Feb 28, 2012 | Africa, China, Development, Passage au crible (English), Security
By Philippe Hugon
Translation: Melissa Okabe
Passage au crible n°59
Pixabay
Meetings dedicated to food security multiplied at the beginning of 2012, while studies reporting the assessment of land transactions show that between 2000 and 2010, on 200 million hectares of monopolized land, three-quarters were intended for biofuels and not for food security (Cirad, IIED, ILC,2012). Cornering of land in developing countries, in Africa and South America in particular, are therefore the object of increasing anxiety, while in a context of high agricultural and food prices, food security is threatened. Generally, these misconceived and nontransparent transactions lead to violent controversies, in particular between NGOs, international organizations, political decision-makers, peasant organizations and researchers. In Madagascar, for example, these deals played a decisive role in Marc Ravelomanana’s departure following the planned contract with the Korean firm Daewo.
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
In the Southern countries, over a period of about thirty years, we observed a low rate of agricultural investment and a downward trend of public aid in agriculture. Yet, the turning point of the 21st century is marked by an inversion of this trend. Large-scale international land acquisitions, like those of China, are multiplying in the Southern countries especially in Africa. Indeed, this continent is not only coveted for its under-ground resources (mines, hydrocarbons), but also for the wealth of its lands. In this respect, we can talk about a global game of Monopoly to acquire land. However, there are numerous unknown factors in the effective realization of these projects, compared to publicized announcements.
Theoretical framework
1. The fast growth of transactions. In a global context of rising agricultural prices, strong instabilities in financial markets and anticipation of an increase in organic-food consumption, land transactions under the forms of purchases or long-term rents (long leases) are quickly growing.
2. The emergence of a new neocolonialism. Do China’s land investments respond to a strategy of development aid as stated by authorities and several international organizations; do they create real opportunities, or are they rather a form of neocolonialism denounced by numerous NGOs?
Analysis
First off, land cornering aims to produce biofuels. It also corresponds to anticipations in terms of food security or changes in the modes of consumption. Finally, they represent security investments. This results from three types of investors: 1) states deficit in lands and strong food importers, possessing strong financing capacities. 2) big food-processing groups but also industrialists, who most often testify to the logic of integrating the upstream in the downstream and/ or contractual farming for foodstuffs. 3) investors and banks considering land as securities investments.
The sellers and renters are countries with weak financial means but apparently have available land. This is the case in Africa where, since 2004, states have rented or sold more than 2.5 million hectares. Benefiting from more than 80 % of non-cultivated farmland1 this continent thus became the object of greed by investors in search of food and/or energy security. Also, Africa has seen a multiplication of bio-industrial and security investments.
China invests all over the world in the farming sector. Globally, it possess 2.1 of 2.8 million hectares in South America, Africa, South-East Asia (300,000 of 400,000 hectares – rice, wood), in Australia, in Russia and in Kazakhstan (87,400 hectares). Appropriation of lands movements in Africa emanate from: 1) government corporations (such as the China State Farm Agribusiness in Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Tanzania, Togo or Zambia). 2) regions with a measure of autonomy (for example the Shanxi Province Agribusiness Group). 3) from individual initiatives.
Several types of profits are expected, such as the influx of investment which would compensate for the reduction in Public Development Aid, technology and skill contributions, improvements in yields and productivity, food safety, or moreover, obtaining currencies (as in the case of biofuels). In fact, Chinese seeds can multiply the yields by two. On the other hand, other effects are more problematic. For example, Chinese installation in Mozambique’s big farms, planned exports, before the fall of Gaddafi, rice for the Chinese in Libya via the Malybia project or the biofuel project for 2 million hectares in Zambia and palm oil in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The main risks are: 1) land conflicts as vulnerable communities, among which 80 % are without title deeds, risk to lose their land rights. 2) lack of transparency of contracts. 3) infringement on food security and sovereignty. 4) negative environmental effects, connected in particular to hybrid rice, GMOs, and control of seeds.
On the contrary, seizing opportunities connected to land transactions implies that various actors are stakeholders in the contracts, that the farmers’ property rights are protected and that family farms benefit, thanks to subcontracts, infrastructure arrangements, input location and credit, the appropriate externalities for big operations.
References
Afrique contemporaine « Investissements agricoles en Afrique » (237) N, 2011. CIRAD, IIUED, ILC (M Taylor ,al) www.landcoalition.org/cpl/CPL-synthesis-Report, déc 2012.
“Land grab or development opportunity? Agricultural investment and international land deals in Africa” Juin 2009 – IIED, FAO and IFAD – Lorenzo Cotula, Sonja Vermeulen, Rebeca Leonard, James Keeley. Philippe Hugon, Fabienne Clérot « Les relations Chine-Afrique- les investissements agricoles au Mali », Rapport MAEE, 2010
1. 1.5 billion of 2.7 billion hectares of arable land are cultivated in the world, that is 55 %. Approximately only 190 million hectares of farmland on the African continent are exploited, which is a fifth of the total potential (source Agrimonde, FAO).
Feb 27, 2012 | Digital Industry, Internet, Passage au crible (English), Publications (English)
By Alexandre Bohas
Translation: Melissa Okabe
Passage au crible n°58
Pixabay
The Megaupload affair could simply be considered as the last of a long series of copyright disputes. But its global character as well as its consequences, with the rejection of the PIPA and SOPA laws, makes for a pivotal event in the normative and institutional construction of the internet.
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
On January 19, 2012, 18 main Megaupload managers, including the emblematic Kim « Dotcom » Schmitz, were arrested for violating copyright laws, money laundering, and racketeering. Then the FBI decided its closure by blocking its web domain. For millions of users, this had a global effect, both by media coverage and by the consequences of these police operations. Based in Hong Kong, this leading company in direct downloads attracted, up to that date, nearly 50 million visitors per day, and counted 150 million official users, their connections generating nearly 4% of the global digital traffic. We counted, 525 servers in America, 630 in Holland allowing this connection.
In reaction to this sudden raid, a number of anonymous hackers and simple users protested against this ruling. The leaders even pirated highly symbolic sites such as the American Presidential site or Universal’s site, sites that were made unavailable. At the same time, Congress had to vote on two legal bills against cybercrime and counterfeiting, PIPA and SOPA. In particular, they expected to widen US judicial powers by allowing the possibility to proceed in taking down all suspicious internet content, whether it originated from the United States or abroad. However, in front of the mobilization of numerous organizations, and also influent groups, their adoption was pushed back.
Theoretical framework
1. Global commodification of the Internet. Introduced by multinational firms, this process aims at establishing principle trade as the fundamental framework of this sphere. It « dis-embeds » its social environment, an image that Karl Polanyi previously qualified in another time and place as The Great Transformation. Progressively replacing relationships based on free access (wantonness), reciprocity and exchange, principle trade came to threaten cultural, economic and social diversity, and demonstrated once and for all that the market remained a constructed, even compulsory institution.
2. Governance of digital training technology. This notion indicates a way to exert power which is supposedly less constraining, more consensual and more representative than the concept of the government. This is the reason that it is used in an increasing manner both by international organizations and specialists to describe the types of regulation adapted to globalized societies marked by a multitude of stakes and transnational actors. Yet, it nevertheless silences the violence of oppositions and the means of police and judicial coercion, put in place to regulate the concerned sectors.
Analysis
At present, the internet forms an integral part of society where one goes for distraction, to carry out research and to work. In this way, the internet leads to numerous interactions of exchange and sharing. These often register outside the trade framework and arise rather from reciprocity. For example, peer-to-peer and streaming constitute modes of original distribution and on a world scale. Moreover, networks such as YouTube favored community type de-territorialized links where innovative forms of expression and creation were able to manifest. Yet, transnational firms deliver a real fight to take part in structuring this central space for millions of consumers. Indeed, within its behavior, it is important to encourage values as well as representations which are favorable to them. But it assumes that the principle of private property has been previously established and recognized as such that they can then legally claim rights to the exchanged goods and services. This so that the market establishment allows them to commercially value their productions. Such an organization according to the laws of supply and demand would confer on themselves a de facto supremacy because they would centralize the copyright, as well as the means to create, produce and diffuse its goods.
Where does the battle over the legal rules of Internet come from? We have already evoked the international elaboration processes of substantive law as well as the huge trials in this matter*. Since the first legal proceedings against Napster until the one against Megaupload, they tried hard to contain, otherwise to reduce, flows escaping the intellectual property rules and thus the copyright payments. Over the years, sites deemed as pirated no longer proposed anything but legal offers, following the example of Napster or Kazaa; or either they were forced to purely and simply stop their activity as in the case of Emulator or Limewire.
However, strength is to observe that the influence of these groups does not remain unlimited. By shaping this sphere, they collide, on one hand, with the diffuse and ill-assorted world of Internet users; on the other hand they have to face other companies directly resulting from Internet. These companies – such as Wikipedia or Google – benefited from creativity and freedom allowed on the Internet *, which explains their active mobilization against the PIPA and SOPA laws.
During these last weeks we’ve seen a violent clash between two centers of the American economy, Hollywood and Silicon Valley. Taking advantage of the support of public opinion, the latter knew how to lead, despite the lobbying of the former. In terms of these confrontations, they take the shape of new rules and institutions. Far from a consensus obtained by negotiation or dialogue, governance of the Internet emerged from the fight between challenger firms which also have to count with the government of the United States as decisive authority.
References
Auffray Christophe, « MegaUpload : décryptage de l’affaire et des accusations », ZDNet France, 23 janv. 2012, disponible sur le site web : www.zdnet.fr.
*Bohas Alexandre, « Coup de force numérique, domination symbolique. Google et la commercialisation d’ouvrages numérisés », Passage au crible, (5), 16 nov. 2009, disponible sur le site web : www.chaos-international.org.
*Bohas Alexandre, « Une construction mondiale de la rareté. Le projet ACTA d’accord commercial sur la contrefaçon », Passage au crible, (22), 22 mai 2010, disponible sur le site web : www.chaos-international.org.
« De Napster à Megaupload, le long affrontement entre la justice et les services de téléchargement», Le Monde, 23 janv. 2012.
Finkelstein Lawrence S., « What Is Global Governance ? », Global Governance, (1), 1995, pp. 367-372.
Hewson Martin, Sinclair Timothy J. (Eds.), Approaches to Global Governance Theory, Albany, NY, SUNY Press, 1999.
« Lois antipiratage : sous pression, Washington fait machine arrière », Le Monde, 20 janv.2012.
Laroche Josepha, La Brutalisation du monde, du retrait des États à la décivilisation, Montréal, Liber, 2012.
May Christopher, The Global Political Economy of Intellectual Property Rights: The New Enclosures, 2nd Ed., London, Routledge, 2010.
Polanyi Karl, La Grande transformation : aux origines politiques et économiques de notre temps, trad., Paris, Gallimard, 2009.
« Peer-to-peer, la fin d’un protocole ? », Le Monde, 11 mars 2011.
Sell Susan, Private Power, Public Law: The Globalization of Intellectual Property Rights, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003.
Feb 7, 2012 | China, Development, environment, Passage au crible (English)
By Valérie Le Brenne
Translation: Davina Durgana
Passage au crible n°57
Pixabay
On January 15th, 2012, mining company Guangxi Jihne Mining Co. Ltd. Polluted the Longjiang river (situated in the autonomous region of Guangxi, south of China) by dumping cadmium (mineral related to the operation of the zinc and highly toxic). As fish farming remains a core activity, the death of hundreds of fish gave the alarm to the local authorities who immediately tried to neutralize the product. Liuzhou, the second largest city in the region, located 60 km downstream of the pollution, is thus directly exposed. Despite official speeches tinged with optimism, the inhabitants of the city rushed to supermarkets to stock up on bottled water, reinforcing the risk of shortages.
This incident adds to a long list of industrial pollution of waters registered in China in recent years. These damages occur even though the country is experiencing considerable disparities in water and a growing water scarcity, besides the need for multiple energy resources which is increasing exponentially.
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
Since 1979, under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, China has progressively entered the market economy and achieved levels of growth and competitiveness that now make it the second largest economic power in the world. Among the many objectives of this transition, one was to reduce the volume of imports while increasing exports resulted in strong industrial development, posing the question of de facto energy supply necessary for this level of activity. The existence of sub-soils rich in energy (oil, coal, uranium), metallic ores (copper, zinc, bauxite) and non-metallic (graphite, sulfur, phosphorus) quickly led extensive campaigns of prospection and the opening of many mining sites, coinciding with the creation of many extraction companies.
Since the 1990’s, the question of energy is equally posed with the problem of the unequal partition of water on the territory. In fact if South China presents abundant hydraulic resources, allowing rice cultivation, the North remains, however, marked by a lack of water and an arid climate. The aim of rebalancing the South-North transfer peaks elsewhere in the project of Three Gorges Dam completed in 1992, and for which China was sentenced to the International Water Tribunal in The Hague, following a complaint by Canada.
Meanwhile, China has entered a process of urban transition. The influx of rural migrants has led to the emergence of new towns, whose numbers increased from 69 in the late 1940’s, to 670 during the 2000’s.The increase in demand for consumer goods, to which is added the economic opening of coastal cities to foreign companies are increasing industrial production. Therefore, the pollution associated with industrial activities, whether the air pollution, linked to coal mining, or that of water by the discharge of toxic effluents, have multiplied, generating heavy risks to public health.
Theoretical framework
Retain two lines of thought:
1. Pressure on energy resources to meet both local and global demands of economic development poses imperatives of productivity to Chinese industry. Thus, by increasing the pressure on energy resources the privatization of Chinese state enterprises was accelerated. However, the transition to market logic involved, in the words of Susan Strange, “a dispersal of power” that makes more complex attempts at state regulation.
2. The emergence of a Chinese civil society: the increasing amount of industrial incidents has encouraged the emergence of a civil society. This is particularly evident in public health and the environment. These issues represent for social actors poles of structuration, some – strong transnational ties – seem now to be considered by the authorities.
Analysis
Cadmium pollution in the Longjiang River by the mining company Guangxi Jinhe Mining Co. Ltd. is symptomatic of the imperatives of productivity and competitiveness posed by the economic growth of the industry. Indeed, the weight of industrial production generates a constant pressure on energy sources whose control is a major strategic issue. In this perspective, mining firms must enhance their level of activity, achieving higher yields and diversifying their supply sources. Now, many Chinese firms are located in Africa and compete with Western companies in the energy market. However, if the increasing privatization makes the transformation of these companies into transnational companies more possible, it simultaneously reduces the regulatory capacity of the state.
In fact, this incident reveals the absence of binding legislation on corporate environmental responsibility, which has nevertheless generated considerable industrial pollution. Multiple discharges of toxic effluents, such as cadmium, are now causing a real public health problem. Consumption of non-potable water exposes people to serious risks of cancer. Moreover, agriculture is also affected by the environmental impacts of these activities. In 2011, a study published by the economic weekly Xin Shiji revealed that 10% of rice produced in China and exported abroad showed traces of cadmium.
Given the scale of this environmental damage, and under the combined pressure of international organizations and NGOs, the Chinese authorities now aim to reduce their energy consumption and fight against industrial pollution. Besides the creation of local authorities to monitor pollution levels, the government authorizes, under very strict conditions, the existence of environmental NGOs and the presence of international NGOs. Boasting a deficit of state support, the players in the Chinese civil society are therefore taken to be structured around the environmental cause. While informing people of the risks, they also hold some ability to influence state policies, relying in particular on multiple transnational solidarity networks. In evidence of their growing importance, the Chinese government now encourages environmental NGOs to participate in the “black listing” of polluting firms.
References
Chen Jie, « ONG chinoises, société civile transnationale et pratiques démocratiques », Perspectives chinoises, 97, sept-déc 2006.
Colonomos Ariel (Éd.), Sociologie des réseaux transnationaux: communautés, entreprises et individus. Lien social et système international, Paris, L’Harmattan, 1995.
Keck Margareth, Sikkink Kathryn, Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics, Ithaca/London, Cornell University Press, 1998.
Strange Susan, Le Retrait de l’État. La dispersion du pouvoir dans l’économie mondiale, [1996], trad., Paris, Temps Présent, 2011.
Jan 26, 2012 | Communitarianism, North-South, Passage au crible (English)
By Philippe Hugon
Translation: Melissa Okabe
Passage au crible n°56
Pixabay
At the beginning of 2012, Nigeria, ally to the United States and Great Britain, has been undermined by two great crises: 1) that of the North-South confrontation characterized by the spiral of ethno-religious tensions; 2) that of the general strike tied to the increased price of gasoline. Threats by the two great labor unions to stop petroleum production of the prime producer in Africa equally contributed to the gravity of the situation. Certain authorized voices – such as the Nobel prize winner Soyinka – went so far as to evoke the risk of a civil war. Others for their part highlight the risk of secession advancing the comparison of Nigeria to the case of Sudan divided between the Muslim North – where the Sharia reigns – and the Christian South. A leading African country with its population of over 150 million habitants, this federal state– where there is no stop to alternating civil and military regimes –, is familiar with endemic violence which weakens it.
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
Formerly a British colony, today Nigeria is a federal state composed of 36 states contested by centripetal forces which were contained until the present by strong military and civil powers or by federalism. The increase in the number of federal states or rules relative to the transfer of political power between the North and the South or yet still the territorial sharing of income, equally contribute to this logic.
The systems of sultanates and chieftainships of Northern Nigeria strongly differ from the rather cemented sociopolitical organizations of the South. These differentiations were maintained by the indirect rule of the British colonial administration. Since then, the North, where 12 States established Sharia rule, remains altogether disadvantaged in comparison to the South.
The country has been torn by several conflicts of which the most violent being the Biafra war of secession (1967-1970) which saw the opposition of the Ibos (supported by France, Israel and Portugal) against the federation (supported by the United Kingdom and the USSR).The causes of this war are likened at the same time to sociopolitical and religious factors and especially the oil stakes setting major powers and chief warrant officers against each other; these tensions led the internal rivalries in Nigeria. In 1970, 3 R’s (reconstruction, rehabilitation, reconciliation) symbolized the end of the conflict. But the country was familiar with numerous tensions between the North and the South and conflicts at the heart of the Niger Delta.
Theoretical framework
The Nigerian crises reveal two main arguments:
1. Nigeria presents itself as a society characterized by petroleum income and its economic, social and political impact. Richly equipped with hydrocarbons, it also offers easy extraction conditions and transport options made possible by sea access. All together these factors make Nigeria one of the most coveted extraction sites in Africa. However internal tensions have intensified because 90% of these riches are concentrated in the Niger Delta.
2. Nigeria has been historically marked by North-South cleavages both on the social and religious planes. The confrontations between Christian and Muslim communities show that these cleavages are tied to the differences of rights and disparities in the division of the oil pension.
Analysis
The Nigerian conflicts can be deciphered under two main criteria.
The first refers to hydrocarbons. Indeed this sector is strategic from a macro-economic point of view with an oil pension which represents between 35-40 % of the GDP (Gross Domestic Product), 80 % of fiscal receipts and 97 % of the country’s exports. In 2011, the level reached 2.5 million barrels per day at 75 dollars the barrel, making Nigeria the eighth world exporter of oil. Six multinationals control 95 % of the production among which more than 40 % is exported towards the United States being 10 % of their imports. In fact, oil aggravates the number of political tensions because it is concentrated in the Southeast and leads to strong differentiations between states. In the Niger Delta (9 federated states including 30 million inhabitants), certain movements, such as the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), and certain dissident factions have developed considerably. The hydrocarbons sector and the price of the gasoline appear just as much in the heart of social conflicts as far as the oil pension arouses grand corruption and strong capital flight. Now, the redistribution of pensions between states and populations should have particularly been passed as a subsidy allowing two thirds of Nigerians (having an income lower than 2 dollars a day) to access primary necessities.
Within these oil challenges, overlaps a second crisis factor: the North-South cleavages. In the Plateau State capital, Jos, conflicts see opposition between the Fulani Muslims and the Christian Berom, two populations which have different rights. As for the Islamic spheres of influence in the North, they are plural (Sufism of the traditional brotherhoods, the Salafiste, Maadhistes and Shiite movements) with 12 (of 36) states having established Sharia law. The situations of great inequality and exclusion from the rights in a country where the division of the oil pension remains uneven, constitute the main elements explaining the power of Muslim networks; certain politicians want to instrument religious oppositions and spread the Sharia in the Plateau State. The most important question, due to upheavals that occurred in Libya, is at the moment the proliferation of the AQMI (Al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb) nebula. The anti-western Boko Haram movement appeared after September 11th, 2001 located in the State of Borno henceforth developed djihadisme; the movement split into several branches, one being close to the Chebabs of Somalia and Aqmi. Now by its radicalization and violent actions, the movement favors a religious cleavage engendering a spiraling of violence, reprisals and repression.
External powers are also determining actors. Notably the United States to whom Nigeria provides more than 40% of their brut petroleum imports. As for China and India, they look to have their interests prevail in this region. Regarding the Arab petroleum powers and Iran, they press on the Muslim states in the North threatened by radical networks and zones of productions and petroleum transport to the South.
Today, the federal structure of Nigeria, the power of large retails in the North and the memory of Biafra make the process of a North-South separation, under the Sudan model, very improbable. Also, an extension of religious conflict is hardly possible because the North would be defeated. On the other hand, the legitimacy of the present regime has been questioned. The violence will lead to new compromises concerning: 1) redistribution of the oil pension, 2) eradication of corruption and 3) negotiations with the various political, labor-union, and religious protagonists? A contrario, is a return of the Jacobin army and the layman majority possible if violence is extended?
References
Draper Michael I., Shadows: Airlift and Airwar in Biafra and Nigeria, 1967-1970, Hikoki Publications, 2006.
Perouse de Monclos Antoine, “Le Nigeria entre deux eaux”, Ramsès, 2011.
Tai Ejibunu Hassam, “Nigeria’s Delta Crisis: Root causes and Peacelessness”, EPU, research paper, Issue 07/07.
Jan 20, 2012 | Constructivism, Passage au crible (English), Peace
By Thomas Lindemann
Translation: Davina Durgana
Passage au crible n°55
Pixabay
The death of President Kim Jong-Il and the probable succession by a triumvirate driven by his son Kim Jong-Un raises the question again of available options to appease and transform the North Korean regime. The first declarations of the Western chancelleries suggest that our leaders are primarily concerned to show their determination to resist any plans to attack North Korea. Some have even envisioned encouraging a Korean Spring to discard quickly the considerable military potential of this Asian Sparta. Yet, beyond the moral issues, it appears that this regime is not a power challenging the territorial status quo. Recent history shows that the renouncing of any offensive position remains possible if one takes greater account of the symbolic dimension of the aspirations of a regime seeking recognition.
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
North Korea is engaged in an armed conflict in 1950 against its southern neighbor. During the war, U.S. General MacArthur envisioned the recourse to the use of tactical nuclear weapons. The armistice was established in 1953 without a peace treaty regarding the 38th parallel. Since this date, many skirmishes have taken place without provoking a major armed confrontation. More recently, in the March 2010, North Korea was accused of sinking the South Korean corvette Cheonan. Due to this affair, the country was sanctioned and ostracized on the global scene. Then, the North Korean bombing of the island of Yeonpyeong – situated to the west of the peninsula and near the maritime boundary (contested on November 23rd, 2010) – brought attention to the fragile situation between the two Koreas. The new leader, Kim Jong-Un has just pledged that South Korea would be punished for its disrespectful behavior at the funeral of Kim Jong-Il. As for nuclear ambitions, North Korea has since 1993 violated the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty on multiple occasions. The Agreement Framework of 1994 and that of Beijing dating from 2007 have driven the temporary abandonment of nuclear weapons in exchange for economic concessions and a certain diplomatic recognition. However, in May 2009, North Korea conducted a second nuclear test, following a nuclear test in 2006. Today, negotiations are deadlocked.
Theoretical framework
Retain two currents of thought:
1. Traditional approaches to so-called rational choice must often consider that crises are resolved peacefully when the net material benefits of peace outweigh the net material benefits of war. Realist theorists emphasize the importance of security costs in the equation of costs/benefits. In this logic, the more important and credible military threats that are addressed by the United States to North Korea, the more North Korea should be encouraged to behave peacefully and to give up its nuclear plans. Other analysts of a more liberal orientation, place, for their part, more emphasis on the utility of economic sanctions to prevent the deviant behavior of a State.
2. However, a firm policy is far from sufficient and may even be counter-productive if it threatens the survival of a regime or induces threats publicly perceived as humiliating. In a more constructivist view, it seems that the North Korean actors are concerned with confirming a certain image of themselves on the political scene. Thus, diplomatic inclusion – symbolic recognition – could be determinant in the appeasement of this conflict. To the contrary, the stigmatization of a State risks leading to the radicalization of the identities of actors that are formed and transformed by these interactions.
Analysis
All analysis of the North Korean situation raises two questions: are the ambitions of these leaders compatible with the territorial status quo and for what reasons are the North Korean leaders engaged in a policy that seems to be on the brink of the abyss?
Above all, despite the boastful rhetoric of North Korean leaders, there is little evidence in favor of a policy of territorial expansion because the legitimacy of the Kim dynasty resting on his deification is primarily internal. Additionally, since 1953, the North Korean State has had an advantage illustrated by searching for self-sufficiency from bellicose businesses. A very hypothetical conquest of South Korea would not pay for North Korean leaders. How could they in fact require that South Koreans enjoy a standard of living comparable to that of Spain in an authentically totalitarian state?
Everything leads us to believe that the North Korean regime exploits the nuclear agenda in order to gain better recognition. This then poses the problem of the legitimacy of a regime that struggles to meet the most basic needs of its population. Additionally, it is known that North Korean authorities were deeply offended by their inclusion in the Axis of Evil in 2002. George Bush has even called the North Korean regime of the “detestable pygmy” alluding to the small size of Kim Jong-Il. When the North Korean leader launched a satellite into the atmosphere with revolutionary songs on the American Day of Independence in 2009, the message seems clear: “We will force you to recognition by arms.”
Faced with such actors, threats, sanctions and disrespectful declarations could in turn drive a hardening of the regime. They could reinforce the internal legitimacy of the North Korean regime by considering opponents as traitors that were bought by Americans. This could also lead to military escalation. The outcome of this tough policy is negative. The South Korean President Lee Myung-bak has ended the “sunshine policy” of his predecessor by initiating military maneuvers close to the line. But this diplomatic isolation has not ended with the Obama administration coming to power. The latter has relied instead on “strategic patience” and has advocated a policy of openness previously conditioned by evidence of the North Korean goodwill. Worse yet, the South Korean President Lee has implicitly announced on August 15th, 2010 the imminent demise of the North Korean regime by introducing to its citizens the introduction of a new tax intended to prepare the unification of the two nations.
In this context, it is necessary to analyze the North Korean bombing of Yeonpyeong Island in December 2010 as the result mainly of existential fears, rather than as the manifestation of an imperial policy.
References
Bourmaud Daniel, « Le complexe obsidional de la Corée du Nord », in : Josepha Laroche (Éd.), Passage au crible de la scène mondiale, Analyse de la scène mondiale 2009-2010, Paris, 2011, L’Harmattan. Collection Chaos International, pp. 89-92.
Braud, Philippe, L’Émotion en politique, Paris, Presses de Sciences Po, 2006.
Laroche Josepha, La Brutalisation du monde, du retrait des États à la décivilisation, Montréal, Liber, 2012.
Lindemann, Thomas, Sauver la face, sauver la paix, sociologie constructiviste des crises internationales, Paris, L’Harmattan, 2010. Collection Chaos International.
Wendt, Alexander, Social Theory of International Politics, Cambridge University Press, 1999.
