Apr 15, 2012 | Africa, Passage au crible (English), Security, Terrorism
By Philippe Hugon
Translation: Pierre Chabal
Passage au crible 64
Sahara. Pixabay
In Mali, in a context of failure of both political power and of the army, Touareg rebels of the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (NMLA or MNLA), acting jointly with Islamic movements have unilaterally proclaimed, in May 2012, the independence of Azawad. This situation, which leads to the de facto secession of Mali has already led to the fleeing of numerous Malians leaving in the North of the country. Timbuktu, The Mecca of the Sahara, is henceforth controlled by Ansar Dine , whereas some Algerians are known to have been taken hostages in Gao. Beyond these conflicts, the whole Sahelo-Saharan region is concerned.
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
These Touareg movements have existed for some time. Colonial France had opposed Touareg warriors during World War I – while at the same time enrolling them in the Saharan Meharist Companies. At the turn of the 4th and 5th Republics, around 1958, the Common Organisation for Saharan Regions (COSR or OCRS) had as its ambition to create an independent Touareg space, notably to dissociate from Algeria the hydrocarbon-rich Sahara. Azawad has been marked since the independence of Mali by cycles of rebellion, of repression and of negotiation. Kaddafi’s regime had thus recruited in 1972 numerous Touaregs from its Islamic region and periodically revived tensions, before imposing itself as negotiator. However, agreements acknowledging more autonomy and rights to the Touaregs have generally remained a dead letter. The recent downfall of the Kaddafi regime has reactivated these antagonisms, on account of migrants and mercenaries returning home equipped with heavy armament.
One can note nowadays a novel amplitude and nature of claims present. To be sure, the NMLA movement (3000 heavily armed men) has proclaimed independence in rupture with former claims which dealt hitherto simply with equality of rights, a greater autonomy and a lessened marginalisation of Northern Mali. To do so, it was backed by Islamist militias, the Ansar Dine of Lyad ag-Ghali Movement – which advocates Charia – and the MUJAO or UMJWA (Unity Movement for Jihad in West Africa), both having links with Al Qaida Maghreb Islamique or AQMI and even, according to certain sources, with Boko Haram.
Theoretical framework
1. The weakness of the State. The mutiny of rank-and-file military quickly became a putsch with accusations of laxity, nay connivance between the political power and the rebel movements. President Amadou Toumani Touré quickly had to give up his position and National Assembly President Traoré was designated as the transition head of State. This politico-institutional crisis, however, bears testimony first and foremost to the extreme weakness, if not the vacuum of the State. In a country where one witnesses a demographic explosion made worse by recurrent draughts, the situation is marred by traffics of all kinds (cocaine, automobiles, hostages, weaponry), armed conflicts (various Katibas, Al Qaida Maghreb Islamique, Touareg movements) as well as rivalries linked to mining and to the oil industry. This situation brings extreme weakness to portions of population exposed to tensions as recurrent as ancestral (between sedentary farmers and nomadic herdsmen, between descendants of razzia raiders victims of raids).
2. The mounting power of non-State actors. The saharo-Sahelan arc brings together the conditions necessary for non-State actors (such as the NMLA, the Mujao, etc.), however heterogeneous, may now extend their grip on the territory.
Analysis
The objectives of the NMLA (the independence of Azawad), that of Ansar Dine (to establish the Charia in Mali) and that of certain Katibas of AQMI (to set up a khalifat of Mauritania and Somalia) differ. A priori, links appear limited between the djihadist Salafists of AQMI and the Berber Touaregs, who are part of the Malekite branch, which is opened to the Soufism of the Tidjânyia or Kandinya brotherhoods and crossbred with animism. However, the territories where AQMI reins remain the same ones as those where Touaregs are deployed. As to the Adrar region of the Ifaghas, it seems to be a sanctuary for certain katibas. Morever, connivance of interests exist undoubtedly within the control of cocaine- and weapon-trafficking even if some were hoping that the Touareg mercenaries who had returned from Libya would mobilize to oppose AQMI.
Actors concerned by the Malian crisis appear most diverse. Algeria cannot accept the independence of Azawad. Northern Niger shelters some 700 000 Touaregs and is close to Northern Mali. The ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) is concerned by the regional dimension of the conflict: the Community can utilize, within the ECOMOG (Economic Community of West African States Cease-fire Monitoring Group) a Force of between 2000 to 3000 men. However, history shows the low efficiency of ECOWAS troops and this Force would require time before it proved efficient, besides the fact that it would be confronted with problems of logistics. France has for its part been present in the onset of the crisis with the collateral effects of the NATO intervention in Libya, and is felt to be close to the Touareg movements and to be directly concerned by the future of the hostages at a time of elections. France has thus asked its citizens to temporarily leave Mali, without doing as much as intervene militarily.
Humanitarian drama is enhanced by the incoming flows of refugees (200 000 on Malian territory and in neighboring countries, Burkina Faso, Niger, Algeria – as of March 2012) as well as of displaced peoples. The disorganization of production and the impossibility for humanitarian actions to take place normally make the situation all the worse. A mobilization of international aid appears therefore urgent. The independence of Azawad has no legitimacy but the de facto secession will endure. However, solutions seem less military as diplomatic and economic.
References
Boiley Pierre, Les Touaregs Kel Adagh. Dépendances et révoltes du Soudan français au Mali, Paris, Karthala, 1999
Bourgeot André (Éd.), Horizons nomades en Afrique sahélienne, Paris, Kathala, 1999.
GEMDEV, Mali-France. Regards pour une histoire partagée, Paris Karthala, 2005
Hugeux Vincent, Thilay Boris, « Les 12 plaies du Mali », L’express, 11-17 avril 2012w
Hugon Philippe, Géopolitique de l’Afrique, Paris, SEDES, 3e ed. 2012.
Apr 8, 2012 | Global Public Goods, Passage au crible (English)
By Alexandre Bohas
Translation: Pierre Chabal
Passage au crible n°63
Qatar. Baie de l’Ouest. Pixabay
Qatar regularly features high in newspaper headlines for its acquisition of works of art. The reining family, aware of the limited resources of their territory, has invested abroad. This paper seeks to understand this involvement in the field of art, reputed uncertain and unproductive.
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
In tune with the increase in hydrocarbon prices and the financial crisis, Qatar’s micro-monarchy has been proceeding with several investments in various strongholds of the world economy. It already owns luxurious touristic institutions such as the Carlton, the Royal Monceau, Harrods and the Savoy Hotels. It holds also minority participations in French multinationals: Vinci, Lagardère, Vivendi, Total, LVMH, Suez Environnement, as well as in European ones: Volkswagen, Porsche or Barclays.
Beside these assets, the Qatari monarchy is also buying masterpieces by famous painters. In 2011, it ranked 1st in the list of the greatest investors on the art market. One estimates that, in just seven years, US exports to Qatar represent US$ 428 million. For instance, in 2009, the Emirate bought the Rothko of Ezra Merkin, the financer, for US$ 310 million, only two years after buying those of the Rockfeller collection. Similarly, Qatar acquired for € 45 million Euros the Claude Berri Fund, originally destined to France. And, in order to exhibit these works of art, Qatar calls upon the greatest, internationally-recognized architects. The Qatari National Museum was thus designed by Jean Nouvel ; the Museum of Islamic Art, inaugurated in 2008, was designed by the Sino-American Pei ; and the Museum of Modern Art by Jean-François Bodin.
Theoretical framework
The anarchical society of the international. Although anarchy characterizes the international sphere, such a situation can take on various forms and is, to be sure, shaped by ideological and material factors, so that it is rather akin to an « international society » (Hedley Bull) than to the perpetual war depicted by the realists. Its members are drawn to entertain cooperative relations, to participate in institutions and to internalize common values, such as loyalty and mutual recognition.
The paradoxical power of small states. While these are often neglected by internationalists, theories relevant for them tend to restrict them to diplomacies aimed at the promotion of norms, of peace and of humanitarian operations (Christine Ingebritsen). Yet, in the recent years, there has been a relative decline of great powers and a contrario, the « Lilliputian States » (Robert Keohane) seem to have benefited from a globalization marked by an intensification of relations as well as from a surge of transnational actors. In such a dynamic, several of them seems to be at the outposts as they concentrate huge amounts of capital and as they position themselves as unavoidable nexi of financial, cultural, commercial and human flows.
Analysis
Taking advantage of the rapid mutations of capitalism and of the world order, Katzenstein’s observations as to the adaptation and the resistance of small States are being confirmed. In effect, globalization has intensified inter-sectoral competition, causes the formation of “économies-monde” as well as the concentration of riches. Thus, power no longer supposes simply the control of the productive and distributive capacities that ensure the independence, if not the autonomy, of Nation-States. Conversely, power is rather derived from the authority and the radiance resulting from the possession of one or several of these nexi of global attraction. In other words, the logic consists not in withdrawing oneself from the international game but on the contrary to find in it a position of prime relevance. For instance, if the United States today keep up nowadays a structural preponderance, this is due also to the central position of Hollywood in the cinema industry, or Wall Street in the world finance, or the Silicon Valley in the new technologies of information and communication.
In a world today having become fragmented and organized in archipelagos, small-sized countries are prompt to polarize around a specific field. This is why some of them, like Qatar, are experiencing a spectacular development. Similarly to Singapore or even to tax heavens, Qatar seeks now to specialize in the world of knowledge and fine arts. These sectors are to enable the country to reach world recognition as a protective rampart against threatening neighbors such as Saudi Arabia or Iran; and they are to contribute to the development of a territory that derives the better part of its resources from the gas industry. Let us remind ourselves that Qatar launched in 1996 the world-famous television channel Al-Jazira, which has since imposed itself in and onto the audiovisual landscape. The kingdom then went on to welcoming artists seeking asylum from Iraq, while its leaders are proving great collectors of art. Moreover, it has attracted several universities, such as the American Georgetown, Northwestern, Carnegie and Cornell, or the European from Stenden and Canadians from Calgary and North Atlantic, who have settled and developed complete curricula in the country. This strategy resembles that of Abu Dhabi, a state which embarked upon the construction of branches for the Le Louvre and the Guggenheim museums not long after inaugurating campuses of Paris-Sorbonne, HEC and New York universities, even one for the Beirut Saint Joseph University.
All in all, this policy of cultural grandeur demonstrates rather well that power cannot equated solely with capacities and geostrategic resources but results pointedly from world transformations which create opportunities for certain, hitherto neglected, actors. Enjoying an autonomous form of government and formally sovereign – in accordance with their statist character – these attract non-state organizations, such as economic firms, in order to form themselves into attractive centers within globalization.
References
« A Smithsonian in the Sand », The Economist, 29 Dec. 2010.
Barthe Benjamin, « Qatar. Les ambitions démesurées d’une micro-monarchie », Le Monde, 25 fév. 2012, pp. 4-5. Supplément Géo et Politique.
Bull Hedley, The Anarchical Society. A Study of Order in World Politics, New-York, Columbia University Press, 1977.
« Ce que le Qatar possède en Europe », Challenges, 14 fév. 2012.
Elkamel Sara, « Qatar Becomes World’s Biggest Buyer of Contemporary Art », The Guardian, 13 July 2011.
Hartvig Nicolai, « Qatar Looks to Balance Its Arts Scene », New York Times, 6 Jan. 2012.
Ingebritsen Christine, “Norm Entrepreneurs: Scandinavia’s Role in World Politics”, Cooperation and Conflict, 1 (37), 2002, pp. 11-23.
Katzenstein Peter J., Small States in World Market: Industrial Policy in Europe, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1985.
Katzenstein Peter J., « Small States and Small States Revisited », New Political Economy, 8 (1), 2003.
Keohane Robert O., « Lilliputians’ Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics », International Organization, 2 (23), Spring 1969, pp. 291-310.
Laroche Josepha (Éd.), La Loyauté dans les relations internationales, 2e éd., Paris, Harmattan, 2011.
Le Grand Dominique , « Le Qatar, premier acheteur d’art », Le Soir, 2 août 2011.
Waage Hilde Henriksen, « The ‘Minnow’ and the ‘Whale’: Norway and the United States in the Peace Process in the Middle East », British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 34 (2), Aug. 2007, pp. 157-176.
Mar 28, 2012 | Uncategorized
By Yves Poirmeur
Translation: Pierre Chabal
Passage au crible n°62
Pixabay
On 3rd February 2012, the Red Khmer Kaing Guek Eav, alias ‘Dutch’, was sentenced on appeal to life imprisonment for crimes against humanity, serious violations of the Geneva conventions, manslaughter and torture by the extraordinary chambers of the Cambodian courts. In the 1970s, ‘Dutch’ had been at the head of the Phnom Penh secret Detention Centre S 21. This sentence extends the thirty-five year imprisonment judgement of the first trial and cancels the compensation granted him for his illegal detention by the Cambodian military court between 1999 and 2007. This sanction comes late and over thirty years after the death, between 1975 and 1979, of at least 12 272 victims in the prisoners camp under the direct supervision of ‘Dutch’. It is still an exemplary sanction, which marks the progress of the fight against the impunity of the perpetrators of the worst international crimes.
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
The creation of extraordinary chambers entrusted with the task of judging the high-ranking officials of Kampuchea and the highest culprits of the genocide having led to nearly two millions victims was made possible after an evolution of particularly chaotic power relations. The Paris agreements (1991) had at first favoured the national reconciliation and provided for the integration of Red Khmers into political life, rather than their prosecution. It is the failure of this process, made complete with the “outlawing of the clique of democratic Kampuchea” (Act of 7th July 1994), the falling-in of one of their leaders, Leng Sary, pardoned by the King and the condemnation of Pol Pot by his own army (June 1997), which led the Cambodian government, in search of international legitimacy, to seek UN support in order to prosecute Red Khmer leaders. This request for help was accepted by the UN General Assembly (Resolution 52/135, 12th December 1997). The setting-up of a third International Criminal Tribunal (ICT), alongside those already created by the security council to prosecute regime officials having violated humanitarian international law in Yugoslavia (TPIY, 1993) and committed the genocide in Rwanda (TPIR, 1994) did not meet the expectations of the Cambodian government, who wished to retain control of his penal actions for reasons of national security and had already promulgated to that effect an Act which provided for the creation of extraordinary Chambers (10 June 2001). Such an ICT, besides stirring up the opposition of China and the reticence of many States at having to fund yet another international court, could not rest on a legal foundation such as the existence of a threat against peace and security (UN Charter, art. 41), because the crimes in question had occurred so long ago.
Theoretical framework
1. A negotiated justice. Differently from International Criminal Tribunals created unilaterally by the Security Council (Chapter VII), internationalised penal jurisdictions rest on a contractual foundation. A bilateral agreement, taking for granted the existence of a State with which the UN can negotiate the setting-up of penal courts specialised in the repression of precisely-defined international crimes, establishes on a case-by-case basis 1) the creation of the tribunals, 2) their modus operandi, 3) their mode of financing and 4) specifies the respective rights and obligations of the signatories. Such a negotiation has the disadvantage of being slow but it offers the advantage of bringing the State to subscribe to a body of substantial obligations regarding the operations of the jurisdiction as well as the rules of penal law. The negotiation follows these rules while imposing demanding criteria of justice in exchange for international support and for the legitimacy which, in returns, it offers.
2. The internationalisation of national penal courts. The extraordinary Chambers belong to the Cambodian judiciary system. However, the UN remains narrowly associated with their management and their operations. The UN assumes the better part of their expenses and intervenes in the designation of certain of their members, which makes them mixed jurisdictions.
Analysis
It is after a very long process of negotiation conducted between Cambodia and the UN General Secretary that a bilateral agreement on the modalities of international cooperation for “the prosecution, according to Cambodian law, of perpetrators of crimes committed during the period of the democratic Kampuchea”, was signed on 6th June 2003. The fruit of a compromise, this internationalised justice is characterised fundamentally by a ‘mix’ (mixité), which generates ambiguities. This appears foremost in the composition and the administration of the extraordinary Chambers, which are managed by an administrative Bureau headed by a Cambodian director and a vice-director appointed by the UN. These Chambers are composed of a first-degree court with five judges, three Cambodian and two foreign, and an appeals Chamber of the Supreme Court with seven members, four Cambodian and three foreign. The inquests and the prosecuting are in the charge of, respectively, two judges and two prosecutors, of whom one is a Cambodian and the other a foreigner. Judges and prosecutors are appointed by royal decree. The judge, the prosecutor and the international judges are chosen, respectively, by the Supreme Council of the magistracy from three lists drawn up by the UN General Secretary. Although the international judges are the minority and do not preside over any decisive organ, decisions cannot be reached without the approval of at least one of them, as they are decisions by qualified majorities of at least four judges in the first instance and of five judges in appeal. Still, foreign judges can never impose their judgement without the support of at least two Cambodian magistrates, which casts a doubt on the independence of these jurisdictions, the appointment to which rests with the national authorities. Last, a pre-trial Chamber resolves eventual disagreements between prosecutors and judges.
This hybridity is also derived from the law, which these jurisdictions apply. The latter are competent not only for crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes such as defined by international criminal law, but also, subsidiarily, for offenses of common law provided for by the Cambodian penal code of 1956 to which the law having created them refers (art. 3), namely manslaughter, torture and religious persecutions. As their rationae personae competence is limited to the sole “high-ranking officials” and “highest culprits”, such an extension of the incriminations concerned offers the advantage to enable prosecuting them when elements constitutive of international crimes are not present. This however is at the expense of a modification of the rules of prescription as established at the time when the facts were committed, which hardly agrees with the principle of non-retroactivity of criminal law. As to the penal procedure that is applied, it ascribes to Cambodian procedural law but subject to the conformity of this law to the principles of international law, in particular to the rules of a right to an equitable trial.
If the conviction of ‘Dutch’ bears testimony to the undeniable interest of the mechanism of internationalised jurisdictions when it comes to fighting against the worst international crimes, the modalities of the institutionalisation of extraordinary Chambers enhance the capacity of the political to largely leave room for impunity.
References
Martineau Anne-Charlotte, Les Juridictions pénales internationalisées. Un nouveau modèle de justice hybride ?, Paris, Pedone, 2007
Boyle David, Lengrand Julie, « Le retrait des négociations pour un tribunal mixte au Cambodge », Actualité et droit international, mars 2002 ;
Ung Boun-Hor, « Le drame cambodgien : des victimes en quête de justice », in : Gaboriau Simone, Pauliat Hélène (Éds.), La Justice pénale internationale, Limoges, Presses Universitaires de Limoges, 2002.
Mar 17, 2012 | environment, Global Public Health, Passage au crible (English)
By Valérie Le Brenne
Translation: Pierre Chabal
Passage au crible n°61
Wikimédia
On February 13th, 2012, the high court of Lyon, France, ruled that the American firm Monsanto was guilty of the poisoning of a grain farmer by a pesticide, Lasso, banned in France since 2007. The court then required an expert’s report in order to determine the amount of damages which the firm is to pay in compensation to the victim. In France, this first conviction could constitute a precedent, should further cases linked to the use of this chemical come before the courts.
This case, linked to the many health and sanitary scandals involving the American firm, Monsanto, raises the issue of the need to regulate the use of phytosanitary chemicals.
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
In 2004, a grain farmer inhaled toxic fumes while inspecting a tank on his property. After the accident, medical analyses revealed a contamination due to monochlorobenzene, a solvent used in a pesticide, Lasso. In 2008, the Mutualité Sociale Agricole or MSA, an agricultural insurance fund, established a cause-to-effect link between the farmer’s neurological disorders and the use of the phytosanitary chemical. This led to the admission of his disability as a professional disease. The farmer then filed a suit in civil liability against the giant American firm, Monsanto, which made him the spokesperson of victims of pesticides in France.
One should recall that during the 1960s, experts in demography had pointed to the increase of the world population and warned about the risks of food shortages. The objective of raising agricultural outputs thus imposed itself onto all western societies. Urged on by national governments, farmers therefore invested heavily in order to modernize their activities. This ‘green revolution’ led to the mechanization of production, land restructuration, the use of synthetic inputs, the selection and hybridization of cultivations and crops.
The American firm Monsanto, founded in 1901 in St Louis, Missouri, represents an emblematic instance of a firm having benefited from this context and hoisted itself to the level of a major player in the agrochemical sector. Yet, the world reputation of this conglomerate is often marred by sanitary and environmental scandals.
Theoretical framework
Two lines of reasoning are relevant.
1. A technological acceleration. in order to anticipate agricultural needs, agrochemical firms develop products aiming at improving agricultural outputs. They thus contribute to the process of ‘technological acceleration’, as Susan Strange conceptualized it. At the same time, these firms gradually cover sectors hitherto monitored by the sole State actor and thereby keep on chipping at the regulatory capacity of the State.
2. A failed regulatory capacity. Pointing to numerous sanitary scandals, ‘sovereignty-free actors’ – to quote James Rosenau – gradually favored the emergence and the dissemination of norms in the field of the world governance of phytosanitary products. Yet, the persistence of conflicts of interest between market dynamics and health interests or sanitary stakes seems to have triggered a lack of precaution as well as an inadequacy of the State regulatory mechanisms.
Analysis
The conviction of Monsanto by the high court in Lyon shows the extent to which agricultural practices have been transformed under the impact of the green revolution. To be sure, the increase in world population induces a constant pressure on agricultural products. Farmers, in order to reduce the risks of food shortages and remain competitive, must continue to expand the outputs of their crops. For chemical firms, the agricultural sector thus represents a substantial market on which to position themselves. These firms therefore develop and sell chemicals aimed at improving the level of agricultural productivity. While fuelling the process of ‘technological acceleration’, these private actors thus contribute also to the reversal in power relations between the State actor and the markets. While assuming responsibility for sectors hitherto subject to State monitoring, these firms substantially curtail the capacity of public authorities to intervene. Henceforth, the regulatory power of the State is only exercised marginally, outside markets. The conviction of the Monsanto firm by the Lyon high court, symbolic as it might be, shows the regulatory limits in France as to phytosanitary products. One must recall that France is both the number one agricultural producer in Europe as well as the number one consumer of pesticides. The intertwining of agricultural and economic stakes has long eclipsed the sanitary impact of pesticides and begotten a lack of precaution on the part of States.
Yet, the numerous denunciations of agrochemical firms by actors of the civil society have gradually led to the elaboration and dissemination of norms in the field of phytosanitary products. From this perspective, several agencies of health safety were set up in France during the 1990s in order to prevent, early on, the risks linked to the use of chemical inputs in agriculture. This led, at the European level, to the adoption of Directives aimed at the harmonization of the conditions in which pesticides are put on the market in Member-States. These regulatory mechanisms, in constant evolution, are built on the basis of an accumulation of experiences and often enter into force only after the putting on the market of the products in question. One might as well state how ineffective these preventive mechanisms are for farmers and farm workers, a population foremost exposed to these products. The increase in the numbers of cancer patients and the multiplication of neurological disorders remain among the principal professional diseases linked to the use of pesticides. However, the gradual recognition by the MSA of these medical conditions contributes to the emergence of a professional claim. Despite an important phenomenon of self-censorship, a number of farmers are now mobilizing some of the modi operandi displayed by environmental NGOs in order to bring their concerns to the attention of public authorities.
In all, damages caused by the unreasoned use of pesticides constitute today a precedent in the field of the effort to regulate biotechnologies, notably at a time when agrochemical firms suggest that GMOs are an alternative to the use of phytosanitory products. In this vein, certain European States show more and more reserve when it comes to authorizing the import of these seeds into their territory. One must yet underline that the logic of the market leads these firms to turn to developing counties in order to export banned phytosanitory products and commercialize transgenic seeds.
References
Champion Emmanuelle, Gendron Corinne, « Le ‘développement durable’ selon Monsanto », Écologie et politique, 29 (2), 2004, pp.121-133.
Parmentier Bruno, Nourrir l’humanité. Les grands problèmes de l’agriculture mondiale au XXIe siècle, Paris, La Découverte, 2009.
Rosenau James, Turbulence in World Politics: a Theory of Change and Continuity, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1990.
Strange Susan, Le Retrait de l’État. La dispersion du pouvoir dans l’économie mondiale, [1996], trad., Paris, Temps Présent, 2011.
lemonde.fr, Planète, « Monsanto, un demi-siècle de scandales sanitaires », disponible à la page: http://www.lemonde.fr/planete/article/2012/02/16/monsanto-un-demi-siecle-de-scandales-sanitaires_1643081_3244.html, dernière consultation: 8 mars 2012.
Mar 11, 2012 | China, Global solidarity, Human rights, Internet, Passage au crible (English)
By Justin Chiu
Translation: Davina P. Durgana
Passage au crible n°60
Pixabay
On February 4th, 2012, China and Russia vetoed a Security Council draft resolution condemning UN repression in Syria. Beginning in Derra in March 2011, the Syrian revolt has already killed over 8,000 civilians. Videos showing the bloody repression – including Homs – which were broadcast worldwide via the Internet, have not gone unnoticed in China. Many intellectuals, for example, question the decision of their government. The official arguments – Reason of State and the principle of non-interference – no longer seem like legitimate comments as social networks have demonstrated. Following the emergence of public opinion in China, authorities are forced to evolve. Thus on February 14th, 2012, Prime Minister Wen Jiabao said he was ready to discuss the situation in Syria.
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
The Arab Spring awoke the repressed affects and emotions of the Chinese population. Recall that in 1989, students who demanded more democracy and freedom were violently repressed by the regime. Beginning in the late sixties, the economic reform and open policy of Deng Xiaoping had resulted in a minimum of public space throughout the eighties to the point that this decade has proven exceptionally rich in political debates and intellectuals. However, after the repression at Tiananmen Square, political demands were forcibly disappeared social movements. The strict state control, improvement of living standards and the weakening of external support prompted the heirs of the democratic movement to promote the emergence of a civil society based on the protection of civil rights.
According to the Chinese government, the collective number of incidents rose from 8,700 incidents in 1993 to 74,000 in 2004. Emphasize in this case that social movements represent all social strata because the Chinese have had their lives disrupted by the dismantling of the Communist social system and the integration of their countries in globalization. Now, the protests come both from workers, city dwellers, peasants, servants or the unemployed: they are very heterogeneous. Meanwhile, the awareness of civil rights in an enriched China, legislators in general and lawyers in particular have become not only stakeholders of civil society, but their spearhead. At the turn of the twentieth century, the construction of a rule of law stands at the heart of the Chinese Communist Party propaganda. Facing international pressure, the notion of human rights was official adopted in 2004 at the 12th Congress of the National Assembly Party.
Considered as a security threat, the new social media from foreign countries are censored or banned outright in China. Yet, contrary to what one might think, the social networking market is now flourishing and highly competitive. Nevertheless, some private actors dominate the world of 513 million Internet users. In this case, Tencent (established in 1999 and the equivalent of MSN Messenger), RENN (the equivalent of Facebook created in 2005) and Weibo (created in 2009 between Facebook and Twitter).
Theoretical framework
1. Increased awareness of human rights. The economic and institutional reforms, initiated over three decades ago, have enabled the development of the Chinese economy and have significantly improved the lives of a majority of the population. However, GDP growth cannot hide social inequalities, regional disparities and profound environmental degradation in the Middle Kingdom. All the less they are now largely borne on the web. Well educated and rich, the Chinese tolerate the increasingly bad and miserable situation of the poor and demand the respect they deserve as human beings.
2. The mounting strength of civil society through social networks. Considering efficiency, low cost of intermediation and powerful means of communication that crystallizes the Internet, we understand better then that it has become an empowering and valuable tool for large segments of the population. With the Internet, the relationship between time and distance between civil society and the state are radically changed. That is why the state actor must find new sources of legitimacy and new ways of governing the face of criticism from civil society.
Analysis
Asserting itself as a leader of emerging countries, China does not hesitate to express a different view from Western countries, as we saw at the Copenhagen Conference on climate change in 2009. Second, nationally, it must pass this year’s political transition by placing Xi Jinping at the head of the party-state. In this sensitive period, the government cannot support an international project that would overthrow an authoritarian regime.
Although messages of compassion multiply on social networks, this does not mean that all Chinese recognize the democratic demands of the Syrian opposition. In fact, Chinese society especially disapproved of his government because it prohibits Syrians any possibility of external assistance and supports a repressive regime. But the debate over the Syrian situation quickly finds its limits since a few days after the veto, Chinese Internet users are already fascinated by other major events.
Critics of the press and intellectuals are not absent in China. Nevertheless, the one who cannot exercise self-sufficiency and crossing the red line is still insignificant. Indeed, they risk being accused of crimes of subversion, such as was the case of Professor Gui Quan who denounced the management of the Sichuan earthquake in 2009.
Democratization of the Internet is a major issue for people and concern for the Chinese government. That is why 30,000 service officers of the Ministry of Information exercised continuous censorship. However, this activity appears increasingly ineffective under the massive number of users. To avoid skidding, the social networking sites are supposed to monitor their users. Thus, the messages published in Tibetan on Weibo are systematically monitored. Last December, the Chinese state required micro-bloggers to register under their real names. This measure was directed to the 200 million users of Weibo. However, the incessant responses mini-bloggers had against this interference with their privacy were enough to demonstrate an increased awareness of human rights in China.
References
Chen Yingfang, « Les mouvements de protestation des classes moyennes », in: Jean-Louis Rocca (Éd.), La Société chinoise vue par ses sociologues, Paris, Presses de Sciences Po, 2008, pp. 187-219.
Elias Nobert, La société des individus, trad., Paris, Fayard, 1991.
Laroche Josepha, La Brutalisation du monde, du retrait des États à la décivilisation, Montréal, Liber, 2012.
Merklé Pierre, La Sociologie des réseaux sociaux, Paris, La Découverte, 2010. Coll. Repères 398.
Nangfang Zhoumo (南方周末 ou Southern Weekly) : http://www.infzm.com/ Pedroletti Brice, Bougon François, « Le veto de Pékin sur la Syrie critique en Chine », Le Monde, 8 Fév. 2012.
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