Oct 20, 2012 | Africa, Defense, Passage au crible (English), Security
By Jean-Jacques Roche
Translation: Pierre Chabal
Passage au crible n°76
Pixabay
On 15 October 2012, the Security Council of the United Nations adopted Resolution 2071 presented at the request of the Malian authorities and with the support of France. Pressing countries in West Africa to develop modalities for military intervention in northern Mali, France is committed by its president to assist “materially and logistically” such an intervention. Three days earlier in Dakar, the French president had ruled out any possibility of negotiation with armed groups “that impose a law, Sharia, cut off hands and destroy monuments hitherto considered part of the heritage of the humanity!”
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
“Africa is the last continent that is still within reach of France, within its scope, the only continent where, with three hundred men, France can still change the course of history.” This quotation by Louis Guiringaud, former Foreign Minister of Valery Giscard d’Estaing (1974-1981), is as often used as the claim that “the time of the ‘France-Africa’ is gone” (François Hollande, Dakar speech of 12 October 2012). As all his predecessors, François Hollande feels compelled to stress, at the beginning of his mandate, his determination to end postcolonial practices. As François Mitterrand, who dismissed late 1982 the Minister for Cooperation initially entrusted with implementing this rupture (Jean-Pierre Cot), François Hollande classically begins his mandate by laying the foundations of a new relationship, but without changing the fundamental objective of ensuring the continuity of the French presence in Africa. As with François Mitterrand, the “will to renew (the) partnership between France and Africa” (Dakar speech of 12 October 2012) is consistent with the assurance that “France would not be quite herself in the eyes of the world if she renounced to be present in Africa “(Mitterrand, XVIII Conference of Heads of State of Africa and France, November 8, 1994). This presence in Africa has certainly changed shape and the times of secret defense agreements are over. However, France still believes it guarantee the security of States within her backyard and there is not a single President of the Fifth Republic who hasn’t been associated with two or three armed interventions in the former territories of the French Union. Note however that François Hollande is quicker than any of his predecessors to authorize an intervention on African soil. Valery Giscard d’Estaing had indeed launched Operation Lamentin in Mauritania in 1977, three years after coming to power. As for François Mitterrand, he had intervened for the first time in Chad, more than two years after his coming into the Elysée (Operation Manta, August 1983). For his part, Jacques Chirac had authorized the operation Aramis in Cameroon in February 1996, nine months after his election. Finally, Nicolas Sarkozy decided to intervene in the battle of N’Djamena in February 2008 (also nine months after his election) as much to support the regime of Idriss Déby as to organize the evacuation of European nationals in the Chadian capital.
Theoretical framework
Although it is today out of the question that French soldiers would participate in this operation, one wonders how support and logistics would be provided? The question remains whether it is possible to design a war that would remain limited for France while its opponents will inevitably fight a total war. In other words, is the Clausewitzian approach of the ‘total war’ out-dated? The questioning of the Clausewitzian war has not appeared in the post-Cold War. To be sure, the debates of the 60s and 70s on the impact of nuclear power took place at a time when the Malenkov doctrine excluded the possibility of a resort to war between the possessors of nuclear weapons. Already at that time, one could ask whether the conceptual risks of “escalation to extremes” did not render obsolete the Clausewitzian framework whereas the only possible war should be pushed back to the periphery of the central strategic system. The massive literature which since 1990 has taken up this theme must thus, in spite of its interest, be addressed while keeping in mind the recurrent nature of this questioning.
In 1991, The Transformation of War, by Martin Van Creveld was published. For the Israeli historian, the Clausewitzian trinity (people, army, government) had ceased to function, but Western armies still wanted to see their opponents in their own image (mirror image) which condemned them to consider these as savages. Going even further in distancing himself from Clausewitzian analysis, John Keegan considered in 1993, in his History of Warfare, that man is not a reasonable political animal since war reveals above all his instincts. In a more socio-economic perspective, Mary Kaldor analyzed in 1999 the new wars (New and Old War, 1999) in terms of a triple rupture. First, their purpose is to ensure political mobilization on the basis of identities. Second, terror and massive violation of human rights replace conventional tactics. Finally, actors are occurring simultaneously at different levels, global and local, public and private, and they interact across the whole world. The success of reprints (in 2005 in the United States and in 2008 in France) of Galula, the French theorist of counter-insurgency fits into this whole questioning of Clausewitzian analyses, counter-insurgency aiming to ensure victory by winning the “the hearts and the minds”, while being measured in the use of force.
Analysis
The current challenge against counter-insurgency – which will inevitably lead to the planned abandonment of the concept of “asymmetric warfare” – is explained by the three pitfalls concealed in the related concept of “limited war”.
First, war is a test of will. The two parties involved in this type of conflict are not stirred by the same desire to win. Paradoxically, the asymmetry of means favors the weakest party that benefits from the asymmetry of wills. Threatened of losing everything, the weakest is engaged in a “total war” whereas the strongest reasons in terms of “limited war”. However, “it is the opponent who makes the law of the other” (Clausewitz), it therefore follows that the strongest – who fears above all the escalation to extremes – will be reluctant to comply with this immutable rule of war that determines a winner and a loser.
This reluctance thus precipitates the second pitfall theorized by Mao: “the certainty of success by strong states pushes them towards escalation to achieve their objectives at the risk of cutting themselves loose of populations or of appearing as incompetent.” Since the weakest dictates his law to the strongest, the latter is inevitably drawn into a war that he is not capable of winning. For regular armies, violence must in effect be governed by jus in bello. In contrast, irregular forces are wasteful of their own soldiers and use their civilian population as a shield. They take it for instance as hostage in order to force the opponent to make mistakes. As they can accept reckless losses, rebel forces condemn their opponents to be on the defensive, which is, at best, a means not to lose, but which provides little assurance of victory. Finally, the war aims of the forces involved are not identical. As Raymond Aron noted, the strongest “has the will to win, and the rebel party not to let himself be eliminated or exterminated […] The rebels simply need not to loose militarily to gain politically”. Therefore, a war of attrition begins, which rarely turns to the advantage of regular armies when, weary of expeditions as distant as costly, public opinion imposes withdrawal without glory or victory.
As the author of On War noted, “one would not introduce a moderating principle in the philosophy of war itself without committing an absurdity.” The authors of “current horrors” (Dakar speech of 12 October 2012) and other rebels, insurgents and terrorists, pirates and anti-socials (names borrowed from the colonial vocabulary) will have at heart to prove either the inhumanity, or the irresolution of their opponents. Between these two evils, we can today choose only the second (the absurdity of Clausewitz), which bodes ill for the commitment in preparation.
References
Keegan John, Histoire de la Guerre : du Néolithique à la Guerre du Golfe, Paris, Dagorno, 1996, 497 p.
Kaldor Mary, New and Old Wars – Organized Violence in a Global Era, Stanford University Press, 2007, 2° éd., 231 p.
Van Creveld Martin, La Transformation de la Guerre, Editions du Rocher, 1998, 318 p.
Oct 5, 2012 | Defense, North-South, Passage au crible (English), Security
By Josepha Laroche
Translation: Pierre Chabal
Passage au crible n°75
Pixabay, Téhéran
From 26 to 31 August 2012, Tehran hosted the 16th summit of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), which comprises today 120 member-countries. At the end of the rally, attended by 35 Heads of State and Government, the Islamic Republic of Iran took over the presidency of the Movement for the next three years.
On this occasion, Tehran undertook an extensive diplomatic and media operation designed to break its isolation on the nuclear issue and to elicit support towards its pro-Syrian policy. At this rally, were present, among others, the Secretary General of the UN Ban Ki-Moon –despite the strong reservations of Washington – the Presidents and Secretaries General of the Arab League, of the OIC (Organization of the Islamic Conference) and of the OAU (Organization of African Union), and Russian President Vladimir Putin (Russia, Invited State) and Latin American presidents Hugo Chavez (Venezuela), Evo Morales (Bolivia), and Rafael Correa (Ecuador) and Michel Temer, the vice-president of Brazil, the latter a State with observer status.
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
The MNA was launched in September 1961 at the Belgrade Conference. Three Heads of State, Marshal Tito (Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia), Colonel Nasser (United Arab Republic/Egypt) and Nehru (Indian Republic) played a role particularly important in the creation of this organization and in its more doctrinal development. Its doctrine was then based essentially on two pillars: anti-colonialism and opposition to bipolarity. In other words, the non-alignment (NA) was defined exclusively in terms of the East-West conflict and, against the North-South gap. Member-States of the NAM have always asserted themselves – in direct line with the Bandung Conference (1955) – as the representatives and spokespersons of the South against the North.
At that time, they refused from the outset to build a permanent structure which would have the monopoly of the formulation and representation of NA and would thus establish a single and standardized non-alignment policy. Since its foundation, the NAM has taken a pragmatic approach that rejects systems of alliances in general and the two blocks in particular, while exploiting antagonisms between different State actors in the context of an active policy of mediation and oscillation.
This continued until the end of the Cold War. But after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the demise of the Eastern bloc, symbolized by the dismantling of COMECON and of the Warsaw Pact as well as by the disappearance of the People’s Democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, the NAM lost most of its raison d’être. Since then, it has undergone a significant decline. Hasn’t the balance of terror, as the founding marker of its identity that had hitherto structured international relations, given way to a more fluid and chaotic global configuration, devoid of any conceptual link with the NA? The movement has thus gone through several years of political apathy and media eclipse. However, the Tehran government now intends to put an end to this situation by working to restore its long-since lost aura.
Theoretical framework
1. By-passing the coercive diplomacy introduced by Westerners. The objective of coercive diplomacy is not to occupy territory, chasing an enemy or inflicting that enemy the greatest possible loss or destruction. Instead, the invocation of a possible coercion aims simply to spur the negotiations and haggling necessary to the more rapid implementation of a peaceful solution. In other words, it is a bargaining power. “To exploit it is diplomacy, vicious diplomacy but diplomacy still” (Thomas Schelling).
2. Raising an anti-Western diplomatic line. In order to defeat the policy of exclusion to which it is subjected, the Iran of the Mullahs intends to federate the NAM Member-States around its siege and fundamentally anti-Western vision.
Analysis
Coercive diplomacy initiated several years ago by the West against the Islamic Republic of Iran is seeking to sanction the undercover development of its nuclear program in blatant violation of the provisions of the NPT (Non-Proliferation Treaty, 1968), of which Iran is a signatory. The persistent refusal by Iran to suspend its sensitive nuclear activities, as well as its refusal to shed light on its nuclear program, has been confirmed by several reports of the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency). Similarly, the Iranian State subtracted itself repeatedly from proposals to negotiate with the Six (E3 +3: Germany, France, United Kingdom + United States, China, Russia). This systematic blocking has thus not offered any alternative to the Security Council of the United Nations but to increase pressure on Tehran and implement sanctions (Committee on sanctions against Iran established pursuant to UN resolution 1737). For example, a strict embargo device developed by the United States and the European Union has been put in place to increase the pressure on the CBI (Central Bank of Iran) and impose to the Iranian government the giving-up of a program of nuclear weapons.
Faced with this coercion by the UN, Iran has developed a response within the Non-Aligned Movement which consists in having Iran’s positions endorsed by representatives of a very large number of States. Tehran has for example obtained that the final declaration of the NAM endorse its own reading of the nuclear issue that is the subject of such a heavy litigation. In other words – and against the unanimous opinion of all experts – the Islamic Republic has managed to validate the argument that its nuclear program would be of civilian purposes only. In addition, Iran has received recognition by NUM participants of its right to control the full nuclear cycle. However, these pronouncements amount to openly violate the prohibition, ordered to Iran by the West and by the UN, to stop its enrichment program, a ban which Russia and China, have joined themselves.
However, can we consider a real diplomatic success garnered by Iran, a success that could enable Iran to bypass – in the near future and over the long term – the ostracism to which it is being subjected? This is certainly not the case for two reasons. Firstly, its political concern to unify the NAM under its authority is mere posturing and an ephemeral display – as divisions over Syria have clearly shown –, and the Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi has not publicly hesitated to oppose Iran’s positions. Secondly, the NAM has remained permanently weakened ever since the end of the Cold War. Also, the NAM seems today more an empty shell than a spearhead. In fact, it no longer corresponds to the new international scene as the world stage is now covered in countless transnational flows and structured by complex interactions where the inter-state dimension is no longer predominant. Finally, the MNA has become an anachronistic movement and, as such, devoid of credit. Therefore, how could a state without credibility expect any salvation from it?
References
Hassner Pierre, « Violence, rationalité, incertitude: tendances apocalyptiques et iréniques dans l’étude des conflits internationaux », RFSP, 14 (6), déc. 1964, pp. 1019-1049.
Levy Jack, « Prospect Theory, Rational Choice and International Relations », International Studies Quarterly, 41 (1), 1997, pp. 87-112.
Schelling Thomas, Arms and Influence, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1966.
Willetts Peter, The Non-aligned Movement: the Origins of a Third World Alliance, Londres/New York, F. Printer, 1978.
Sep 22, 2012 | Articles, Fil d'Ariane, Publications (English)
Par Alexandre Bohas
Published in Global Society review
Abstract
This article deals with the seeming paradox of a lasting American power and a global anti-americanism, which brings into question the relevance of the concept of soft power. Indeed, discontent over the current hegemon does not affect the consumption of its goods and the diffusion of its symbols. The contradiction results from the state-centric perspective of traditional scholars which do not shed light on the diverse aspects of American supremacy. In addition, Nye’s notion of soft power does not stress the shaping of foreign societies by non-state actors and thus their important role in American predominance. As a consequence, the concept of soft power will be revised in order to reduce its ‘shallowness’ and highlight the constraining aspect of today’s prominent power.
Télécharger l’article The Paradox of Anti-americanism: Reflection on the Shallow Concept of Soft Power
Sep 15, 2012 | Culture en, Global Public Goods, Passage au crible (English), UN
By Alexandre Bohas
Translation: Pierre Chabal
Passage au crible n°74
Wikipédia
The looting of Muslim shrines perpetrated in Mali in 2012 by religious extremists has raised consternation of global proportions. However, after this unanimity without effect, it is important to examine the specificity of the common goods of a cultural nature that requires a renewed governance.
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
On May 4th 2012 the graves of Timbuktu – classified by UNESCO as World Heritage of Humanity –are destroyed by Islamists who consider the cults of Muslim saints contrary to the fundamentalist Islam they claim to ascribe to. These abuses have continued despite these monuments being declared as Heritage in Danger and despite the condemnation of these acts by many countries and international organizations such as UNESCO and the International Criminal Court.
Northern Mali, including the cities of Gao, Timbuktu and Kidal, has been occupied for several months by armed gangs, which came into rebellion on January 17th, 2012. The latter consisted of a motley alliance of Islamic movements such as Eddine Ansar, AQIM (Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb), and MUJWA (Movement for Unicity and Jihad in West Africa), as well as some Tuaregs form the NMLA (National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad), ousted from the coalition shortly afterwards.
To achieve territorial conquest, the rebels relied on the particularistic claims of indigenous populations and on the revenues of traffics combined with the vacuum of the State in the region and with chaos in Libya. They were then able to make quick advance through the dislocation and mutinies within government forces in Bamako.
Theoretical framework
1. The peculiarity of certain common goods. Unlike global public goods, cultural goods may be subject to rivalries and are characterized by their non-exclusivity. With the process of globalization, they cover more and more areas including culture where they are doubly threatened. They undergo behaviors of “free-riders” (Mancur Olson) and sub-optimal logics of self-interest (Garrett Hardin). As evidence of cultural diversity and as expression of a universal community in the making, they symbolize a vision of the world which many economic, social and religious actors do not share and even oppose.
2. Inadequacy of institutions in post-Westphalian times. International organizations are obsolete in “post-Westphalian” times (Richard Falk). The process of globalization that currently undermines the state system established by the Treaties of Westphalia (1648), leads to a compression of space-time (David Harvey), an ever higher interconnection (David Held), a dissemination of authority (Susan Strange) along with a plurality of spheres and global actors (Philip Cerny). The preponderance of non-state and identity violence as well as the emergence of territories beyond any political structure, reflect the interstate inability to resolve global issues. In other words, it cancels all proceedings based on sovereign States.
Analysis
Presupposing the existence of a proto-community of planetary order, International Relations theorists have formally considered the legal and institutional mechanisms with a view to global governance (David Held). In this regard, common goods of a cultural nature refer to the substantive definition of the latter. Also, the Convention for the Protection of the World Heritage, adopted on November 16th 1972 under the auspices of UNESCO, recognizes “the outstanding interest which requires the preservation of [some goods] as part of the World Heritage of all mankind [and] the importance which represents, for all the peoples of the world, the safeguarding of these unique and irreplaceable goods, whatever people they belong to 1 “. In March 2012, 189 States had ratified 774 artifacts classified in this list. The Ad Hoc Committee stated in its Global Strategy that it wants a classification that better reflects “the diversity of cultural treasures […] of our world […] recognize and protect sites that are exceptional evidence of interactions [. ..] among human beings, of cultural coexistence, spirituality and creative expression 2”. Thus, this patrimonial policy induces a recognition of universal values and of common goods on a human scale. However, integrating transformations are accompanied by a fragmentation that causes the return of Manichean logic and identity and religious tensions. Destructive madness manifested in Timbuktu, “the city of 333 saints”, provides an illustration.
Responsible for “ensuring the identification, protection, conservation, presentation and transmission to future generations of the cultural and natural heritage”, states play a central role in dealing with fully global issues 3. This state-centered vision is based on the realistic hypothesis that they remain capable and legitimate to resolve these issues. However, nowadays, this theoretical framework is exceeded as the non-state dimension of international relations is clear. In this case, the Malian failed state is emblematic of territories where a myriad of uncontrollable networks of all kinds, economic, criminal and religious, remain entangled in the trading of licit and illicit goods, smuggling, and illegal migration.
We witness the relative failure of state intervention. Indeed, UNESCO alerts as to the degradation of certain monuments multiply while mobilizations against the imminent destruction of sites remain without avail. Besides the case of Mali, remember the Bamiyan Buddhas destroyed by the Taliban in Afghanistan in March 2001. In the future, these problems can only worsen due to inadequate governing and the exacerbation of identities caused by globalization. Finally, there is a vibrant lack of instruments of a cosmopolitan governance to achieve a consensual classification of this common heritage, its global ownership and its promotion. Its definition and its preservation, which cannot be left to market mechanisms nor to intergovernmental organizations, are a challenge today as the symbolic effect and the impact on knowledge of this recognition face anti-universalist conceptions relayed by archaic institutions.
References
Chirac Jacques, Diouf Abdou, « Urgence à Tombouctou. Il faut sauver la paix au Sahel », Le Monde, 16 juillet 2012.
« Conseil de paix et de sécurité de l’Union africaine – Les crises malienne et soudanaise préoccupent», All Africa, 18 juillet 2012.
Cerny Philip, Rethinking World Politics: A Theory of Transnational Neopluralism, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010.
Falk Richard, « Revisiting Westphalia, Discovering Post-Westphalia », The Journal of Ethics, 6 (4), Dec. 2002, pp. 311-352.
Grégoire Emmanuel, Bourgeot André, « Désordre, pouvoirs et recompositions territoriales au Sahara», Hérodote, (142), mars 2011, pp. 3-11.
Hardin Garrett, « The Tragedy of the Commons », Science, 162 (3859), Dec. 1968, pp. 1243-1248.
« La folie destructrice d’Ansar Dine », Al-Ahram Hebdo ,19 juillet 2012.
Harvey David, The Condition of Postmodernity : An Enquiry into the Origins of Culture Change, Cambridge, Blackwell, 1990.
Held David, « Restructuring Global Governance: Cosmopolitanism, Democracy and the Global Order », Millenium, 37 (3), April 2009, pp. 535-547.
Olson Mancur, La Logique de l’action collective, [1965], trad., Paris, PUF, 2001.
Rémy Jean-Philippe, « Mali : La Route de Tombouctou passe par Bamako », Le Monde, 17 juillet 2012.
Strange Susan, The Retreat of the State: the Diffusion of Power in the World Economy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996.
UNESCO, Convention pour la protection du patrimoine mondial culturel et naturel, Adoptée par la Conférence générale à sa 17e session à Paris le 16 novembre 1972, consultable à l’adresse suivante http://whc.unesco.org/.
UNESCO, Stratégie Globale, 1994, consultable à la page web : http://whc.unesco.org/fr/strategieglobale.
1. UNESCO, Convention pour la protection du patrimoine mondial culturel et naturel, Adoptée par la Conférence générale à sa 17e session à Paris le 16 novembre 1972, consultable à l’adresse suivante http://whc.unesco.org/,p. 1.
2. UNESCO, Stratégie Globale, 1994, consultable à la page web : http://whc.unesco.org/fr/strategieglobale.
3. UNESCO, Convention, op. cit., p. 3.
Sep 7, 2012 | Global Public Health, North-South, Passage au crible (English)
By Clément Paule
Translation: Pierre Chabal
Passage au crible n°73
Source : Wikipedia
From 22th to 27th July 2012, nearly 24,000 people from 183 countries participated in the 19th International Conference on AIDS (Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome) held in Washington by the IAS (International AIDS Society). This conference, held every two years since 1994, hosted many activities, whether scientific workshops, speeches by decision-makers or artistic events aimed at raising public awareness as to the HIV (Human Immunodeficiency Virus) / AIDS pandemic. The disease has caused 30 million deaths in three decades but the Summit was considered a success insofar as the possibility of ending the scourge in the near future was seriously envisaged. It seems clear that this relatively optimistic outlook –explicitly asserted by the slogan “Turning the tide together” – rely on essential technical breakthroughs while the financial crisis is leading to donor disengagement. Since then, calls for mobilization have succeeded one another in order to facilitate access to treatment for the 97% of patients living in low and middle-income countries while intensifying the efforts of medical research.
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
After the identification and isolation of the virus in the early eighties, many states implemented programs of public action designed to control the epidemic. Often criticized for their excluding or stigmatizing nature – thus, the quarantine procedures –, these local initiatives proved ineffective to contain the HIV/AIDS that turned into a pandemic during the decades that followed. Ultimately, the fight against this health disaster did take shape globally, as illustrated by the creation of institutional arrangements such as UNAIDS (Joint United Nations Programme on HIV / AIDS) in 1995. Meanwhile, there ahs been a multiplication of NGOs – such as Sidaction or AIDES in France – some of which manage to internationalize themselves, like ACT UP (AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power). For their part, states do not remain still and establish various cooperation mechanisms to reduce mortality in severely affected areas, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. As such, PEPFAR (President’s Emergency Fund for Aid Relief) created by George W. Bush in 2003 with several billion dollars, appears to be the largest government intervention in global health. In this logic, UNITAID was launched in 2006 to facilitate the purchase of medical treatments for developing countries from a solidarity tax on airline tickets implemented by thirty countries. Finally, we note the emergence of public-private structures such as the Global Fund to Fight against AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria set up as soon as 2002, a financial instrument in charge of centralizing and distributing funds dedicated to anti-HIV/AIDS activities.
Within this complex architecture, IAS was founded in 1988, with 16 000 members, including many researchers and health professionals specialising in the virus. This nonprofit organization has imposed itself as the holder of a leading multifaceted expertise: the recent appointment of Françoise Barré-Sinoussi – 2008 Nobel Prize for Medicine – as President of the organization bears testimony of the organisation’s prominence. As such, the IACs (International AIDS Conferences) play a crucial role insofar as they make it possible to render public the latest scientific discoveries about the disease, while boosting international mobilization and soliciting donors. Also, the choice of this forum to announce the possibility of halting the pandemic is very significant on a symbolic level, especially as this position is based on considerable technical advances. Let us mention here the patient in Berlin, presented as the first patient cured of AIDS after a bone-marrow transplant in 2007. It should also be noted that 34 million people now live with HIV but that only 54% of the 15 million people having developed the disease – about 8 million people – benefit from antiretroviral therapy. In addition, the UN estimates indicate that 2.7 million new infections would have occurred in 2010 – down 20% since 2001 – – while the number of deaths related to the virus is estimated at 1.8 million for the same period.
Theoretical framework
1. Global governance of health in action. This conference suggests a range of partnerships gathered around a given ‘global public concern’, namely the HIV / AIDS pandemic. But it is important to explore the lines of tension of the space that brings together actors with heterogeneous status and capital, which is not without an impact on the international management of the scourge.
2. Scientific advances Vs. socio-economic logics. If progress of research on the virus makes it now possible to consider its withering, most participants agree that a strictly technical approach is insufficient. In effect, the disease is deeply embedded into social relations on different scales, from the North-South gap to the moralizing stigmatisations.
Analysis
The diversity of contributors to the event ought to be emphasised: alongside political figures – Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, former President Bill Clinton and South Africa’s Vice-President Kgalema Motlanthe – artists were present – Elton John – as well as international officials – the president of the World Bank Jim-Yong Kim, the UNAIDS Executive Director Michel Sidibé, businessmen as Bill Gates or renowned scientists. This multisectoral mobilization illustrates the gradual coexistence of state and interstate actors with the rise of non-state actors, including multinational corporations or private foundations. In this regard, let us mention the multipositionality of individuals such as former President Bill Clinton, who negotiated with pharmaceutical companies the reduction of the price of certain treatments. Yet, the growing role of philanthrocapitalists – like the Gates Foundation, which invested a total of 2.5 billion of dollars against HIV – and several States of the South is not enough to make up for the disengagement of donor countries in a context of austerity: UNAIDS estimates this loss at 7 billion of dollars for objectives three times more costly in 2015. Especially since Barack Obama, in fact absent from the conference, announced budget cuts for PEPFAR as soon as 2013.
Despite these difficulties, the research results are promising according to the Towards an HIV Cure initiative launched by the IAS, while health indicators seem to be improving. If a vaccine does not yet appear likely, new perspectives have been proposed to refine existing therapies, whose costs were lowered. Consider the case of Truvada, a prophylactic treatment which reduces the risk of transmission – up to 90% when taken daily, according to clinical studies – during a high-risk sexual intercourse, which was approved by the FDA (Food and Drug Administration) on the eve of the IAC. However, this latest innovation has aroused the concern of organizations like ACT-UP, which discussed the potential adverse effects of the medication in terms of prevention. More generally, the implementation of these techniques remains at the heart of controversies because the social logics in which the pandemic ascribes remain complex.
Thus, despite repeated denunciations of the stigmatization of people infected with the virus, many activists from the South failed to obtain a visa to go to Washington. The US administration in effect rejected visa applications from sex-workers, who then chose to organize simultaneously a counter-Summit in Kolkata, India. This parallel event called Sex Workers Freedom Festival brought together a thousand demonstrators, and gave itself the goal of claiming and obtaining the participation of these particularly vulnerable populations in decision-making for the fight against HIV/AIDS. This initiative was supported by the UNAIDS Executive Director, who recalled that less than 1% of international funding was devoted to sex workers while these were one of the groups most affected by the disease. In addition, protesters denounced the conditionalities attached to funds distributed through PEPFAR, which require the signature of an anti-prostitution clause by the organizations seeking financial support. This example shows, beyond the technical nature of the responses, the difficulty of ending a pandemic whose political dimension is proving omnipresent.
References
Dixneuf Marc, « La santé publique comme observatoire de la mondialisation », in : Josepha Laroche (Éd.), Mondialisation et gouvernance mondiale, Paris, PUF, 2003, pp. 213-225.
Website of the 19th International Aids Conference : http://www.aids2012.org [20 août 2012].
UNAIDS, UNAIDS Guidance Note on HIV and Sex Work, April 2012, to be accessed at : http://www.unaids.org [Aug.21th 2012].
UNAIDS, Together We Will End AIDS, July 18th 2012, to be accessed at : http://www.unaids.org [Aug. 25th 2012].
