May 1, 2011 | environment, Passage au crible (English), Security
By Clément Paule
Translation: Davina Durgana
Passage au crible n°39
Source : Flickr
According to the May 3rd edition of the Asahi Shimbun journal, the Japanese government has evaluated the sum of compensations to be paid by TEPCO (Tokyo Electric Power Company) to be nearly 50 billion dollars. Nearly three months after the earthquake of May 11th, 2011 the accident that took place in the middle of Fukushima-Daiichi did not always seem to be mastered by the first Asian electrician. For now, the question of the indemnification of victims – individuals and collective localities – has already incited controversies so that the industry authorities have remained very criticized for their handling of the crisis. Thus, the President of the powerful parental organization Nippon Keidanren (Federations of Japanese Economic Organizations), Yonekura Hiromasa has challenged the responsibility of the State, which is supposed to ensure the entirety of compensations. For now, according to the group JP Morgan Chase, the financial cost of the catastrophe has risen by 24 billion dollars for TEPCO while Bank of America-Merrill Lynch evokes a figure five times greater.
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
As the third global producer of nuclear energy – behind the United States and France – today, Japan has fifty active reactors generating nearly 30% of the electricity of the country. In order to reduce their strong dependence to fossil fuels, the Japanese State has opted since the 1970’s for a strategy that privileges the atomic industry. Stimulated by gigantic investments and American cooperation, this sector was considerably developed through Toshiba, Hitachi and Mitsubishi Heavy Industry. In 2006, the METI (Ministry of Economy, Commerce and Industry) has reaffirmed the objective of producing by 2030, 50% of electric needs through this technology. Towards this end, the construction of a dozen new structures has been planned for the coming decades.
Recall equally that TEPCO, leader of the Japanese market and the fourth global firm – after RWE., EDF. (Electricity of France), and EON – was created in 1951 in the framework of the end of a State energy monopoly. In the 1960’s, business saw great growth and invested in nuclear energy: the complex of Fukushima-Daiichi became operational in March 1970. In little time, TEPCO has become the first multinational producer of electricity in Asia. Additionally, this dazzling ascension has been marred by numerous scandals: in August 2002, authorities revealed the falsification by the operator of dozens of documents in order to hide incidents in their installations since the 1970’s. In a general manner, these controversies implicating the industry have multiplied with the accidents of Tokaimura in 1999 or in Mihama in 2004. As for TECPO, the earthquake of Chuetsu in 2007 has induced the closing of their large central location – Kashiwazaki-Kariwa, located 250 kilometers North of Tokyo – within 21 months. The company has thus incurred their first loss in 28 years, estimated at 4.4 billion dollars.
Theoretical framework
1. Network of Allegiances of the Nuclear Sector. Denounced by ecological movements under the term of oligarchy, the collusions that unite the public and private nuclear actors seem structured in the sequencing of the crisis. Characterized by their political and judicial irresponsibility, the decision-makers seek to maintain solidarity, facing the rise of profane criticism.
2. Strategies of Avoiding Blame. Then, the handling of the crisis became equally the theatre of tensions between the same stakeholders in terms of the accusation of fault. In this respect, the government, made more fragile since the earthquake, tends to attribute the responsibility of the accident to TEPCO.
Analysis
For the first time, relating the similarities of this event with the implication of the major gas company BP with the oil slick in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010 is relevant. In fact, the stigmatization of a deviant multinational firm, the questioning of subcontracting or the price drop of the firm seems now to be the common elements of these post-accident economic activities. Additionally, TEPCO does not seem to be capable of controlling the situation because their first crisis exit plan was not presented until April 18th, 2011, though the disaster happened April 7th. As for its directors, they have simply taken refuge in public contrition. Also, the communication of the company has proven lacunal, that is to say erroneous. These repetitive losses, which have achieved the destruction of the reputation of this actor critiqued by the State, has stimulated the development of socio-technical controversies and alternative evaluation. All the same, inversely of BP in 2010, it imported and retained the failure of national agencies of regulation, in particular the NISA (Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency), in charge of inspections of METI, and the commission of the NSC (Nuclear Safety Commission). Despite the actions of whistleblowers such as seismologists Katsuhiko Ishibashi and Kiyoo Mogi who have denounced conflicts of interest, noting that norms have not been revised. Precisely such as certain recommendations of the AIEA have been equally ignored, through the moratorium of five years on enrichment and reprocessing, publicized by former Director Mohamed El Baradei.
Noteworthy is the ambiguous attitude of the government towards TEPCO, which has threatened nationalization, but has simultaneously been supported by the State. To this regard, the sidelining of the NGO Greenpeace – to proceed to measuring radiation or the development of indemnification funds destined to avoid the bankruptcy of the enterprise – can translate this support. Recall that in the past the authorities have covered the accidents that compromise the operator, and that the scandal of 2002 has not had but a very limited impact on the group. Then, emphasized are the effects of internationalization of Japanese nuclear actors, which have accompanied increased deregulation since the 1990’s. For example, the JINED accord (International Nuclear Energy Development of Japan Co. Ltd.) established in October 2010 between the State and Industry on the export of technology abroad. Additionally, one mentions the central role of TEPCO in the framework of the Kyoto Protocol, in order to attain the objectives of the country in terms of the reduction of carbon dioxide emissions. One sees here that institutional and strategic proximities are reinforced by the network of allegiances unifying the top administration and the leaders of electricity, crystallized in the METI, charged with the promotion of atomic energy, but also in security controls.
For now, this configuration has lead to a closing of the managing spaces of the catastrophe, notably in the production of evaluations of radioactive leakages. As evidenced by the resignation at the end of April by Professor Toshiso Kosako – scientific advisor to the Prime Minister – who was in disagreement with the measures taken by the Cabinet. Furthermore, critical commentators have castigated the circular circulation of information – according to the expression of P. Bourdieu – disclosed by loyal leaders of the nuclear sector. Contrary to the United States with respect to BP, the Japanese authorities have thus turned towards a certain solidarity with TEPCO and a strategy of blame avoidance caused by the stigmatization of an actor that was already deviant. In any case, the collusion and the straddling between the public and private are not questioned as such. Seemingly there is the risk of free-riding – or a lone-rider – of a State participating in control, that is to say the concealment of information on behalf of its strategic priorities. This secret organization – which cannot be attributed to an alleged Japanese specificity – represents a danger not only to the population, but in this precise case, also for global public goods. Additionally, this has now proven to be more problematic than international instances of regulation – such as the AIEA – which is more concerned about the military advantage of this technology than its civil use which is, however, particularly risky.
References
Chateauraynaud Francis, Torny Didier, Les Sombres précurseurs : une sociologie pragmatique de l’alerte et du risque, Paris, EHESS, 1999.
Ishibashi Katsuhiko, “Why Worry? Japan’s Nuclear Plants at Grave Risk from Quake Damage”, International Herald Tribune, 11 août 2007.
McCormack Gavan, « Le Japon nucléaire ou l’hubris puni », Le Monde diplomatique, avril 2011.
Poirmeur Yves, « Qu’est-ce qu’une information loyale ? », in: Josepha Laroche (Éd.), La Loyauté dans les relations internationales, 2e éd., Paris, L’Harmattan, 2011. Coll. Chaos International.
Weaver Kent R., « The Politics of Blame Avoidance », Journal of Public Policy, 6 (4), 1986, pp. 371-398.
Apr 26, 2011 | Diplomacy, International migrations, North-South, Passage au crible (English)
By Catherine Wihtol de Wenden
Translation: Davina Durgana
Passage n°38
The meeting on Tuesday, April 26th 2011 between Nicolas Sarkozy and Silvio Berlusconi was held on the control of consecutive migrations of Arab revolutions; France has announced the beginning of a safeguard clause planned by the Schengen against immigrants arriving at the Franco-Italian border.
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
The revolutions that have arisen on the southern shore of the Mediterranean (Tunisia, Egypt, Libya) have aroused alarmist discourse on the migratory risk implicit for Europe. Thus, in his speech on February 27th 2011, President Sarkozy has with all in agreement – discussed the situation derived from the growth of migration and Islamism. He has indicated that major consequences of “migratory flows that have become uncontrollable and on terrorism” should be assumed, adding that, “it’s all of Europe that would be on the front lines”. Since then, the Media has not stopped interrogating the tie that exists between the Revolution on the interior of these countries and the migratory movements that have resulted, though it is rare to see revolutionaries leaving their country without waiting for the aftermath of their victory in growth of liberties and equality. One month later, the arrival of approximately 28.000 Tunisians and Libyans on the Italian island of Lampedusa has provoked contention between the President of Council, Silvio Berlusconi – who had decided to deliver temporary visas of three months to those who requested asylum in the form of territorial asylum – and France who has refused to allow migrants to breach the Franco-Italian border though regulated by the Schengen Accords (free movement on the interior of the Schengen Zone, of 28 European countries). On April 20th, 2011 French authorities have announced that they have decided to suspend the provisory application method of this convention to apply the clause of preemptive safeguard “in cases of threats to the public security” and to allow them to resume state control of borders.
Theoretical framework
We consider two lines of logic:
1. The Multilateral and Bilateral Accords of Border Control, a new diplomacy of migrations. Signed between an E.U. country and a coastal country within the E.U. or between a non-European country and the European Union, these accords often aim to limit migratory flows by policies of control of departure and the redirection of undocumented persons to the border, in exchange for development policies, commercial accords or the attribution of visas for certain elites. The most emblematic example remains those of the readmission accords in terms of the European Pact on immigration and asylum of 2008, already put in place by a number of States in a bilateral fashion. Thus, Italy and Libya have already signed many texts in this sense, making Libya the border-guard for Europe against undocumented migrants and requestors of asylum and has engaged in filtering them, without being a signatory to the Geneva Convention on Asylum (1951). In exchange, Tripoli requested 5 billion Euros from the Government of Berlusconi. For their side, Tunisia has also signed bilaterally with Italy and with France documents through which they are engaged in controlling borders and to return redirected undocumented immigrants.
2. The Policy of Outsourcing Borders. The loss of control of the Readmission agreements linked to the end of the dictators of the South poses the question of the efficiency of other European instruments of border control. It would mean on one side, the Schengen Accords on the control of external European borders, and on the other side, the Dublin Accords on the right of asylum within Europe. Finally, Frontex has placed European police in control of borders. Nevertheless, faced with the weak establishment of bilateral readmission accords and border control signed with Libya and Tunisia, one could question what determinations weigh on the instruments of external border control of Europe, spearheaded by the European Policy on Immigration and Asylum since the beginning of the European Pact in 2008. What is Frontex doing? It will carry support for the shipwrecked of the Mediterranean to bring them to European coasts, despite the lack of resources, even when their budget in 2010 was 88 million Euros. Additionally emphasized, is that the European system seems to be less effective when bilateral accords are tied to signatory dictators. In fact, Tunisia, Libya and Egypt did not have a multilateral readmission accord with the European Union. The signed bilateral accords on border control, that is to say, commercial, between heads of States have seemed consequently less efficient because the regimes that have succeeded dictators are considered to be held in less respect. Finally, the current difficulties of managing migratory flows have equally demonstrated a lack of solidarity in the European countries not “sharing the burden” of Italy.
Analysis
An overview of the migratory context of depart and return on the Southern bank of the Mediterranean has driven us to identify very diverse migratory situations. Tunisia is a country of emigration in which 50% of the population is under 25 years of age, is largely urban, educated and racked with unemployment. Nevertheless, due to its proximity to Europe, it is also a transitory country for sub-Saharans. Another transit country, Libya, which in 2009 sheltered 780.000 foreigners, according to the report of the United Nations on Population, represents a country of immigration, considering its oil resources. This country attracts a southern migration (to say South-South) essentially coming from neighboring states (Egypt, Niger, Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria). Most of these migrants are now repatriated to their country of origin, which has sometimes organized the return of their deported, such as Morocco for example. Others are returned to their homes by all means, anxious about climates of violence. As for Egypt, it’s a country of depart towards the countries of the Gulf, Italy, Libya and to a lesser degree, some other European countries (France, Spain).
These States have signed bilateral and multilateral readmission accords with their European neighbors through which they are engaged in sending home undocumented migrants redirected to the border of the European countries, despite their nationalities or if they are migrants in transit on their territory are then arrested in Europe. Since these conventions were signed between States or with the European Union, they have often been negotiated directly between Presidents Berlusconi, Kaddafi and Ben Ali, in exchange for funds such as the obtainment of visas for candidates (very qualified) initially, measures of aid or development or gifts, such as the construction of a freeway from the East to the West from Libya to Egypt. However, has the end of these authoritarian regimes led now to the end of their engagement as shields of Europe?
In Tunisia, the candidates of departure previous to the Jasmine Revolution profited from the opportunity of more relaxed police control of the borders. They have attempted to leave from less common points of departure such as the Zarzis region, near the Island of Djerba. Unemployment, poverty, and hopelessness faced with the consequences of a revolution in employment and standard of living have incited them to leave. The majority are not requesting asylum, but they are mostly economic migrants that dream of Europe in general, and France in particular. A majority of these migrants are found on the Island of Lampedusa. In return, the migrants in transit in Tunisia have taken other routes or are repatriated to sub-Saharan Africa. As for Libyan migrants, they are often considered as requesting asylum by the Italian State. Globally, the labor migrants of the south have taken the route of return towards their country of origin, repatriated sometimes by the Italians or regrouped behind the borders of neighbor countries of Libya: 336. 658 people have thus gone to Libya, and 165,000 towards Tunisia. Then, the U.N has invited these States to maintain their open borders because for William Swing, Director General of the International Organization of Migrations, “it is one of the most important humanitarian evacuations of history”.
References
Cassarino Jean-Pierre, Unbalanced Reciprocities: Cooperation on readmission in the Euro-Mediterranean Area, Middle East Institute, September 2010, 93 p.
Wihtol de Wenden Catherine, La Question migratoire au XXIe siècle. Migrants, réfugiés et relations internationales, Paris, Presses de sciences-Po, 2010.
Apr 1, 2011 | China, Diplomacy, Passage au crible (English)
By Jenna Rimasson
Translation: Melissa Okabe
Passage au crible n°36
On March 11, 2011, Japan experienced an earthquake with a magnitude of 9 on the Richter scale, the epicenter of which was located in the Pacific Ocean. These tremors had immediately prompted a tsunami which devastated the east coast of the archipelago region, where the country’s nuclear power stations are concentrated. Therefore, a nuclear catastrophe is added to this humanitarian crisis, making it a concern of the entire world. The Chinese state, a close neighbor to Japan, quickly reacted to the Japanese tragedy. It sent rescue teams, emergency equipment for the survivors, and even fuel, while organizing blood donations in its universities and certain public spaces. Finally, its government evacuated 3000 citizens from disaster zones. However, this situation leads China to especially question its own management of nuclear energy.
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
In 1281, the Kamikaze typhoon (divine wind) destroyed Kubilai Khan and his Mongolian fleet, which attempted to invade the chain of Japanese islands. This natural element guaranteed the independence of the country from China, a situation preserved until World War II.
China, on the contrary, experienced two major defeats against Japan, in 1895 and in 1931. The latter ended with the Japanese occupation of Manchuria until 1945, the year in which the atomic bombings of Nagasaki and of Hiroshima forced Tokyo to surrender.
These historic episodes always arouse diplomatic tension, such as Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine, a Shinto sanctuary in Tokyo, or even the Chinese territorial claims over the Diaoyu Islands. However, the earthquake which occurred in the Chinese province of Szechuan, on May 12, 2008, allowed for a Sino-Japanese rapprochement. Indeed, Peking accepted humanitarian aid offered by the Japanese rescue teams.
Regarding the nuclear file in its entirety let us recall that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is part of the nuclear powers; its first nuclear test was carried out on October, 16, 1964 in Lop Nor, in the Xinjiang province. In 1984, China became a member of the lAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) and on March 9, 1992, after years of refusal, Peking finally ratified the NPT (Non-Proliferation Treaty).
Theoretical framework
1. Emergency Aid. During natural disasters, states but also NGOs – in particular those who possess an international dimension – provide financial and material aid to disaster-stricken regions. Besides this display of compassion, this assistance increases the visibility of the donor and allows him to impose his ethical values on the global scene.
2. Re-appropriation of diplomatic action by informal means. Civil Society Actors by-pass traditional institutions to implement a foreign policy which distinguishes itself from that of States. This phenomenon illustrates a revolution of capacities, evoked by the American political analyst, James Rosenau, when he invites us to revalue their role, taking micro-macro mixing into consideration.
Analysis
Chinese-Japanese relations actually find themselves in a difficult phase, due to military tensions in the China Sea and the economic crisis heavily felt in Japan. Often paralyzed, traditional diplomatic institutions stop real dialogue between Peking and Tokyo. Yet, the earthquakes in Szechuan, and that which largely destroyed the Hondo Island, were the occasions of the greatest solidarity between these two peoples. In fact, the Chinese remember the aid offered by their neighbors and at present, mobilize themselves to go to their rescue. Micro-social interaction, at the level of the individual, establishes itself, making the erosion of the stato-national frame apparent. In this context of crisis and emergency, Central Administrations of the State and PCC are by-passed to the benefit of local levels – sister cities to Japanese municipalities are at present making their contributions – or still, civil society with the intervention of associations, and national NGO’s, such as the Red Cross for example. Therefore, one sees the necessity of rapid action favors a redistribution of authority to profit sub-national and transnational entities. The cooperative dynamic which establishes itself obliges political powers to bend their strategy; the diplomatic play of these new actors is forcing them to modify their initial positions. Often criticized for their lack of autonomy, Chinese NGOs at the moment use their privileged governmental connections to bend the decision of the latter. These organizations impose themselves on political institutions thanks to their more appropriate routine of action and the fact that the source of their legitimacy comes from below. As time goes by, they become indispensable interlocutors at the very moment when the Chinese State attempts to maintain its monopolies despite controversy. This operation appears more well-to-do as the assistance offered to inhabitants of the archipelago agrees with the Chinese conception of human rights, oriented more toward the economic and social, rather than political, dimension. It is emphasized, on the other hand, that the crisis affecting Japan also benefits the Sino-Taiwanese relations, with the implementation of increased cooperation in sanitary risk prevention and emergency aid.
The impact on Chinese politics is also shown through the State Administration’s emphasis on Nuclear Security and the greater role granted to the Ministry of the Environment. Previously maintained at the level of a simple agency, this henceforth has a more important budget. However, the increasing influence of the experts in the decision-making of Zhongnanhai constitutes the most considerable element because knowledge became a legitimizing tool likely to modify the hierarchy of the priorities on the governmental agenda. Peking, which at the moment manages the construction of 25 nuclear power stations, 13 already being in service, has just halted the decision to set up new infrastructures and to substantially strengthen safety standards, systems of alert / measure of the radioactivity.
The natural elements and nuclear technology strain the Sino-Japanese relationships as much as questions of national security and public health. They impose more transparency on Chinese leaders and also a bigger consideration of the public opinion. Nevertheless, the energy needs of China remind the government of priorities of another order. Indeed, in 2007, Peking and the French company Areva signed the biggest contract ever concluded in the nuclear domain – at 8 billion euro – to increase its’ energy production and acquire new technology: the famous reactors of the EPR (European Pressurized Reactor) generation.
The operation of the atomic energy remains – as in numerous countries – a subject of secret defense and consequently difficult to deliver to the democratic debate. However, the partnerships which form between public spheres in this strategic sector reveal a certain decline of the State to the benefit of the economic entities.
References
Areva, « Dossier de presse. Areva en Chine », nov. 2007.
Fossier Astrid, « Présentation générale de la société civile en Chine », Monde chinois, (19), aut. 2009, pp.9-14.
Niquet Valérie, « Du Tremblement de terre du Sichuan aux Jeux olympiques : la Chine face aux défis politique de l’année 2008 », Asie Vision, (8), sept. 2008, en ligne, www.ifri.org/downloads/Asie_Visions_8_Niquet.pdf, consulté le 10 juillet 2010.
Xinhuawang, « La Chine accorde avantage d’aide au Japon », 17 mars 2011, En ligne, http://french.news.cn/chine/ 2011-03/17/c_13782500.htm, consulté le 25 mars 2011.
Xinhuanet, « 山西省红十字会开展日本地震后寻人工作 », [La Croix Rouge de la province du Shanxi déploie ses activités de recherche des rescapés japonais après le séisme], le 17 mars 2011, En ligne, http://www.sx.xinhuanet.com/jryw/2011-03/17/content_22301497.htm, consulté le 25 mars 2011.
The Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China, « 日本发生特大地震后中国多部委表示向日 提供援助 » [Après le séisme, les différents ministères chinois offrent leur assistance au Japon], le 16 mars 2011, En ligne, http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2011-03/16/content_1825560.htm, consulté le 25 mars 2011.
Mar 25, 2011 | Development, North-South, Passage au crible (English), Poverty
By Clément Paule
Translation: Melissa Okabe
Passage au crible n°35
On March 20, 2011, the Global Day of Solidarity with the Uprisings of the Arab and African people was celebrated in many countries, as much so in France as in Mexico or Morocco. Organized by networks belonging to associations such as ATTAC (Association for the Taxation of financial Transactions and Aid to Citizens) or the CADTM (Committee for the Abolition of Third World Debt), this movement was initially decided within the setting of the WSF (World Social Forum) in Dakar. From February 6-11, 2011, the eleventh edition of this international gathering of alter-globalists had in fact reunited some tens of thousands participants in the Senegalese capital. After the opening march and the series of workshops, on February 10, 2011, the Social Movements Assembly produced a declaration anticipating the convergence of two initiatives*. Additionally on March 20th, the Global Day of Action Against Capitalism was decided to be held on October 12, 2011.
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
Let us recall that the first WSF was held in Porto Alegre on January 25-30 2001, during the continuation of the mobilization against the WTO (World Trade Organization) Summit in Seattle. In this particular case, the event was symbolically created in reaction to the World Economic Forum in Davos. With the elaboration of a Charter of Principles, the Porto Alegre movement also equipped itself with an International Board and Steering Committee to ensure the permanence of the process. The WSF often took place in Brazil – four times in Porto Alegre in 2001, 2002, 2003 and 2005, and in Belém in 2009 –, while also being exported in India – to Mumbai in 2004 –, in Africa – in Nairobi in 2007 and in Dakar in 2011 – as well as in Karachi, Caracas and Bamako within the framework of the 2006 poly-centric meeting. Numerous regional events have been created for a decade, as seen in the African, Asian, European, Maghreb, etc. social forums. It is also emphasized that 55 summits of this type have been held in 28 different countries in 2010.
Besides that, it is noted that this expansion attests to the diversification – at least geographically – of the public and of tackled issues, as seen with the increasing number of regular participants. Among these, one indicates the emergence of charismatic leaders and the eagerly anticipated announcement of their take on such issues. Here, we refer to names such as Samir Amin, Demba Moussa Dembelé, Bloke Massiah, Amina Dramane Traoré or even Immanuel Wallerstein. In 2005, nineteen personalities of this stature signed the Manifesto of Porto Alegre containing twelve propositions, including the cancellation of Southern debt, the Tobin tax, the dismantling of tax havens, etc. However, this statement remains devoid of official value, even if it can be considered as a minimal base of alter-globalization. Generally speaking, the founders of the WSF and a part of their promoters tried to create an open anti-authority platform, a place of non-decisive exchange. However, this conception suffered recurring criticism, stigmatizing the inefficiency of a disorganized gathering that puts politics aside.
Theoretical framework
1. Heterogeneity of the militant space. Proposed by Lilian Mathieu, the concept of space – understood as the practical universe and in a relatively autonomous sense at the center of the social world – allows for the reproduction of this group of participants whose resources and positions remain very diverse. Moreover, it emphasizes the permeable borders of alter-globalization. In this configuration, there are permanent internal struggles over the definition of this label, and an increasing possibility of attack by external stakeholders.
2. Political Investment Strategies. As such, this flexibility can favor the re-appropriation of an event by professional actors within the political arena. Situated across various levels, these interferences spark controversies and feed the evolution of the WSF in and of itself.
Analysis
First off, most of the commentators emphasized the agenda-setting function of the Forum – for themes that received little media coverage. Case in point, let us indicate the stakes which constitute land grabbing – or migrant rights. However, the emergence of this problem owes itself very much to the 2010 regional gatherings, such as the Cochabamba Summit dedicated to climate change. However to inquire over the selection of these multiple causes dismisses the extreme variety of present activists, often shadowed by the vague term civil society. Revisiting the recommendations of Sidney Tarrow, it is advised to distinguish these actors according to their resources and their modes of action rather than classify them according to their ideology. Hence, strong disparities appear within the alter-globalist space, translated first off by the difficulty of small associations to finance their participation in an autonomous manner. In the same logic, the implementation of activities – in a generally disorganized climate – tends to favor the habitual WSF organizations, having competences and superior means to manage logistical faults. In spite of efforts made by the International Methods Committee – special pricing, considering Dakar, caravans (campaigns), etc. –, this relative marginalization of the layman invalidates the idea that a fair structure of political opportunities exists. Let us equally mention the strong geographic disparities despite the presence of delegations from about 130 countries. If the forum remains above all a place of meeting and networking, the large committees – CRID (The Research and Information Centre for Development), ActionAid, Via Campesina, etc. – occupy a central position. As evidence, the creation of ATTAC – Senegal during the event enabled 800 memberships.
However, this heterogeneity seemingly favored by a Forum is conceived as an open space, forbidding any official decision-making. Under this relationship, the sixth principle of the Charter asserts that no one is authorized to express, in the name of the WSF, the document more generally proclaiming independence from politics. According to Chico Whitaker, an international meeting must consider the good of mankind which cannot be privatized nor prioritized. In this respect, material management can seem ambiguous, in particular due to the financial uncertainty of the organizers. Therefore, let us cite the substantial contribution from Morocco, at the moment when this government had unofficially mandated a delegation of agents to oppose the Sahrawian presence at the Forum. Soon after, the Senegalese authorities hosting the Summit, adopted an ambiguous attitude, qualifying as passive resistance, even seen as sabotage by Immanuel Wallerstein. It is noted that criticism was especially aimed at President Wade who distanced himself from anti-globalization during a conference organized on February 7th. Around the contours of the 2012 presidential elections, the climate of social tension which ruled over Senegal along with the increasing protests – aggravated by the question of unballastings and of unemployment – would have led Wade to hinder the holding of the international and anti-authority gathering. If his invitation to the Forum had aroused lively debates, the keynote speech pronounced by Evo Morales was also targeted. The Bolivian President, as well as the Brazilian ex-leader Lula, in fact insisted on the necessity of changing things by attaining power, contrary to the dominant strategy of the forum which aims to push politics aside. At that very moment, activists – following the example of Gus Massiah – were able to denounce the reclamation of propositions, such as the Tobin tax or the control of tax havens, by the G20. As summarized by Samir Amin, “the WSF remains… lagging behind, always “late” in relation to the progress recorded on the ground by the fights”. Here, this economist evokes a relative disconnection between the Tunisian and Egyptian movements and the Forum, even if it is advisable to take into account the importance of the delegations coming from the Maghreb and from the Mashriq, and requires emphasis on the implementation of eleven social forums in these regions in 2010.
References
Mathieu Lilian, « L’espace des mouvements sociaux », Politix (77), 2007, pp. 131-151.
Revue française de science politique, « Les ONG face aux mouvements altermondialistes », 54 (3), juin 2004.
Tarrow Sidney G., The New Transnational Activism, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005.
Wallerstein Immanuel, “The World Social Forum, Egypt and Transformation”, 20 février 2011, à l’adresse web : http://www.iwallerstein.com/the-world-social-forum-egypt-and-transformation/ [10 mars 2011].
Pour une synthèse retraçant les grandes lignes de cet événement, cf. « Forum Social Mondial de Dakar, 6-11 février 2011 », Fil d’Ariane – Contributions
For a retracted summary of the main themes of this event, refer to: « Forum Social Mondial de Dakar, 6-11 février 2011 », Fil d’Ariane – Contributions
*For a retracted summary of the main themes of this event, refer to: « Forum Social Mondial de Dakar, 6-11 février 2011 », Fil d’Ariane – Contributions, located to : http://www.chaos-international.org/images/stories/fil_dariane_dakar.pdf [11 mars 2011]
Feb 3, 2011 | European Union, Passage au crible (English)
By Klaus-Gerd Giesen
Translation: Justine Davis
Passage au crible n°34
On December 17, 2010, the European Union granted Montenegro official candidate status. This was the only nation authorized by the European Council to join the group that included Croatia, Iceland, Macedonia, and Turkey, whereas the Albanian and Serbian requests were postponed. A few days after this decision, the Prime Minister, Milo Djukanovic, left the post that he had occupied almost completely without interruption since 1991. And yet, the two events are intimately connected.
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
At the age of 29, Milo Djukanovic took the reins of power when Montenegro was still part of Yugoslavia. With the support of his mentor, Slobodan Milosevic, he achieved success in the Anti-bureaucracy revolution within the Communist League. Ever since, Djukanovic has constantly ruled over the little Balkan state, with the lone exception of a 16-month interruption (October 2006-February 2008). He served five terms as chief of government and two as president. Beginning his political career as a dogmatic communist, he was quickly converted to Serbian nationalism during the civil war that unsettled Yugoslavia in the 1990s. Afterwards, he turned against his old ally, Milosevic, before finally embodying a freedom fighter leadership, which was fulfilled by Serbia’s secession in 2006.
As for the European Union enlargement process outside of the 27 current member states, it appears to be at a complete halt since the 2005 referendums on the European Constitution, and further weakened by the severe economic crisis of 2008-2009. A certain enlargement fatigue has been felt; for example, Croatia still has not succeeded in finalizing its membership. In this context, it is all the more surprising that Montenegro succeeded in passing the first step in the membership process, namely the Stabilization and Association Agreement.
Theoretical framework
There are two combining explanatory factors:
1. The unilateral mastery of all the stages of the European Union membership process raises an efficient lever of soft power. It allows the European Union to influence the domestic politics of the countries desiring to join.
2. Nevertheless, certain endogenous forces remain in a position to structurally resist Brussels guardianship and to adapt themselves to pressure.
Analysis
Official membership status was given to Montenegro in exchange for the departure of Milo Djukanovic from his state functions. Djukanovic, who benefited from the support of his friend, Silvio Berlusconi, became, over the years, an embarrassing figure for the majority of other heads of state or for Western European governments. As the head of a progressively transforming nation, under his neo-patrimonial leadership, he also led a clan that was qualified by numerous observers as a mafia. Additionally, implicated in countless corruption scandals, Djukanovic has been considered a pariah since enormous cigarette smuggling took place that he supported, or even supervised, between 1995 and 2002, causing the loss of billions of Euros worth of taxes of the member states of the European Union. Finally, his regime, though elected with all of the appearances democratically, regularly intimidates the independent media. For example, Italian and German judges took interest in his case, but were hindered in their investigations by his immunity thanks to his status as Prime Minister or president.
Dominating the local structures of power, which are profoundly flooded with corruption and vote-buying, Djukanovic’s departure – at the age of only 48 – could only have been imposed from the outside. Supported primarily by Germany, the European Commission discretely made Montenegro understand that it would not gain candidate status as long as its leader remained in power. His promise to depart was thus able to drive the European Council’s decision on December 17, 2010.
In reality, Brussels exerted pressure due to the problems that were encountered during the last enlargement, which went into effect January 1, 2007. Indeed, admitted to the EU even though reservations were expressed about the integrity of their judicial systems, their level of corruption and the governmental will to fight against organized crime, Bulgaria and Romania have since been the object of an absolutely new European follow-up. Four years later, the results remain insufficient. Regularly reprimanded by the Commission for the passivity of their political elites, the two newcomers are still as tainted by corruption and organized crime. This is a true affront for the European institutions, and all the more so since the freezing of important subsidies to Bulgaria has not succeeded in changing the situation. This is the reason that the European Commission decided to change its strategy and require, henceforth, an acceptable level of combat against corruption and organized crime, occurring preferably long before any membership negotiation or at the latest just before negotiations begin. This is the credibility of a European integration project where the core remains the demonstration of a unique and completely transparent market which functions without illegal obstacles. Croatia has already been subjected to these expenses (rather belatedly), because the former Prime Minister, Ivo Sanader, has been imprisoned since December 10, 2010 in Austria, after being accused of being directly implicated in several corruption scandals that shook Croatia.
It remains to be seen whether the European Commission’s new approach will really allow for encouragement of structural reforms. In Montenegro’s case, one could express serious doubts due to the fact that the former Prime Minister, Milo Djukanovic, will not at all step down from politics and will remain at the head of the principle governmental party, DPS, which followed the old Communist League.
Accordingly, he will continue to control the government of the new Prime Minister, Igor Luksic, a 34-year-old, young technocrat. One might say that the maneuvering margin of the latter to modernize the country and initiate membership negotiations appears to be narrow. We must see here the proof that though the European Union Soft Power is perhaps successful at influencing these events, it does not succeed in modifying the structures – especially in occurrences of neo-patrimonial organizations – that are within the nations on its outskirts.
References
Giesen Klaus-Gerd, « La crise économique et l’érosion de la souveraineté monténégrine », Le Courrier des Balkans, 31 mars 2009, http://balkans.courriers.info/article12586.html
Krifa-Schneider Hadjila (Éd.), L’Élargissement de l’Union européenne, Paris, L’Harmattan, 2007.
Sajdik Martin, Scwarzinger Michael, Europen Union Enlargement, New Brunswick, Transaction Publishers, 2008.
Telo Mario, Europe: A Civilian Power?, Basingstoke, Palgrave/Macmillan, 2007.
