Security measures worldwide have been strengthened because of the terrorist threat, and the holding of COP21 even questioned. Yet, the summit took place without any incident.
Theoretical framework
1. A model of joint regulation. At the heart of the climate talks, we may identify hierarchies of authority. In this respect, the United Nations represents an asymmetric interdependent system between unequal parties. The rules are constantly re-shaped, resulting from action or non-action. According to Marie-Claude Smouts, two types of regulation, two rationales constantly confront each other in this type of organisation. The first one comes from dominant players holding the power to shape new rules and have them adopted in order to master the collective game. The second one comes from subordinates. The latter strive to set up bypassing and dodging strategies to nonetheless influence the final decision.
2. North-South de-territorialization and re-territorialization. In the post Cold War period, the territoriality principle has gone through major transformations. The territory of the State has been questioned by material and immaterial transnational flows, which result from lighter border controls and decline of spatial and logistical constraints. This has been followed with the de-territorialisation of international exchanges that led to a reorganisation of the governance in various sectors (security, ecology, migrations, health, etc.). But recent multilateral negotiations on climate change introduced a confrontation of this rationale with the traditional North-South divide, which hampered the adoption of a global agreement. In fact, the climate threat imposes a global management of the atmosphere as a common good, which breaks out the classic notion of territorial appropriation.
Analysis
The UN Climate Conference represents a major opportunity for the member States. In 2015, 195 countries ratified the UNFCCC. In the multilateral negotiations, diversity and heterogeneity of the parties add up to the United States hegemony. In the light of this, the US opposed the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol considering it an infringement to the development of its own economy. Consequently, the non-action of a dominant country considerably diminished the efficiency of the public authority on international cooperation. Moreover, many countries have decided to get not involved in the second phase of the Protocol (2013-2020). Moreover, after 2000, the emerging BASIC changed the situation. China became one of the most prominent CO2 emitters in the world, exceeding the emissions of the United States in 2006. In Copenhagen, the two leaders and emerging countries jeopardised the mutual trust built within the United Nations, which eroded even more the negotiations. As a consequence of this tense climate, the Copenhagen agreement has not been adopted by the UNFCCC, even though not legally binding for the parties.
On the other hand, the subordinate countries attempted to expose their point of views during the talks through an “iterative game“, which contributed in pacifying conflicts between members. In this framework, the parties sought any opportunity to meet their expectations on specific topics, but had to compromise on some others, resulting in a feeling of eternal restarting. This process compelled the COP21 to come up with reciprocal commitments. It is worth remembering that the action taken to limit the temperature rise to 1,5°C and the expression “loss and damage” firstly mentioned by the alliance of small Island States have been included in the Paris Agreement. However, these principles were strongly rejected by the United States.
It should be underlined that this document is the first universal agreement in which all of the developed countries, together with developing countries, have recognised their obligations to manage their GHG emissions. From this point of view, the traditional North-South governing mode has been altered according to the threats related to climate change. This de-territorialisation and re-territorialisation movement erodes the localisation constraints. For example, an IPCC report (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) indicates that climate change is today the first cause of regional conflicts and forced human migrations. Moreover, the de-territorialisation process is also linked to the joint policies that countries have committed to, in order to achieve economic stability and levelling of social challenges. The long-term objective is really ambitious (below 2°C) and entails a collective effort. It raises an issue of financing. In this regard, the Paris Agreement sets an obligation to developed countries to support poor countries and help them tackle climate change. From 2020, 100 Billion dollars will then be delivered on a yearly basis. Developing countries are also invited to fund them on a voluntary basis. This global agreement will be enforced when 55 countries counting for at least 55% of the global emissions will have completed their ratifying procedure. However, the text also introduced the INDC (Intended Nationally Determined Contributions) for the reduction of the countries’ GHG emissions. This tool enables countries to determine their own contributions on a voluntary basis, according to their respective capacity, economic context and national priorities. In other words, this very ambitious treaty is barely binding from a legal point of view. In the future, an achievement-oriented agreement should mainly rely on the respective expectations of the parties influential enough to make a mark on the outcome of the negotiations.
References
Aykut Stefan C. and Dahan Amy, Gouverner le climat ? 20 ans de négociations internationales, Paris, Presses Science po, 2015.
Chao Weiting, « Le triomphe dommageable des passagers clandestins. La conférence de Doha », in: Josepha Laroche (Éd.), Passage au crible, l’actualité internationale 2012, Paris, L’Harmattan, 2013, pp. 111-115.
Smouts Marie-Claude (Éd.), Les nouvelles relations internationales : pratiques et théories, Paris, Presses Science po, 1998.
Apr 25, 2016 | Africa, Passage au crible (English), Terrorism
By Philippe Hugon
Translation: Lea Sharkey
Passage au crible n° 140
Source: Youtube
Originally a hallmark of democratic transition, Burkina Faso was hit by major attacks in Ouagadougou, on Friday 16th, January 2016, resulting in at least 30 killed of more than 14 nationalities. These attacks took place two months after the Bamako attacks at the Radisson Blu Hotel. Responsibility for the attacks has been claimed by Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) which imputed it to the Al Mourabitoune group led by Jihadist chief Mokhtar Belmokhtar. French Special forces stepped in to rescue the hostages of the Splendid Hotel and eliminate the attackers.
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
Burkina Faso is an isolated Sahelian country with porous borders: Ivory Coast in the South, and Mali and Niger in the North. One of the world’s poorest countries, it is located in a vulnerable zone coping with many issues, from demographic explosion to increasing unemployed youth, climate hazards and incapacity for border control. Led by Blaise Compaoré for 27 years, this State has subsequently known a deep political turmoil. For a long time, the President had played the intermediate between Jihadist groups and their targets. He had sealed a non-aggression pact with islamists and mediated hostage rescue operations. In the neo-patrimonial system he set, resources leveraged through various alliances and control of some trafficking networks, allowed him to finance the political game from an internal point of view. But Blaise Compaoré eventually lost his power when he tried to amend the constitution, which would have allowed him to run for President again.
At the end of October 2014, the youth uprisings led in a few days to the demote of the ‘President for life’. The movement ‘The Citizen’s Broom‘ then somewhat embodied an ‘African Spring‘. A transitional government that would lead to legislative and presidential elections, on October 11, 2015, had then been established. But the political/military and business clan of Compaoré sought revenge and failed their attempted coup staged by Gilbert Diendéré. The loyalist military eventually forced the perpetrators to surrender, and the process of democratic transition then resumed. After being delayed, the presidential elections have been won in the first round of November 29, 2015 with 53,49% of vote cast, by Roch Marc Kaboré, Blaise Compaoré ex-Prime Minister.
The terrorist attacks happened three days after the new government had been formed, on the very day judicial authorities had launched an arrest warrant against Guillaume Soro, President of the National Assembly of the Ivory Coast, accused of being part of the plotted coup. Most importantly, these attacks happened while Burkina Faso was reinstating a new security system as the PSR (Presidential Security Regime) and Intelligence Service had grown weaker.
Theoretical framework
The Burkina Faso terrorist attacks are linked to two main international thrusts.
1. A reorganization of the Islamic forces. The attack, attributed to Al-Mourabitoune, brings great media coverage to the group, and attests of the broadening of its geographical area of intervention. Finally, on a background of alliances and antagonisms shaped at its very heart, it confirms the pledge of loyalty taken to AQIM against the Islamic State.
2. Ruling out the Western forces. Besides Burkina Faso, these Jihadist attacks intend to threaten French economic interests, expatriates and military intervention. On a symbolic level, it is worth highlighting that this operation has been launched in the city where French and North American Intelligence Service and Special Forces are located. Hitting Ouagadougou amounts to striking at the heart of Intelligence Ops (Operation Sabre, DGSE, Military Intelligence) in the Operation Barkhane.
Analysis
The attacks are linked to the strategies of various Islamic groups that recruited youths from various African countries. These attacks intensified within the last four-year period in the Sahelo-Saharan area. In this case, the attackers where young Peuls, Tuaregs and Arabs from Northern Burkina Faso. In fact, the idle youth of these regions may only choose between informal activities, trafficking or being recruited by militias. Available reports show that this creates the perfect breeding-ground for cluttered enlisting from Jihadist militias, from a socio-economic, academic, or even ethnic and religious point of view. This is why large terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda and the Islamic State are constantly competing when recruiting, but also on a strategic level. Al Mourabitoune, which claimed the responsibility for the Ouagadougou attacks, is affiliated to AQIM even though a sub-group declared to be loyal to the Islamic State. Originally a member of Al-Qaeda, its leader Mokhtar Belmokhtar broke with AQIM and merged with the Those who Sign with Blood Brigade and Mujao Group. He then resumed his allegiance to Al-Qaeda and is now considered as Sahara’s Ben Laden. On this account, he is considered liable for the In Amenas (Algeria), Arlit (Niger) and Radisson Blu (Bamako) attacks. Other Sahelian groups appeared also to be close from Al-Qaeda such as the Somalian Al-Shabaab, the Malian Peul MLF (Macina Liberation Front), and Ansar Eddine of The Tuareg Ag Ghali in Mali.
Further than referring to Salafism and Takfiris, these terrorist groups actually control trafficking networks. For instance, Al Mourabitoune took hostages to demand ransoms and took part in cigarette trafficking. It then avoided direct confrontation with security forces to replenish its strength. Due to this strategy, it has now great operational capacity and may clearly compete with the Islamic State. This terrorist scheme mainly hit expatriates. But beyond victims and destabilisation of African States, the goal is to create havoc amongst Westerners, likely to drive them out – both investors and humanitarians – of Burkina Faso. In fact, it is necessary to underline the relative powerlessness of world leaders. Namely, Operation Barkhane, supported by African and multilateral forces, has admittedly prevented a territorial takeover of Jihadist forces in the Sahelo-Saharan basin. At the same time, it has certainly eased the spreading of numerous small groups in this wide area. The aims of these attacks appear to be multiple. They are a striking example of the competition between Jihadist groups to control trafficking networks and recruit new adjuvants. They also seek to wage and win the media war through the globalisation of fear and increase the vulnerability of Western countries by driving them out of the Saharo-Sahelian zone.
References
Hugon Philippe, Géopolitique de l’Afrique, 3rd ed, Paris, SEDES 2013.
Jacquemot Pierre, « Les trois paradoxes du Burkina Faso, Lettre de l’IRIS, Nov 2, 2014.
Serge Michailof, Africanistan, Paris, Fayard 2015.
Apr 15, 2016 | Financial crisis, International commerce, International Political Economy, Passage au crible (English)
By Moustafa Benberrah
Translation: Lea Sharkey
Passage au crible n° 139
Source: Pixabay
On Saturday, October 18th 2015, the Algerian Minister of Commerce, Bekhti Belaid, announced that his government applied for external financing from the PRC (People’s Republic of China) for “some large infrastructures projects”. His Industry and Mines counterpart Abdessalem Bouchared mentioned on the same day ongoing negotiations regarding a Sino-Algerian vehicle assembly project. Hence, the political leader called for the development of subcontracting activities in Algeria, recalling the importance of the Chinese experience in this sector. During a press conference organised with Lyu Xinhua, President of the Chinese Council for the promotion of South-south cooperation, Abdessalem Bouchareb even encouraged the Chinese firms to get involved in the steel extraction program of Gara Djebilet (Tindouf), that required massive investments and high-tech equipment.
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
Let it be mentioned first some contextual events that might explain the reason why Algeria had to resort to public debt. According to figures provided by the Algerian Bank, external debt is estimated to a 3.7 billion dollars (2.27% of the GDP – Gross Domestic Product) when reserve currency amounts to 159 billion dollars. On the first hand, falling oil prices have deeply affected the Algerian economy, mainly relying on the hydrocarbon sector, which led the government to freeze many development projects. A rise of the electricity and fuel prices has then been resolved in the frame of the 2016 Budget law. Moreover, article 66 of this law plans the opening-up of public enterprise capital and the complete cession to partners after 5 years, which reactivates the privatisation process. As a justification, the Finance Minister advocates a ‘protective‘ management of the State’s resources. On the other hand, the economic slow-down of the Chinese GDP must be underlined: according to Chinese official figures published in October 2015, the growth reaches a 6.9% per year on the first trimester. Yet, it has been the lowest performance of the second world’s largest economy since the 2009 financial crisis. This appeared clearly in last September sensible decline of the industrial production. As well, retail sales, considered as a barometer of the Chinese households’ consumption, showed only a slight acceleration, and a pick-up limited to 10.9% in 2015. This economic stagnation led the People’s Republic of China to intensify its trade with some of its partners, such as Algeria. Most notably, it sought to spread its activities, currently limited to construction industry and hydraulic systems, namely by diversifying into mechanical and electronically industry, steel industry and mines.
Theoretical framework
1. The monetisation of an emerging economy. More and more, sovereign functions of the State are handed down to intermediates, coupled with a division of prerogatives: on the one hand, transformation of production and transport systems, and on the other hand, monetisation and financialisation of the economy. In this regard, the conditions of the capital holder prevail, hence ensuring its domination.
2. A win-win partnership. Facing the collapse of the financial bubble, China is looking to maintain its economic growth. Such a relationship relies on postcolonial specialisation, established between suppliers of raw materials and producers of manufactured products and services. This system foreshadows a Chinese redeployment in Africa and Asia, characterised by straddling techniques, brushing aside every distinction between public and private, State and market, networks of influence and economic accumulation.
Analysis
It should be highlighted that emerging countries, such as China, have been strongly impacted by the third phase of the 2007 world financial crisis. This stage, concomitant to the collapse of raw material prices, follows the burst of the American real estate bubble in 2008 and its consequences on the European debt in 2011. According to Goldman Sachs consultancy,”the growing uncertainties relative to the after-effects of the decline in emerging economies, collapse of raw material prices and rise of American interest rates have raised concerns regarding the durability of the increase of asset prices, marking thus a new phase of the global financial crisis“.
In order to cope with this issue, the People’s Republic of China seeks to deepen its business partnerships, in order to meet the imperatives of global competition. This is the reason behind a policy of economic transnationalisation, as a balance between national policies and international demands. As an example, the AIIB Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank has been established on June 29th, 2015, requiring an 800 billion dollar investment per year. This initiative embodies the Chinese ambition to come up with an interesting alternative for lenders such as the Global Bank or African Development Bank. Such initiative is in line with the three PRC main interests: 1) strengthen its diplomatic position. 2) Wisely invest its reserve currency in order to reinforce the Yuan. 3) Provide its construction and hydraulic industry groups with transnational growth connections.This policy is in line with the process of the new silk road, a Chinese fund estimated to 40 billion dollars, and the BRICS bank (Brazil, Russia, China and South Africa). Yet, if these intermediaries hold a structural power that strengthens their political influence and legitimacy, Philip Cerny notes however that the Competition State holds its position and domination through public-private partnerships. In the light of this, the Chinese government doubles its aid programs in writing-off debts or providing low-rate loans likely to attract developing states. In this regard, the privileged relationships that PCR and Algeria have had since 1958, and the fact that one is the first supplier of the other when it comes to external trade – are greatly facilitating this type of cooperation.
In order to account for its use of long-term debt, the Algerian government brings forward large infrastructure projects that have been mainly attributed to Chinese firms, employing more than 40000 workers on the national territory. Moreover, the authorities have been stating that this should strengthen production, while ensuring new income pivotal to debt repayment, and a surplus bound to cover the loss-making sectors. It should be underlined also that an ADB report (African Development Bank), published in 2012, shows that Algeria has granted between 2002 and 2012, 20 billion dollars worth of contracts to Chinese companies, without a clear increase showing on national employment rates. Consequently, Chinese companies such as CSCEC (China State Construction Engineering Corp) clearly appear as the main recipients and beneficiaries of this public aid initially bound to the Algerian economy. Collaborating with major banks in their country of origin, these companies have a prominence even out of their national territory and a key position when tendering to public procurement due to competitive costs and a good knowledge of local politics and economics. However, the Algerian economy may not rely on such good prospects, and suffers, on the contrary, a loss of independence.
References
Cabestan Jean-Pierre, Le Système politique chinois. Vers un nouvel équilibre autoritaire, Paris, Presses de Sciences Po, 2014.
Cerny Philip G., Rethinking World Politics: A Theory of Transnational Pluralism, New York, Oxford University Press, 2010.
Chiu Justin, « Une banque multilatérale entre coopération et prédation. La signature des statuts de la BAII », consulted on November 12, 2015 on Chaos International.
El Watan consulted on November 15, 2015 at www.el-watan.com
Hibou Béatrice, « Retrait ou redéploiement de l’État », Critique internationale, (1), aut 1998, pp. 151-168.
Hugon Philippe, « La Chine en Afrique. Néocolonialisme ou opportunité pour le développement ? », Revue internationale et stratégique, (72), 2008, pp. 219-230.
Strange Susan, The Retreat of the State. The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996.
Mar 28, 2016 | Climate change, English, environment, Global Public Goods, Passage au crible (English)
By Valérie Le Brenne
Translation: Lea Sharkey
Passage au crible N° 138
Source: Pixabay
From November 30 to December 11, 2015, the 21st Convention of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP 21). Following intense talks, the negotiators compromised on a 40 pages agreement, aiming to restrict the global warming to 2 degrees Celsius. Presented as the major missing issues of this Summit, oceans were finally taken into account but only with limited scope. As such, the preamble of the appendix details that, « Parties to this Agreement […] note that it is important to maintain the integrity of all ecosystems, including oceans ».
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
Signed in 1992 at the Earth Summit in Rio, the UNFCCC counts 196 members today. Every member state recognises the existence of a climate change caused by human activity, and commits to reducing their greenhouse gas emissions (GHG). Enforced in 1994, the agreement plans that a conference of the Parties (COP) should be held to evaluate the policies carried out in this regard and negotiate new dispositions.
In 1997, the COP3 resulted in the signature of the Kyoto Protocol, assigning to « the developing countries and transitional economies quantified targets regarding GHG emissions » (Aykut, 2015). But, the fact that the US did not ratify the accord, added to a patent lack of results triggered a deep crisis that peaked in Copenhagen in 2009. After two years of discussions, member states could not agree on the next treaty bound to take effect in 2020, ending the summit in failure. Postponing the deadline to 2015, the Paris talks thus appeared as the « last chance summit ». The role of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change in allowing the climate issues to reach political agenda must be here underlined. Founded in 1998, the IPCC « assesses the current state of scientific, technical and socio-economical knowledge on climate change, their causes, potential impact and response strategies ». Since its creation, the IPCC has published five reports (1990, 1995, 2001, 2007 and 2013-2014), each one delivered with a synthetic guidance note addressed to policymakers, elaborated by the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technical Advice (SBSTA). In their last report, experts alerted on the impacts of climate change on oceans. Besides the risks induced by the rise of sea-level, scientists evidenced the issues of the oceans acidification and global warming of the seas, due to the absorption of up to 30% of the human-related carbon dioxide emissions released in the atmosphere. In fact, these brutal bio-geo-chemical transformations impact the marine system overall and is has been already jeopardising many species.
Theoretical framework
1. The scientific legitimisation of an environmental cause. IPCC most recently published scientific conclusions contributed in establishing the legitimacy of this environmental cause. This tends to demonstrate how the knowledge structure (Strange, 1994) plays a major role in shaping issues and allowing them to access political agenda.
2. Pooling hybrid resources. In spite of IPCC alerts, oceans issues were not inscribed on the COP21 agenda. As a response, many representatives from the civil society, scientific world, public and private sectors gathered in the Ocean & Climate Platform (OCP), and organised the Ocean for Climate Days from December 2 to 6, off Le Bourget Talks.
Analysis
It should be underlined that this subject did not appear all of a sudden on the climate change global agenda. In fact, previous IPCC reports stated the alarming state of the risks induced by the rise of the sea level. Nevertheless, their last assessment revealed new emergency issues. Indeed, this rationalisation worked for the legitimisation of the topic while encouraging initiatives focusing on marine preservation. As such, the Global Ocean Commission had been launched in February 2013, London. Composed of key political figures such as former foreign affairs minister David Miliband or Costa Rica President José Manuel Figueres, the GOC published in June 2014 a report entitled From Decline to Restoration. This emergency plan for world oceans is prescriptive and addressed to political leaders. The TARA Expedition research project stands out as well and has been published in the prestigious American Science review in May 2015. This work has for instance evidenced the consequences of global warming on plankton, microorganisms at the base of all the sea life chain. American Secretary of State John Kerry has also created the Annual Our Ocean Conference in 2014. The second edition took place in Valparaiso, Chile, in September 2015, and has been marked by several official announcements regarding the creation of important marine preservation areas, such as the one located around Easter Island. Eventually, on the eve of the COP21 grand opening, eleven countries signed the Because the Ocean Appeal launched by the Chilean and French Government, the Prince Albert II of Monaco Foundation, the Global Ocean Commission, the Institute for Sustainable Development and International Relations (IDDRI) and TARA Expeditions. This declaration notably claims “1) the publication of a special IPCC Ocean Report, 2) The respect of the Sustainable Development Objective n°14 regarding the ocean and marine resources 3) The creation of an ‘Ocean task force’ placed under the aegis of the UNFCCC”.
This renewed interest was not enough to list the topic on the Parisian Summit programme. This is why an international coalition of representatives from the civil society, scientific world and public and private sectors joined their resources in the Climate & Ocean Platform. Created on June 10, 2014, with the support of the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission (IOC) of the Unesco, this institution seeks “better consideration of the ocean in the climate talks“. Besides the Ocean Appeal for Climate, an online petition developed under the aegis of the American oceanographer Sylvia Earle, the OCP also drafted nine recommendations based upon and completing those proposed by the GOC in 2014. Finally, the organisation of the Ocean for Climate Days in the Climate Space Generation in Le Bourget provided entry points to the Blue Zone and furthered the talks with parties to the negotiation process. However, these initiatives do not dim the fact that eventually, COP21 only marginally considered oceans issues, a surprising fact in regard of the widespread, acknowledged and alarming scientific data.
References
Aykut Stefan, « Désenclaver les négociations climatiques. L’enjeu crucial de la COP 21 à Paris », Passage au crible, (133), Chaos international, 20 sept. 2015.
Aykut Stefan C., Dahan Amy, Gouverner le climat ? 20 ans de négociations internationales, Paris, Presses de Sciences Po, 2015.
Strange Susan, States and Markets: An Introduction to International Political Economy, Londres, Pinter, 1994.
Site officiel du GIEC, available to this web address :
https://www.ipcc.ch/home_languages_main_french.shtml.
Site officiel de la Plateforme Océan & Climat, available to this web address : http://www.ocean-climate.org/.
