Dec 13, 2016 | Climate change, environment, Non-state diplomacy, Passage au crible (English)
By Simon Uzenat
Translation: Lea Sharkey
Passage au crible n° 147
Source:© Chaos International
On October 5, 2016, the conditions have been reunited to bring the Paris Agreement into force, as it has been ratified by at least 55 countries accounting for an estimated 55% of the total global greenhouse gas emissions. Thirty days later, on November 4, 2016, the Paris Agreement is made effective. As a consequence, the 22nd COP (Conference of the Parties) of the UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change) reunited in Marrakech from November 7 to 18, also serving as the 1st session of the CMA (Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement) is setting up the multilateral regime for climate regulation, in which non-state actors, and sub-national governments specifically, occupy an increasingly prominent role. The 1st Climate Chance Summit, held in Nantes from September 26 to 28, 2016, has been designed to assert and focus non-state climate action.
> Rappel historique
> Cadrage théorique
> Analyse
> Références
Rappel historique
The COP15 Copenhagen Summit was the deadline to reach an agreement according to the the Bali Action Plan schedule and Bali Roadmap, approved in December 2007.Twelve years after the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol, its failure formalises the end of a coercive approach and announces « a pursuit of a global redistribution of political authority », now involving local authorities. In December 2008, at the COP14 in Poznan, the UNFCCC Executive Secretary Yvo de Boer recognised that « 50 to 80% of the GHG (Greenhouse Gas emissions) attenuation measures and 100% of the adaptation to climate change initiatives are led at sub-state level ».
In the frame of international associations such as UCLG (United Cities and Local Governments) or transnational events such as the 1st Global Summit of Regions, held in October 2008 in Saint-Malo, local authorities have progressively deployed on a global scale to voice their opinion within climate negotiations. For the first time, the decision adopted at the 2010 Cancun Conference acknowledged their role in the policy of attenuation and adaptation to climate change. In the case at hand, it « recognises the need to engage a broad range of stakeholders at the global, regional, national and local levels, be they government, including subnational and local government ».
Cadrage théorique
The transnational mobilization of local authorities and their intensified relations with other non-state actors rely on two simultaneous movements.
1. A dissemination of political authority. As globalisation did not put out territorial conflicts, deep-rooted in the Westphalian system, it has however led to an increased competition between local governments. These local governments use corporate strategies on the political and economic level to gain shares in the global market. Their set of actions is syncretic and combines traditional diplomacy, except for the use of military power, with some of the typical communication and action strategies of NGOs and transnational firms. The current debates relative to multilateralism have to be re-framed and « far from describing a merely renewed interstate configuration, multilateralism refers to the emergence of a new fragmented, hybrid global governance. »
2. An international division of the climate labour. While the Kyoto Protocol only involved industrialised countries mentioned in the Annex1, so as to reduce their GHG emissions within specific proportions and schedule, the Paris Agreement engages both developed, emerging and developing countries, on the basis of their INDCs (Intended Nationally Determined Contributions). The main levers for climate action being in the hands of non-state actors – considering their field of competence (local authorities and firms) – they get to play a major role in shaping and implementing national and international strategies of climate-resilient development.
Analyse
If the Paris Agreement supports the seventh principle of the Rio Declaration (1992) relative to the « shared and differentiated responsibilities » of States, it mostly results in a shift of the paradigm of collective action, which has been boasted by the UNFCCC and fuelled by IPCC reports (International Panel of Experts on Climate Change). The normative approach developed between member States under the Kyoto Protocol gave way to « free » decentralized initiatives, organised around a global objective set up by scientific experts (control the temperature rise under 2°C before 2100 and 1,5°C if possible), this being the lowest common denominator, to such extent that some have described this process as a shift from « cooperation to coordination » (François Gemenne).
This stocktaking exercise takes place within a wider movement that has been under way since the post-Copenhagen climate turn – initiated in Cancun and made official in Paris – and that has been offering many windows of opportunity to non-state actors, and specifically to local authorities. These actors have been repeatedly asking for increased synergy – pivotal to their effectiveness – with other major multilateral agreements for development. This has been clearly stated in the declarations adopted at the end of the recent international events organised by local actors, such as the Global Summit for « Climate & Territories » in Lyon, July 2015, the 1st Summit of Local Representatives for Climate in Paris in the frame of COP21 and the Nantes Summit in September 2016. Based on human security and priority given to the recognition of collective and individual rights, these transnational texts have been acknowledged by state actors and have strengthened the legitimacy of non-state actors. Local governments, being the closest to citizen demands and expectations, are thus playing a even more important role on the global scene and specifically within the climate arena.
The Lima-Paris Action Plan (which became the Global Climate Action Agenda) and the nomination of high level champions as planned in the Part IV of the Paris Agreement attest of the Parties and UN organisation’s will to associate more closely non-state and state actors; the former’s ambition being to atomise responsibilities (and tensions), while the latter’s objective is to bolster climate commitments and results. Largely indicative of this ambition were the presence of the French champion Laurence Tubiana during the three days of the Nantes Summit and the clear support given by the Moroccan champion. They both added an official mediation channel with the national bodies of negotiation. In fact, the Nantes declaration recognised that the « mobilisation of [non-state actors] will only be efficient if closely supported by enhanced dialogue with UN bodies ».
The digital platform NAZCA (Non-state Actor Zone for Climate Action) embodies the operational side of the COP21. The platform « captures the commitments to climate action by companies, cities, subnational, regions, investors, and civil society organisations. » Over 5305 organisations, 47,7% are local authorities, on a par with private actors. This balance is also apparent in the number of commitments (on a total of 11615) but the gap increases when adopting a more qualitative focus: over the pre-2020 period, the private sector accounts for 88,6% of the initiatives against 9,8% for local governments. Provided data call for detailed analysis, but already confirm differentials of means and temporality that help understand the implementation of hybrid coalitions (water, air, international solar alliance) which used the Nantes Summit as a stage to express their point of view in the perspective of COP22. In doing so, these « interested non-Parties organisations » actively work towards a partial reconfiguration of the climate arena, which tends to bring non-state parties closer to the heart of the negotiations, while keeping them away from decisions.
Références
Aykut Stefan C., Dahan Amy, Gouverner le climat ? 20 ans de négociations internationales, Paris, Les Presses de Sciences Po, 2014.
Betsill Michelle M., Corell Elisabeth (Eds.), NGO Diplomacy: The Influence of Nongovernmental Organizations in International Environmental Negotiations, Cambridge (Mass.), MIT Press, 2008.
Petiteville Franck, Placidi-Frot Delphine (Eds.), Négociations internationales, Paris, Les Presses de Sciences Po, 2013.
Setzer Joana, Environmental Paradiplomacy: the Engagement of the Brazilian State of São Paulo in International Environmental Relations, LSE Thesis, June 2013, available at:
http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/839/1/Setzer_Environmental_paradiplomacy.pdf
Uzenat Simon, « Un multilatéralisme sans contraintes. Les engagements des États dans le cadre de Copenhague », Passage au crible (15), Feb. 18th, 2016.
Nov 20, 2016 | environment, Global Public Goods, Passage au crible (English)
By Valérie Le Brenne
Translation: Lea Sharkey
Passage au crible n° 146
Source: Pixabay
From October 10 to 15 2016, the African Union Summit on Maritime Security and Safety and Development took place in Lomé (Togo). At the end of the meeting, thirty-one States adopted a charter to combat maritime piracy and IUU fishing (Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated fishing).
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
West Africa is one of the regions of the world most affected by illegal fishing. It should be pointed out that this practice is to be distinguished from unreported and unregulated fishing. As these practices are usually linked, illegal fishing is however a criminal act perpetrated at international level and the latter falls within the scope of local poaching or may be an infringement to existing national regulations.
If the scope of the phenomenon is difficult to assess – mainly because of 1) the low coercive powers conferred to the Regional Fisheries Management Organisations (RFMOs) , 2) the non-existence of a regional cooperation between the States, 3) a lack of national monitoring devices, 4) a lack of coordination of the harbour authorities in this field, 5) the transnational dimension of the operations and – as the case may be – of the criminal networks involved, 6) the complexity of the laundering mechanisms – these catches are however estimated to between a third to a half of the catches in West-African waters, approximately amounting to 1.3 billion dollars. In 2013, a team of researchers from the Sea Around Us Project – a programme developed within the British Columbia University in Canada to gather vast amounts of data on international fishing – has quantified the impacts of this phenomenon in Senegal. According to the conclusions then issued to the government, the shortfall approximately reached 300 million dollars per year.
As fisheries have been declining steadily as from the mid nineties – according to the last FAO report, the proportion of overexploited stocks has escalated from 10 to 31,4% – the combat against illegal fishing became a key challenge in order to drive fisheries towards a sustainable path of development. Moreover, illegal fishing is today a major issue in terms of food security for coastal developing countries.
Currently, this issue features amongst the main priorities of the international agenda related to ocean protection. In September 2015, the UNDP (United Nations Development Program) has set up new OFD (Objectives for Development) in which the fourteenth objective related to « Aquatic Life » plans the elimination of this practice. In June 2016, significant progress has been made with the enforcement of the FAO Agreement (dubbed as the « PSM Agreement ») aiming to prevent, deter and eliminate illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing. Adopted in 2009, this treaty compels participating countries to 1) « enforce harbour controls measures of fishing vessels », 2) « deny harbour access and use of harbour infrastructures to vessels involved in illegal activities » and 3) « secures access to shared information gathered by the States on these vessels ».
Theoretical framework
1. The failures of maritime governance. Adopted in 1982 in Montego Bay, Jamaica and enforced in 1994, the UNCLS (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea) regulates the use of interior seas and of the ocean. More precisely, the text established the sovereignty of coastal States on their national waters. Any country may file an official request and has a right to dispose of an EEZ (Exclusive Economic Zone) of 200 miles on which it has sole authority to decide of the activities developed within the area (mineral exploration and extraction, renewable marine energy (RME), fishing, tourism, etc.) In spite of this legal disposition, West African countries – whose abundant fish stocks are much coveted – struggle to uphold this right. Because of a lack of control over the sea, authorities are not able to stop all fishing vessels illegally operating in their EEZ, as these vessels use various schemes to avoid localization systems.
2. A transnational criminality. Operated in various areas – mainly in West Africa, South-East Asia and Antarctica -, involving many States – especially those offering convenience flags – and relying on organised networks, IUU fishing is today a new form of transnational criminality. As a response, new instruments are implemented (agreements, charters, surveillance programs, etc.) that have emerged from a coordination of multiples institutions tackling the issue (OI, regional organisations, States, NGOs, universities). However, these initiatives remain variable and have only just begun to evolve towards functional cooperation, due to of a lack of achievement of the States’ commitments.
Analysis
The adoption of the UNCLS in 1982 has been preceded by three international meetings, the first one being the Geneva Convention on the Law of the Sea in 1958 which led to the signing of four conventions. However, these regulations have been quickly questioned by developing States that just gained their independence. It should be reminded that in the fifties, European fishing companies (Spanish, French and Portuguese), facing the decline of some North-Atlantic species, started operating in West Africa. In the same period, many scientific studies established the existence of abundant stocks in the area, which triggered the development of these trawlers in the Gulf of Guinea. Following these disputes, a second conference was held in 1960 but closed without any agreement being reached. A third conference opened in 1972 and closed in 1982.
By establishing the principle of EEZ, the text authorizes States with significant fisheries to protect it from foreign fishing vessels and favor their own fishing fleet. Moreover, the Montego Bay Convention provides that any States that are not able to exploit their stocks fully may sign partnerships with third countries to grant them access to the surplus in exchange for a financial contribution. Lacking adequate infrastructures or means to invest in new units, or even data and/or expertise to challenge assessments released by foreign scientists, most of them have thus signed partnerships and collected taxes on the catches’ value.
However, this process has not been paired with reinforcement of maritime security in West Africa. A growing number of foreign fishing vessels – from Europe first, then from Russia, China, and South-East Asia in the nineties – started operating illegally in these waters, to the detriment of local fishermen. Within decades, the phenomenon has increased dramatically, to such extent that it now jeopardizes already weakened ecosystems together with the local socioeconomic equilibrium of coastal communities, while posing a major risk to food security. Furthermore, the decline of fish stocks leading some Asian ship-owners to find a way to decrease their exploitation costs, has induced human trafficking such as embarking groups of Burmese refugees.
As such, combatting this transnational criminality became a priority on the international agenda. In West Africa, several operating procedures have been identified. One of the first strategies to avoid surveillance are 1) turning off the Automatic Identification System (AIS) and/or the Vessel Monitoring System (VMS) 2) transmitting false data or 3) modifying the vessel’s identification marks. A second method relies on transshipping illegal cargoes, such as laundering catches onto one or more refrigerated vessels that already contains legal catches. This may be done in port, near the coast or on the high seas. Another technique may be false registration, as it happened with fish-poaching vessel Thunder (PAC 126). Lastly, the serious lack of transparency for license delivery in West African countries also prompts illegal activities.
In order to curb these practices, the FAO – the main international organisation operating within the marine fishery sector – has crafted the PSM agreement, advising a more strict regulation of harbour activities. In fact, the treaty foresees intensified data sharing between the States, IO and ORGP in order to 1) improve identification and tracking of smugglers and 2) more efficiently take control of units involved in illegal activities and illegal transshipping. The recent development of advanced technologies – such as real-time monitoring device Global Fishing Watch resulting from a cooperation between Google, SkyTruth, Oceana and several universities – allows for a dramatic step forward in terms of localisation. However, only 47 States are currently parties to the agreement, of which only 7 West African countries (Angola, Benin, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, and Sierra Leone). To this day, none have yet ratified it. The same applies to the Lomé Charter, that lacks two major States parties, Cameroun and Senegal, which economies are nonetheless deeply affected by foreign intrusions in their national waters. It should be underlined that the text only states general guidelines – especially in terms of information sharing between States – and does not consider any implementation of a specific mechanism.
As no clear commitments have been taken by the affected countries, the combat against illegal fishing is not yet to deliver tangible results. But progress is nevertheless vital, considering that in addition to being overexploited, fish species located in the equatorial seas are already affected by the consequences of climate change.
References
Daniels Alfonso and al., Western Africa’s Missing Fish: The Impacts of Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing and Under-reporting Catches by Foreign Fleets, Overseas Development Institute, Londres, June 2016.
Interpol, Environment Security Directorate (Scale Project), Étude sur la pêche illégale au large des côtes d’Afrique de l’Ouest, Lyon, Sept. 2014.
Le Manach Frédéric and al., « Who gets whats? Developing a more equitable framework for EU fishing agreements », Marine Policy, 38, 2013, pp.257-266.
Pauly Daniel, « La pêche illégale le long de la côte ouest-africaine », Diplomatie magazine, special issue, October 2016, pp. 68-71. (Non released)
Official website of the Lomé Summit on Maritime Security, Safety and Development, available at: http://www.sommetdelome.org/. Last checked : October 20, 2016.
Nov 20, 2016 | Africa, Diplomacy, International commerce, Passage au crible (English)
By Moustafa Benberrah
Translation: Lea Sharkey
Passage au crible n° 145
On Source: Wikimedia
September 14, 2016, was held the second meeting of the EU-Tunisia Joint Parliamentary Committee. At the end of the meeting, a non-binding resolution was adopted, advising European institutions to set up a « Marshall Plan ». Such devices intended to support the Tunisian transition as well as the conversion of the European debt in investments programs.
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
Five years after the overthrow of Zine el Abidine Ben Ali, several evolutions marked the Tunisian political scene, such as the adoption of a new constitution on January 26, 2014. This constitution establishes the freedom of speech and opinion, the freedom of conscience, the principle of equal rights for women and men and the principle of parity within representative assemblies. These improvements have been acknowledged on October 9, 2015 with the Nobel Peace Prize attributed to a quartet that included the UGTT (General Tunisian Labour Union), the employers’ federation UTICA (Tunisian Union of Industry, Trade and Handicrafts), the LTDH (Tunisian Human Rights League) and the ONA (National Association of Lawyers). It should be pointed out that this group has been developing for more than two years a « national dialogue ». To such extent that the EU (European Union) has expressed its will to enhance its partnership with the Tunisian Republic by focusing on the essential role played by civil society in the building of the democratic process.
Negotiations between Tunisia and the EU have been resumed on October 15 2015, with a view to concluding a DCFTA (Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement) broadening the free trade zone already set up in 1995 for industrial products. This text has prompted the Tunisian State to the status of « privileged partner » and advocates for deeper economic integration within the European zone. It should be reminded that these talks have been part of the Euro-Mediterranean Barcelona process launched in 1995. This process has introduced the « EUROMED partnership » concept, based on three priorities: policy, economy and security. Following this initiative, the French President François Hollande has announced on January 22, 2016 that « France would implement a 1 billion euro plan over the next five years ».
However, this Maghreb State is still facing tremendous political, economic and security challenges. The political assassinations and terrorist attacks of the last months have led the EU to reaffirm its support. After the Bardo attack of March 18, 2015, the European institution has expressed its solidarity and underlined that the « security of this neighboring country and of the European countries were connected ». This declaration follows the signature, on November 4, 2015 of an agreement concluded between the EU Ambassador Laura Baeza and the Ministers of Development and Home Affairs, Yassine Brahim and Nejem Gharsalli over a 23 million euro loan. This amount is dedicated to reforming the security sector focusing on border protection and combat against radicalisation. Moreover, economic measures have been discussed, such as an increase in quotas of olive oil destined to the European market. The European Commission has adopted these proposals in September in order to « protect the Tunisian economy in the aftermath of the recent terrorist attacks ». As such, supporting the sector on which more than one million Tunisians rely on, has been advertised as a « tangible effort to boost employment » and as an « essential economic advantage in the short term ».
Theoretical framework
1. A unilateral control over the negotiations. The terrorist attacks that struck Tunisia in 2015 have reinforced the EU’s initiatives in the matter of security. These arrangements are proposed within the frame of a « privileged partnership » which would include, in the long term, all sectors of the Tunisian economy. However, opening markets to competition raises concerns on the serious imbalance which would mainly profit Western traders, and this has already led Tunisian organisations to mobilise against the talks.
2. The structural resistance of civil society. James Rosenau has demonstrated that foreign politics are no longer exclusive to national authorities. Governments have now to deal with sovereignty free actors. In fact, these actors challenge what they consider as a bad management of public funds that have indeed not led to clear socioeconomic improvements.
Analysis
It should be noted that in Tunisia, the push for further cooperation remains controversial amongst civil society and the media, as they keep pointing out a concealed form of cronyism. These groups support the view that such agreement would extensively influence political orientations in terms of diplomacy and economy. Moreover, they consider that its immediate impacts are questionable. In this line, political opposition has exposed DCFTA as a blatantly commercial and financial agreement and warned of the serious imbalance between European and national traders, considering free trade mostly profitable to Europe and especially to France, Germany and Italy. Dissenters also note the absence of a clear support to the modernisation of the Tunisian economy, to build a competitive production apparatus for the industry, agriculture and tertiary sector. In these conditions, opening the markets would be hardly profitable to Tunis.
Furthermore, these dissensions might be fuelling global turmoil. As they asked for a standstill on the talks in June 2015, fifteen organisations – including the UGTT, the FTDES (Tunisian Forum for Human Rights) and the LTDH – have expressed their concerns through a public declaration. Finally, the Tunisian youth challenges ongoing neo-paternalism.
Several economists and press organisations have broadcasted this view to delay the negotiation process, quoting the Moroccan situation where the DCFTA is limited to impact assessments carried out by the Ministry of Commerce. These actors have access to specific data granting them the use of the knowledge structure – as described by Susan Strange – to prioritize the objectives featuring on the political agenda. As the EU gives credit to these sovereignty free actors, considered as the State’s key counterparts, the discussions might be subject to delay or even momentarily brought to a halt, as it happened in 2014.
References
Benberrah Moustafa, La Tunisie en transition. Les usages numériques d’Ennahdha, Paris, L’Harmattan, 2014. Coll. Chaos International.
Laroche Josepha, “The Nobel Prize, a Commitment against Islamism”, PAC 137, http://www.chaos-international.
Nawaat, last checked on February 10, 2015 on: www.nawaat.org
Rosenau James N., Turbulence in World Politics: a Theory of Continuity and Change, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1990.
Strange Susan, States and Markets: An Introduction to International Political Economy, Londres, Pinter, 1994.
Aug 21, 2016 | Europe (English), European Union, International migrations, Passage au crible (English)
By Catherine Wihtol de Wenden
Translation: Lea Sharkey
Passage au crible n° 144
Source: Wikipedia
On April 4, 2016, the agreement between Turkey and the European Union took effect. It complements a series of bi and multilateral treaties that the European Union has signed with its Southern neighbours, transforming them into border guards for Europe. In return, offsets are granted, such as visas for the qualified, infrastructure construction or development aid. But this document appears to scale up operations. As of 2014, Europe has been surrounded by countries in turmoil, plagued with civil wars, both in the South-Mediterranean rim (Libya, Syria, Iraq) and in the Horn of Africa, from which flew streams of asylum seekers of unmatched magnitude. The same applies for the South. In 2015, 1 255 640 000 migrants filed for asylum in the European Union and 625 000 in 2014, when previous peaks (in the early 1990s, in the aftermath of the fall of the Berlin Wall) only reached 500 000 annual requests; with an average volume of 220,000 per year for the other years. Unlike the Arab revolutions, which, since 2011, had induced small flows to Europe (Tunisia, Libya, Egypt), nobody had anticipated the Syrian regime would stay in place. Nobody had imagined that 4,7 million Syrians would leave their countries to seek shelter in Turkey (2.7 million are currently living there), Jordan (600,000), and Lebanon (1 million), the rest trying to cross the Greek border to seek asylum in Europe.
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
As a State party to the Geneva Convention on Asylum (1951), Turkey has however retained its geographical reservation to Europeans only, non-Europeans not being allowed to benefit from UN asylum, unless directly issued on-site by the UNHCR. The Syrian families who left their country have been welcomed in Turkey. They seek to stabilize their status, access the labour market and attempt to cross the Greek-Turkish border. According to the UNHCR report (United Nations High Commissioner for refugees 2015), the majority of Middle-Eastern asylum-seekers indeed came through Greece, Italy only in second place for other migrants and refugees. Two routes are possible: by sea, through smugglers or by land, crossing the Evros river, then Thrace and through the Balkan route. Early September, the picture of the three year-old Syrian child Aylan Kurdi, found dead on Bodrum’s Beach as his parents drowned in an attempt to reach Greece by sea from Turkey, moved millions. At the same time, Angela Merkel’s announcement, declaring Germany ready to welcome 800 000 asylum seekers, was only cautiously relayed by the other Western European countries. They were also slow to give a positive answer to President of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker, which had proposed resettlement quotas to European countries based upon their wealth and the size of their population. Therefore, France agreed to welcome 30 000 asylum seekers over two years in addition to regular requests. In 2015, the number of these asylum requests amounted to 79 000 requests. But few Syrian asylum seekers wished to go to France as many had ties with Turkish migrants who settled in Germany a long time ago. Moreover, the deterrence policy and the difficulty to access the labour market for asylum seekers in France did not make it an attractive country. A dividing line also appeared between Eastern and Western Europe, as European countries of Central and Eastern Europe – the so-called Visegrad countries – showed hostility to hosting refugees from Middle-East countries and of Muslim culture; a series of reactions fostering a sharp rise of the extreme right.
Theoretical framework
1. Asylum: a failure of the deterrence strategy and of European solidarity. Despite 25 years of militarization and control of borders, the influx of refugees has continued to grow over these past two years, comforting the role of non-State actors such as people smugglers. Facing a divided Europe, European countries have sought to outsource border control to non-EU States (return agreements for failed asylum seekers) often bilaterally. They sometimes entrusted the sorting of asylum seekers to those countries, now regarded as safe by the European Union. This reveals the lack of confidence of the European Union countries in the EU border control mechanisms. This reflects also a lack of solidarity between Member States of the Union regarding the treatment of asylum. Some countries such as Germany showed great generosity. Others, like Hungary, have purely and simply refused to host any refugees, fearing their ideal of ethnic and identity homogeneity might be threatened.
2. From advocating sovereignty to the temptation of isolationism. The States of the European Union and those of the Balkans seek to return to a national border control and to close them. In doing so, they deliberately ignore the Schengen mechanism, which establishes freedom of internal movement throughout the European territory. Is the Schengen system threatened by the refugee crisis? Some fractions of the extreme-right advocate a return to national border control by the States, dismissing the fact that international trade, cross-border work, tourism would then be severely stricken.
Analysis
The European Union chose Turkey to conclude such an agreement in order to alleviate the burden of arrivals in Greece, which is currently experiencing a major economic crisis. The idea is to transfer to Turkey a major part of the hosting responsibility, but without providing any right to asylum, as set by the Geneva Convention. The second answer lies in the European attempt to put an end to the smugglers’ trafficking in the Aegean Sea, after the European attempt to make war to smugglers (and migrants) proved not feasible. Indeed, how is patrolling to remove small boats in the Mediterranean Sea possible, without any intervention mandate neither from the countries of departure nor from coastal countries? The third response is related to the concern of the Turkish Government to foster a positive image in Europe by signing this text. Turkey’s claims in return for hosting Syrians may be outlined as such: 1) Re-opening the negotiations relative to the accession of Turkey to the European Union. 2) Abolition of visas for Turks coming to Europe as Turkey presents today a negative migration balance for Europe (there are less Turks going to Europe and Turks of Europe returning to Turkey). 3) A payment of 6 billion Euros over two years to host the Syrians. Associations have expressed strong objections to this provision as it recalls former agreements between Libya and the European Union. Let’s remind that this country, long banned from the international scene, regained some European respectability (especially facing Italy and France) because it had accepted to sort sub-Saharan asylum-seekers travelling to Europe, in exchange for gifts granted to president Gadhafi: payment of substantial sums of money, development programs and infrastructure construction. For Turkey, the agreement is rather focused on a “one for one” swap. For each Syrian repatriated by Ankara at the request of the European Union (as failing to meet the refugee profile), another would be relocated to the European Union within the limits of 72 000. In early April, European countries were about to implement this very strange bargaining, with the assistance of Frontex, the European Agency for the Management of the External Borders of the European Union, with NATO contributing to interceptions in the Mediterranean Sea.
However, United Nations Special Representative on international migration Peter Sutherland expressed reservations on this potentially “illegal” agreement. In addition, the effectiveness of such an agreement is not guaranteed, as migrants will try out other routes than the Greece-Turkey road, paying a fortune to other people smugglers. Such a provision would thus enable Greece to forward inadmissible asylum requests to Turkey. But associations challenge the classification of Turkey as a safe third country. Finally, the agreement applies only to Syrians, when more than half of the refugees entering Greece are Afghans or Iraqis.
People smugglers will have to reorganize other routes that do not cross the Aegean Sea. However the path of the Balkans also appears arduous. Indeed, many transit countries in the region have closed their borders, such as Macedonia. 30,000 people have died in the Mediterranean since 2000 and 3000 in the year 2015 alone. In 2016, 351 deaths have already been registered, an issue met with indifference amongst European opinions. This agreement, which outsources asylum to a non EU country – conveniently considered for the occasion as safe – is in breach of the non-explusion principle enshrined in the Geneva Convention. Regarding the treatment of immigration and asylum, the agreement also puts to the test values of solidarity between European countries but also Human Rights, on which Europe has been built.
References
Schmoll Camille, Thiollet Hélène, Wihtol de Wenden Catherine (Eds.), Migrations en Méditerranée, Paris, CNRS Editions, 2015.
Wihtol de Wenden Catherine, Atlas de migrations, un équilibre mondial à inventer, 4th ed., Paris, Autrement, 2016.
Aug 2, 2016 | Globalization, International commerce, Multilaterism, Passage au crible (English)
By Valérie Le Brenne
Translation: Lea Sharkey
Passage au crible n°143
Source: Flickr – World Trade Organization
The WTO’s 10th Ministerial Conference was held in Nairobi, Kenya, from December 15 to 19, 2015. On this occasion, the organisation welcomed a new member, Afghanistan, increasing the number of member States to 163. The meeting culminated in the adoption of six measures on agriculture, cotton and issues related to least-developed countries (LDCs).
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
The WTO is a relatively new arena amongst international organisations. Created in 1995, the WTO has been established by the Marrakech Agreement that closed up the Uruguay Round Negotiations (1986-1994). This new scene has replaced the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) born in 1948 with the mission to build a global free-trade system through progressive removal of custom barriers. After World War II, victorious powers – with the United States at the helm – agreed on the necessity to avoid any return of protectionism, as of which prevailed during the interwar period. Indeed, protectionism contributed to worsen the economic crisis of 1929 and triggered the outbreak of the conflict. But that project also originates from the will of the American hegemon to stop the vicious financial triad deficit-debt-reparations which detrimental effects had already been criticised by economist John Maynard Keynes, at the signing of the Versailles Treaty. In this regard, the specificity of the United States economic endorsement of the UK in 1942, and especially their long-term debt policy, should be underlined. If Washington considered material support to Europe as a non-refundable war effort, agreements clearly detailed economic and commercial policy settlements that were to be enforced as soon as the war would end (Graz, 1999).
After a few preparatory reunions, the United States launched the Havana Conference in November 1947. The meeting led to the adoption of the GATT agreements four months later, and planned the creation of the WTO. However, under pressure from business circles, the Senate opposed the ratification of the treaty. This blockage led to maintain the GATT, an organisation initially designed to operate only on a short period. Between 1948 and 1994, eight rounds have been held. However, the last round achieved important developments related to domains such as services, textile, intellectual property, while stressing tensions on agricultural questions.
Since its foundation, the WTO has followed an arduous path. After the marked failure of the Seattle Conference in 1999, its members opened a new round in 2001 in Doha. However, tensions between trading powers, disagreements between emerging States and a steady North-South divide stalled the talks in 2006. Moreover, as the 2008 financial crisis fostered protectionist attitudes, no significant step forward has been registered since then. Indeed, this situation advertised the WTO as a paralysed organisation. Simultaneously, this dead-end triggered critics against multilateralism as a regulation instrument.
Theoretical framework
1. The inertia of an international regime. Developed by John G. Ruggie and Stephen Krasner, the notion of regime refers to the “construction of a limited order, restricted to one domain of activity and a few governmental players” (Laroche, 2013). Based on this principle of functional separation, the WTO is a striking example of international regime. Nevertheless, as the multiplicity of interests at stake slows down – and sometimes prevents – any possible agreement, this multilateral chamber shows structural inertia without any prospects of evolution.
2. A revival of bilateral agreements. The crisis experienced by this organisation underlines the limits of this type of cooperation. This leads to a growing number of commercial partnerships being established between regional powers – the Transatlantic and Transpacific Partnerships being two of the most finalised models of these partnerships.
Analysis
Discussed by Law theorists in the interwar period, the concept of international regime has been revived in the 1970’s. In 1975, John Ruggie publishes in the famous American review International Organization an article titled “International Responses to Technology, Concepts and Trends”, in which he defines international regimes as a « collective of common anticipations, rules and regulations, plans, agreements and commitments [..], accepted as such by a group of countries ». However, it is not until the 80’s – and mostly through Stephen Krasner’s work – for the International Relations theorists to transform it into a wide-ranging debate field and engage heated debates between constructivists, liberals and realists. Acknowledging the chaotic structure of the international system, all admit of the States capacity to cooperate in order to implement, in various domains, « governance without a government » (Rosenau & Czempiel, 1992). In fact, « the convergence of anticipations [would] contribute to reduce uncertainties and strengthen collective stability » (Laroche, 2013).
As it aims to implement a global economic order, the WTO appears as a typical example of international regime. As it stands, the WTO forms a case study questioning the validity of a construction elaborated by « practitioners for practitioners » (Laroche, 2013). The question of hegemonic stability must be put forward. Indeed, if the various schools of thoughts concurred on the ability of the States to cooperate on a functional basis, they disagree on the creation, consolidation and survival requirements of these international regimes. Following Robert Gilpin’s thesis (Gilpin, 1981), neorealists considered that this process would only thrive with an hegemon or at least, as Charles Kindleberger showed, if a stabilizer would exercise its leadership (Kindleberger, 1973). Considering the GATT, the role played by the United States during World War II should be underlined – and specifically their ability to enforce a liberal approach on international trade – as it forged a body of rules designed to facilitate the creation of this proto-international regime.
If we may accept the hypothesis that the presence of an hegemon fosters the development of an international regime, this approach does not withstand questions relative to its reinforcement or continuity. It should be highlighted that, if the stalling Doha negotiations makes tangible the current failure of an organisation without any common plan of action (Petiteville, 2004), the first hurdles had been experienced right from 1999 in Seattle. The meeting could not be held as numerous NGO’s came to show their ideological opposition to neoliberalism, accused of deepening inequalities and causing environmental destructions. Let’s remind that the attacks of September 11, 2001 – an event that marked, at least symbolically, the end of the United States dominance over the global arena – did not lead to postpone the Doha meetings. Not only the meetings were maintained but also the new round of negotiation immediately pointed out development as a keynote for the talks. This motto has been more than ever considered as one of the pillars of the fight against global terrorism, spear-headed by the American power. Far from being merely anecdotal, these two elements point out structural limits in international regimes, while moving beyond the debate on hegemonic stability. The complexity that lies behind maintaining and consolidating these areas of discussion is to be attributed to their permeability. In other words, as their creation may be backed by a consensus on the collective interest to cooperate, their continuity and consolidation are threatened by 1) the multiplicity of actors 2) the diversity of interests at stake 3) the permeability between spaces of negotiations 4) the pressure exerted by exogenous forces. As a consequence, the artificiality induced by this hyper specialisation and its corollary, technification, may be weakened by a confrontation with reality, in which politics and economics are deeply rooted.
Currently, all of these pitfalls – competition amongst emerging countries, antagonisms between great commercial powers such as Europe and the United States, ongoing North-South divide specifically related to agricultural questions, opposition from non-governmental players or discrepancy between commercial priorities and environmental issues (Damian & Graz, 2010) – are significant impediments to thriving negotiations within the organisation. It should be underlined that the process is being obstructed by the need to obtain, for each item of the negotiation, approval by all of the members and not only by a majority. Threatened by a triangle of decisional impossibility (Petiteville, 2013) – i.e. the impossibility « for [one hundred and sixty three States] to agree on the basis of a consensus and agenda where « nothing is agreed until everything is agreed », according to the rule of the « single undertaking » – the WTO is considered as a multilateral dead-end organisation. In fact, this signal reduces the confidence in its capacity to regulate globalisation, which reinforces, in return, inertia in this international regime.
As no significant progress is being made, WTO members mark their disloyalty. This appears through bilateral negotiations meant to formalise regional agreements designated as « mega-regional commercial agreements » (ICTSD, 2014). However, even the plethora of coalitions (Cairns, G20, G99,etc.) did not overcome any divisions. Moreover, the 2008 financial crisis bolstered protectionist reactions while attesting of the limits of neoliberal policies (Stiglitz, 2010) which weakened even more the credibility of the organisation. As such, commercial ventures are being observed on a regional basis. This is the case with the TTIP (Transatlantic Trade Investment Partnership) which plans the launch of partnership between the United States and the European Union. Launched in 2013 by Barack Obama and the Union leaders, José Manuel Barroso and Herman Van Rompuy, this project focuses on the creation of a free-trade area, based on the reduction of customs and regulation barriers between the two sides of the Atlantic. However, the text is currently sharply criticised by NGOs, fearing 1) an alignment of European norms on the United States norms that could lead to GMOs on European market. 2) The authority granted to arbitral courts, often criticised for their collusions with global firms. Another initiative of this type, the TTP (Trans-Pacific Trade Partnership) has been officially adopted in Auckland, on February 4, 2016, by twelve countries: Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chili, the United States, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New-Zealand, Peru and Singapore. Just like the TTIP, this agreement plans to lower the barriers to trade and investment, especially between the United States and Japan. But as the attention is drawn to these treaties, global transformations in international trade should not be set aside, as such the increasingly important emerging powers. In relation to this, the growing importance of Chinese policies should be underlined as they focus on the consolidation of new economic partnerships with various African countries (Cabestan, 2015). As such, more than 20 agreements have been signed between Beijing and Algeria in a few years, in strategic domains such as industry, agriculture, weapon industry and infrastructures (Benberrah, 2015).
In this context, restructuring the WTO appears to be essential. In fact, if this organisation operates well as an authority by monitoring the commitments taken by its members, but struggles when required to lead the liberalisation of global trade. Each pack of measures approved should not make us forget that, in order to survive, this organisation will have to face major reforms in the negotiations processes that have been in place since the GATT foundation.
References
Books
Cabestan Jean-Pierre, La Politique internationale de la Chine, Paris, Presses de Sciences Po, 2015, pp. 477-540.
Gilpin Robert O., War and Change in World Politics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1981.
Graz Jean-Christophe, Aux Sources de l’OMC : la Conférence de La Havane, Paris, Droz, 1999.
Kindleberger Charles P., La Grande Crise mondiale, 1929-1939, [1973], trad., Paris, Economica, 1988.
Krasner Stephen (Éd.), International Regimes, Ithaca (N.Y.), Cornell University Press, 1999.
Laroche Josepha, « L’Économie politique internationale », in : Balzacq Thierry, Ramel Frédéric (Eds.), Traité de relations internationales, Paris, Presses de Sciences Po, 2013, pp. 631-660.
Petiteville Franck, « Les négociations multilatérales à l’OMC. L’épuisement d’un modèle », in : Petiteville Franck, Placidi-Frot Delphine (Eds.), Négociations internationales, Paris, Presses de Sciences Po, 2013, pp. 345-372.
Rainelli Michel, L’Organisation mondiale du commerce, 9th ed., Paris, La Découverte, 2011.
Rosenau James N., Czempiel Ernst-Otto (Eds.), Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992.
Stiglitz Joseph E., Le Rapport Stiglitz. Pour une vraie réforme du système monétaire et financier international, [2010], trans., Paris, Actes Sud, 2012.
Reviews
Benberrah Moustafa, « L’asymétrie sociopolitique d’une coopération économique. L’implantation dominatrice des firmes chinoises en Algérie », Passage au crible, (127), Chaos International, May 29, 2015.
Damian Michel, Graz Jean-Christophe, « L’OMC, l’environnement et la contestation écologique », Revue internationale des sciences sociales, 170 (4), 2001, pp. 657-670.
Draper Peter, Lacey Simon, Ramkolowan Yash, « Accords commerciaux méga-régionaux : quelles implications pour les pays de l’ACP ? », [Online], Passerelles, 15 (4), ICTSD, October 9, 2014.
Kindleberger Charles P., « Dominance and Leadership in the International Economy. Exploitation, Public Goods and Free Rides », International Studies Quaterly, 25 (2), June 1981, pp. 242-254.
Petiteville Franck, « L’hégémonie est-elle soluble dans le multilatéralisme ? Le cas de l’OMC », Critique internationale, 22 (1), 2004, pp. 63-76.
Ruggie John G., « International Responses to Technology, Concepts and Trends », International Organization, 29 (3), Summer 1975, pp. 557-583.
