Feb 4, 2013 | Africa, Defense, Passage au crible (English), Security
By Philippe Hugon
Translation: Anton Stzepourginski
Passage au crible n°84
Pixabay
On the 28th of January 2013, an international donor conference opened at the AU (African Union) headquarters in the Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa in order to finance the deployment of an African stabilization force and rebuild the Malian army. This event gathered the UN (United Nations), the AU, the European Union, Japan and the United States. According to the AU, $460m are required to support the AFISMA (African led International Support Mission to Mali). Most of this amount ($240m) shall be used to rebuild the Malian army and to fund Chadian troops. The AU is committed to pay 10% of the total amount.
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
The UN passed resolution 2085 on the 20th of December 2012, a necessary first step towards any conflict resolution. The next step was supposed to be political negotiations or the use of international armed forces to help African and Malian troops. Yet, France decided there was no time to deploy AFISMA, to rebuild Malian military and to establish a legitimate government in Mali. Thus, the French intervention in Mali didn’t violate the UN resolution 2085, on the contrary, it was asked by President Traoré. Only Qatar, Tunisia and Egypt denied approval of such intervention (not even China, Russia or Algeria) and it was broadly supported by Malians and Africans. France is now on the front line, feeling a bit lonely despite the logistical support provided by its Western allies (aerial refueling tankers, Transall, drones and intelligence).
The Franco-Malian military operation, (Operation Serval) was a long-time planned operation. But because of the failure of the Ouagadougou negotiations and the change in the Ansar Dine position, there was no other choice left but to intervene as quickly as possible. The occupation of the town of Konna by the Jihadists was threatening the strategic base of Sevare along with Mopti and Bamako, further South. Also, due to climate conditions, the intervention couldn’t take place between March and September. The intervention of January the 11th of 2013 mobilized French airforce (Rafale and Mirage planes, helicopters), light armored vehicles and 2500 land soldiers (special forces, and 250 paratroopers in Timbuktu on the 27th of January). French troops first stopped the military advance of the Jihadists, they then took control of the Niger Bend backed up by Malian armed forces (first in Gao, then Timbuktu) and Chad troops (in Kidal, where the NMLA (National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad) was present). Jihadists scattered in Northern Mali (in the Adrar of Ifoghas) and along the border with neighboring countries (in the forest near Djabali). France allies (Germany, Canada, Denmark, the United Arab Emirates and Italy) gradually supported this operation, especially after the In Amenas hostage crisis on the 16th of January. After the initial French intervention, African countries started to deploy their troops, such as Chad, Niger and Burkina Faso.
Theoretical framework
1. The war in Mali is another example of asymmetrical warfare. In such conflicts national or international troops fight armed militias. Whereas the former are motivated and fully equipped, to a greater or lesser extent, the latter are determined fanatics up for guerrilla activities and acts of terror. Yet, in Mali, those armed militias are not homogenous. Firstly, there is the NMLA: A cross-border group of tuaregs which follows a more secular Islam and which asks for greater autonomy in the Azawad area, if not independence. Secondly, there is Ansar Dine: This AQIM-affiliated (Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb) group is led by Iyad Ag Ghaly and calls for the full application of Sharia law in Mali. In January 2013, a new group which calls itself the Islamic Movement for the Azawad and claims to be closer to the NMLA, split from Ansar Dine. Thirdly, there are other groups such as AQIM, its enemy the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa which profits from drug trade, and the Northern Nigerian terrorist group Boko Haram.
2. This war also shows how local conflicts can now easily become international. As an example, in this situation, there are interlinkages between Mafia groups and radical Islamists. They both fight against Western presence which is commonly associated with multinational companies working in the hydrocarbon sector and the mining industry.
Analysis
The war in Mali is a multiscale situation with its specific factors and actors. It was caused by several things: Firstly, the Tuareg people had been making claims for a very long time, and they recently took advantage of the fact that mercenaries of Gaddafi were returning to Mali after the war ended in Libya. Secondly, radical Salafism has gained in popularity. And thirdly, when President Amadou Toumani Touré was in power, neither the army nor the government was tough enough against criminal activities. In fact, the military coup on the 22th of March 2012 only confirmed the disintegration of the Malian State and its army. This led Northern Mali to become an uncontrolled area.
The social and economic dimension of the Sahelo-Saharian crisis has to be taken into account despite the small share of Northern Mali in the national GDP (5%). Indeed, on one hand many young people are left with no future because of a demographic boom. Whereas on the other hand, there is a proliferation of all kind of traffics (mostly drugs and guns) plus a spread of environment and food crisis because of climate conditions and the vulnerability of ecosystems in this region. The growing insecurity made the failure of the Malian State and its regional and local authority even worst. Mali was about to become the epicenter of a crisis in the whole Sahelo-Saharian region. That is why several regional and international organizations, along with major states, agree with the military intervention, as it was shown by the international donors’ conference in Addis Ababa. The first part of the intervention was a great success thanks to air force (bombing of storage facilities for fuel and weapons, and destruction of armored combat vehicles) and the troops who took cities back. Yet, Jihadists chose to defect rather than fight which means that there will be many sources of resistance all across a huge territory. This is a very serious problem because hiding and launching surprise attacks are what they do best while most African armies don’t have the experience of such combats. Today, the main question is whether or not African armies will be up for this job. And the answer doesn’t look too promising, especially when it comes to the Malian army which clearly needs to be rebuild. Yet, a solution must be found because as in any other asymmetrical conflicts, the war could get caught in a spiral system and last longer than expected. Still, Mali is not Afghanistan, whereas the Taliban are very popular amongst Pashtuns, Jihadists are seen as aliens. Effective border checks would allow keeping them from getting fuel, ammunitions and trucks. Nevertheless, the major unknown factor in the region is Algeria. Many Algerians are involved in various traffics in Northern Mali and it is difficult to say how the authorities will deal with that situation. Lessons of the failure in Afghanistan have to be learned, otherwise all the financial assistance will be lost in the network of corruption. This military intervention must include other dimensions: political (elections, democratic power, more autonomy for Northern Mali), humanitarian, economical and diplomatic. French troops are to be replaced by Malian and African armies. That is mainly why the international donors’ conference was organized. Also, local populations have to take part in restoring security in the country, especially the Tuareg people who must join in this political and military game. There are many diplomatic commitments just like this international donors’ conference, but it is not enough to finance AFISMA with its 8000 soldiers or to rebuild the Malian army. Those are two essential points that have to be dealt with, even if a peacekeeping operation is being planned. Finally, there can’t be military support without proper international financial help (to fight against illicit trafficking, to implement urban renewal policies, to promote local projects and a decentralized cooperation etc.).
References
Gourdin Patrice, « Al-Qaïda au Sahara et au Sahel ». Diploweb.com, 11/3/2012
Hérodote, Géopolitique du Sahara, (142),2011.
Holeindre Jean-Vincent, Geoffroy Murat (Éds.), La Démocratie et la Guerre au XXIe siècle. De la paix démocratique aux guerres irrégulières, Paris, Hermann, 2012.
Hugon Philippe, Géopolitique de l’Afrique, Paris, SEDES 2012.
Jan 23, 2013 | Globalization, North-South, Passage au crible (English), Sport (English)
By Josepha Laroche
Translation: Anton Stzepourginski
Passage au crible n°83
Pixabay
Owned by Amaury Sport Organization, the Dakar rally raid (ex Paris Dakar) started on the 5th of January and ended on the 20th. It includes three types of vehicles: motorcycles, cars and trucks. It is the biggest off-road race in the world.
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
The Dakar rally raid first took place in 1979. Since then, the route was changed almost every year: Paris wasn’t always the starting point, nor Dakar was the arrival. In 1992, Dakar was replaced by Capetown and in 2002 the rally was organized between Dakar and Cairo.
Despite its designation, this event no longer goes from Paris to Dakar. Since 2009, it takes place in South America across Peru, Argentina and Chile. On the 24th December of 2008, four French tourists were murdered in Mauritania. As a result, the organizers cancelled the 2008 edition and decided to leave Africa for Latin America. It didn’t come as a surprise, as several editions had already been disrupted (if not threatened) before, forcing the organization to cancel several stages of the rally or to change the initial route.
Theoretical framework
1. Civilizational dynamics. In his work, Norbert Elias showed that the propensity of people who enjoy hurting others started reducing after the Middle Ages in Western Europe. As a result, it lowered the tolerance threshold of physical violence and it showed the wish to put it “behind the scenes” (E. Dunning), to punish it or to magnify it through sports.
2. An unaccomplished sportification. Elias insists on the fact that the sportification process is part of the slow effort of self-control and of evolution of one’s feelings. This has been accomplished by the civilization since the Renaissance period, along with the state building project. Sports allow a “regulated release of feelings” but they also include affections and aggressiveness. However, they are contained within a strict framework where violence remains limited in a specific time-space continuum. For the German sociologist, everyone’s inner emotions and impulses are always defined and tamed with sports in the end. In other words, sportification is an essential step on the civilizational process: it is a pacifying key-device.
Analysis
Since its creation, the Dakar rally raid received strong criticism and was a matter of widespread debate. Firstly, opponents insist on the high number of deaths and wounded people that happens in every edition: children or spectators fatally struck by a vehicle, or competitors getting killed in an accident. There have been many victims over the editions and this iron law also applies to journalists and organizers (like Thierry Sabine, in 1986). Secondly, they say it is an act of ecological aggression and a plundering of energy resources, even more today, in the context of the fight against global warming.
In front of such risks, the French association CAVAD (Group for the Dakar rally raid anonymous victims) was created in 2006 to campaign against this event. It calls for a parliamentary investigation on “various incidents and misdeeds that occurred during the rallies” in Africa and Latin America, and expresses its doubts at to whether such social disorders are appropriate. Its members refuse to become “accomplices of such a widely advertised rodeo in the land of poverty” and say this rally shouldn’t be ignored. By doing so, they condemn using developing countries as a playground while those are being “highly exposed to AIDS, hunger and over indebtedness“. For them, the Dakar rally raid is a “neocolonialist provocation with a huge waste of money and energy”. Therefore, every year, they call for a boycott of this “obscene and shameful slave trader crusade”, as they call it.
On the opposite side, the organizers of the Dakar rally raid, say they are not to blame for any physical or symbolical harm. Yet, they barely regret “inevitable” but rare accidents. As a main argument, organizers report the great support and dedication shown by both the authorities and the inhabitants in every host countries. To clean themselves, they use the “economic development” as an alibi. According to them, this sporting event attracts foreign currencies, builds new roads and other facilities which is an extraordinary chance for the local population. This Western-centered paternalist attitude not only shows a profound denial of the reality, but it also reveals how societies are culturally alienated. Indeed, some countries even ask to host the Dakar rally raid when they know perfectly well that there won’t be any economic benefits – the only big winners are the brands. Meanwhile, the local populations fail to see the cultural domination comprised in this so-called sporting event. Yet, the organization of the routes since the beginning of the Dakar rally raid already speaks on the domination of the South by the North.
Organizers not only want to make the Dakar rally raid looks like an epic, they also want to make the audience believe it’s true. Thus, they argue this event is an opportunity for the competitors to go beyond their limits, to promote cults of both speed and technical achievement. Yet, they can’t ignore that such presentation is a de facto promotion of a manly prowess demonstration in its most primal form. While rallying, competitors are engaged in a battle with no risk of physical harm: this confirms the position of Norbert Elias. Indeed, thanks to their interdependent relationship, the social ties are more linked and operational between them than at the beginning of the rally. In other words, as Emile Durkheim referred to, an organic solidarity is set in motion, strengthening the cohesion of the group. However, the process of sportification that brings them closer also enables them to show more brutality around the symbolical limits of the Dakar rally raid. As a matter of fact, the latter acts as a sanctuary for the competitors and fulfills a cathartic function. In contaminating host countries, the Dakar rally raid shows so-called higher beings displaying “signs of affluence in the most ostentatious nature way possible” (Veblen). All this leads us to believe that the trivialized – or glorified – violence of this globalized annual trespass is the sign of the implementation of a brutalization process.
References
Barthes Rolland, Mythologies, Paris, Seuil, 1957.
Douglas Mary, De la Souillure : Essais sur les notions de pollution et de tabou, trad., La Découverte, 2001.
Elias Norbert, Au-delà de Freud, sociologie, psychologie, psychanalyse, trad., Paris, La Découverte, 2010.
Elias Norbert, La Civilisation des mœurs, [1939], trad., Paris, Calmann-Lévy, 1973.
Elias Norbert, La Dynamique de l’Occident, trad., Paris, 1975.
Elias Norbert, Dunning Eric, Sport et civilisation, la violence maîtrisée, trad., Paris, Fayard, 1994.
Laroche Josepha, La Brutalisation du monde, du retrait des États à la décivilisation, Montréal, Liber, 2012.
Renaud, « 500 connards sur la ligne de départ », https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ct5SeoMQhew
Veblen Thorstein, Théorie de la classe du loisir, [1899], trad., Paris, Gallimard, 1970.
Jan 22, 2013 | Articles, Fil d'Ariane, Publications (English)
Par Rémy William Angora, Florent Bédécarrats et Cécile Lapenu
Evidence from 126 Assessments
www.cerise-microfinance.org cerise@globenet.org
Abstract
Is social performance profitable?
The question may be cynical, but nevertheless relevant for microfinance to keep its “promise” of being an economically viable development tool (Morduch, 1999). For years, the sector focused on sustainability and growth, measured in terms of financial performance. For the most part, sSocial performance was taken for granted, which led many microfinance institutions (MFIs) to neglect its measure and management. Concerned by this trend, pioneer practitioners, investors and donors have taken steps to address social performance by developing tools, methodologies and assessment frameworks. As criticism of the sector has increased, social performance has been mainstreamed (Copestake, 2007). But has it been expense of financial performance?There are contradicting viewpoints regarding the pairing of financial sustainability and social objectives. Some observers suggest an incompatibility, pointing to problems of mission drift experienced by MFIs that pursue profitability by insisting on physical guarantees, increasing loan amounts and targeting the better-off (Christen, 2001). Others emphasize synergy, arguing that social performance improves mutual trust, client participation and satisfaction, which translates into higher repayment rates and lower transaction costs (Lapenu, 2007). While these assertions draw on case studies, the research has not been extensive enough to draw sector-wide conclusions.Insufficient data has long been the main obstacle to answering this question. Reliable results are simply not easy to come by. Impact studies are limited, costly to replicate and difficult to compare (Copestake, 2003). Recent works using sophisticated techniques (Cornée, 2006; Gurtierrez-Nieto & al., 2007; Cull et al., 2009; Mersland & Strøm, 2009; Lensink & Niels, 2009) have mainly used financial data and inadequate social performance indicators such as portfolio size, average loan size or number of women clients (Armendariz & Szafarz, 2009; Dunford, 2002). These proxies offer little more than a vague idea of depth of outreach–only one of the many dimensions of social performance. Moreover, they only account for credit operations, effectively ignoring other aspects of microfinance.
Télécharger l’article The Relationship Between Social and Financial Performance in Microfinance
Jan 7, 2013 | Digital Industry, Globalization, Passage au crible (English)
By Justin Chiu
Translation : Anton Stzepourginski
Passage au crible n°82
Pixabay
On the 21st of December of 2012, the Samsung company was addressed a warning by the European Commission. This action was taken against an abuse by Samsung of its dominant position judging on the excessive use of its patents. Indeed, patent infringement litigations between Apple and Samsung are still ongoing in Japan, South Korea and in several Western countries. As an example, in August 2012, the South Korean Samsung Group was ordered to pay a record $1-billion fine to Apple.
In this worldwide range of patent battles between the two electronic giants, the European Commission has become the first supranational body trying to ease the tensions. Yet, the question remains as to why smartphone manufacturers don’t mind using their competitors’ patents while they know they could face legal proceedings.
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
In 1983, the first mobile phone was put on the U.S market. Since the Motorola DynaTAC 8000, the development of the mobile phone market symbolizes alone technical progress. However, the introduction of the GSM standard (Global System for Mobile communication, also called 2G for “second-generation wireless telephone technology“) in the middle of the nineties was the real kick start. Indeed, the 2G allowed data to be transmitted through an analog signal, a much cheaper operation than using the previous analogous mode. At the same time, the telecommunication sector was being financialized, but after its worldwide deregulation, merger and acquisition policies started to be implemented; especially in developing countries, by every incumbent operator in the Triad. All of those are now private companies.
Once again, the telecommunication sector changed in the middle of the two-thousands when the 3G hit the market. With a high-speed network it became possible to use new services such as mobile applications (apps) or audiovisual content. Thus, this gave birth to a new economic scheme represented by three components: mobile telephony, electronics, and software. Nowadays, only smartphone manufacturers have the required technical resources to connect those three components. Meanwhile, benefits of the former incumbent operators were declining.
Today, the smartphone market constitutes a global booming sector. With 153.9 million units sold in the second quarter of 2012, this market increased by 40% compared to the analogous period of the previous year. Samsung and Apple own almost 50% of this market. The former has been on the telecommunication market for decades and now holds a large number of key patents on 3G. As to the latter, it greatly influences its competitors with patents on control interface and design. Smartphone-related manufacturing techniques are frequently exchanged between competitors, if not copied. Yet, as trade war is raging on, they have to find new adapted means in order to increase their sales. As a last resort, legal proceedings can be used to reduce competitors’ sales. Since the first trial opposing Nokia and Apple in October 2009, patent-related cases between smartphone manufacturers keep on making headlines.
Theoretical framework
1. A telecommunication sector with no order. Today, there is no form of global governance in the field of telecommunication. In fact, as they are becoming more and more transnational, the number of trials between smartphone and tablet manufacturers keeps increasing. The international telecommunication rules set by the ITU (International Telecommunication Union) are now obsolete. As a matter of fact, the treaty was reformed for the first time at the World Conference on International Telecommunications in 2012. In 1997, the WTO concluded a General Agreement on Telecommunications introducing deregulation in this sector. However, its provisions are hardly implemented on this market once owned by nation-states. Because of this lack of international authority, rules are only implemented on a national basis. As to the courts precedents, they are piecemeal.
2. A transnational spread of technical data. Over the past three decades, operators got their supplies from a globalized market. It helped unifying telecommunication norms and standards at a global level. This process allows interoperability in mobile telephony, a matter of critical importance for both companies and individuals. Smartphone manufacturers are in the heart of innovative industries and their goal is to sell their goods all over the world. Yet, their smartphones need continuous improvements considering the speed of technical progress and the free-access to data. Therefore, patent infringements are strongly recommended, if not compulsory.
Analysis
Engineering technology gives relevant information on techniques, and according to Marcel Mauss it constitutes an important part of sociology. In other words, the smartphone industry has its place within international relations and thus doesn’t have to deal with economic improvements and advancements of knowledge and innovation in these target areas. However, it is essential to point out how fast and intense the changes in the market can be and, as a result, the way they impact on our society. The smartphone is not only a communication device it is above all a status symbol: as an example, Blackberry mobiles were very popular amongst businessmen. However, prices have declined thanks to the competition between manufacturers that’s why all social classes can now afford a smartphone. This is good news for customers who need to be connected at all times in order to share information with the outside world through their social networks.
It is very difficult to enter the smartphone market without a large portfolio of patents and solid legal expertise. Therefore, the main actors of this market are only transnational companies organized in an oligopoly. Quarterly sales results play a major role in the competition between the manufacturers, indeed, poor profits outlook can cause steep decline in companies’ stock market capitalization. This global market is growing fast, and its actors must always penetrate new markets or consolidate their assets if they don’t want to get kicked out of the game. Also, another problem is that the computer electronics life cycle is shortening while investment costs in research and development are increasing. This vicious circle is very difficult to break for companies facing difficulties, whereas, in the meantime, dominant companies strengthen their sales. This is why Samsung was asked by the European Commission to grant license to its essential industry-standard patents. However, in the legal struggle between Samsung and Apple, the former often finds itself in a bad situation because claims don’t deal with internal control related patents.
Out-of-court settlements happen a lot in this field. A surprising example is the settlement found in the case between Apple and HTC in November 2012. They decided to avoid litigation and they agreed on a 10-year reciprocal license agreement for existing and future patents. In fact, HTC has suffered a lot from its trials and is no longer Apple’s enemy. Today, the Taiwanese smartphone manufacturer no longer partners with Google and Microsoft. HTC is Apple’s ally, for now.
As long as Samsung and Apple will keep their dominant market position, this patent war will last. Ironically, the real challenge doesn’t lie in these patents but in the innovative business strategies of those smartphone manufacturers and in the implementation of an international arbitration mechanism.
References
Commission européenne, « Abus de position dominante: la Commission adresse une communication des griefs à Samsung pour utilisation abusive possible de brevets essentiels liés à une norme de téléphonie mobile », Communiqué de presse, 21 déc. 2012, à l’adresse web : http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-1448_fr.htm [28 déc. 2012]
Elias Norbert, La Dynamique de l’Occident, trad., Paris, 1975.
Le Monde, « Samsung condamné à verser plus d’un milliard de dollars à Apple », 25 août 2012, à l’adresse web: http://www.lemonde.fr/technologies/article/2012/08/25/guerre-des-brevets-apple-remporte-une-victoire-ecrasante-contre-samsung_175 0814_651865.html [28 déc. 2012]
Mauss Marcel, Techniques, technologies et civilisation, Paris, PUF, 2012.
Musso Pierre, Les Télécommunications, Paris, La Découverte, 2008. Coll. Repères.
Roseau James N., Sign J. P. (Ed.), Informations Technologies and Global Politics, The Changing Scope of Power and Governance, Albany, State University of New York Press, 2002.
Strange Susan, The Retreat of the State. The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996.
Jan 2, 2013 | Globalization, Internet, Passage au crible (English)
By Alexandre Bohas
Passage au crible n°81
Pixabay
The ITU conference (International Telecommunication Union) ended in December 2012 by a disagreement among Member States concerning the type of regulation for the Internet. However, this lack of consensus turns out to be decisive for the future of the sector while it reveals antagonisms of powers and worldviews.
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
Since the end of the 19th century, the ITU regulates telegraph, telephone and radiotelephony, in particular through the attribution of radio frequencies. It was placed under the control of the United Nations after the Second World War, and is still often considered as a specialized and technical organisation. Yet, this conception was questioned in the Seventies by the partisans of the New Information and Telecommunication World Order who underlined the political dimensions.
Although the Internet has developed out of this organization, it belongs to the domains of information and communication technologies. It is managed by a non-profit organization based in California, the ICANN (Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers). This body deals with, on the one hand, the systems of domain names and, on the other hand, the coordination of actions in favour of security, stability and unity within this virtual space. Its functions confer upon it a considerable influence with the introduction of this medium in every social, economic and political sphere. This is the reason why China, Russia, Saudi Arabia wished to integrate it in the regime of the ITU despite the opposition of Western nations. To justify this decision, they invoked the right of each government to manage “Internet numbering, naming, addressing and identification resources” 1. After the vote of the proposition by a majority of States, 55 states led by the United States refused to sign a treaty including such an enlargement of competences which, according to them, would threaten the governance model and the unity of the Internet.
Theoretical framework
The international system as a “historical bloc”. According to the holistic perspective of Gramsci, the global sphere would be marked by the domination of hegemonic coalitions, with economic, social, institutional and ideological bases (Robert Cox and Stephen Gill). From this perspective, States would constitute nothing but heterogeneous superstructures, stakes of power conflicts, whereas transnational interests, organisations and groups would engender global structure. The advantage of this paradigm is to identify changes in the system as much as to escape from the state-centred tropism.
The global governances at the service of the American preponderance. Globalisation favours the rise of “formal and informal processes et institutions, whereby rules are created, compliance is elicited, and goods are provided in pursuit of collective goals” 2. Non-state actors are fully recognized to the detriment of governments which lose their privileged status. These types of hybrid public regulations ratify new balances of power while they reinforce a configuration of the international arena favourable to the United States.
Analysis
Conflicts on the Internet highlight the scope of the upheavals that are provoked by this medium in developing countries. Resulting from Western technology and discoveries, its use implies values such as freedom of speech and equality among users as much as interdependencies and transnational solidarities. In addition, its contents are available everywhere in the world and project ideologies, specific representations, and living standards. In this respect, its socio-cultural dimensions are transmitted in the rest of the world through its global expansion. Hence the distrust, even the opposition, of governing elites whose regimes enter into contradiction with messages delivered on the web. Indeed, the latter thwarts the pillars of their power by exposing them as illegitimate and by allowing increased means of action to skilled individuals. With this concept, the late James Rosenau wanted to underline growing capacities and resources of individuals on the global scene.
In addition, this opposition to the building of a numerical space unveils a reaction of Nation States against the proliferation of transnational bodies of governance where they are overstepped by non-state actors and processes. Compared to an international organization, these bodies favour implicitly civil societies. For example, the direction of the ICANN is composed of a council of sixteen members who represent all the stakeholders of the Internet: computer sectors, internet-user communities, e-business companies, notably through the Generic Names Supporting Organization and the At-Large Advisory Committee; whereas States are only associated with an advising role, thanks to the Government Advisory Committee. Although they are present, they remain without a privileged status. In other words, they are bypassed by this organization which maintains direct bonds with members of civil societies – technical specialists, militants, internet users and economic operators – thanks to regular meetings and participation within nomination and decision organs.
We could add that authoritarian states prove to be structurally weak in these configurations due to constraints that they imposed on their social groups. In doing so, global governance favours America, which is characterized by the dynamism and the diversity of its society. This mode of regulation insures it a de facto preponderance faced with the rise of state power which is led by strong men, an accelerated growth and sovereign funds. As a consequence, it contributes institutionally to forming the American “historical bloc”. In denouncing the agreement of Dubai, the United States are the spokesman of Western economic interests with their information and communication technologies constituting the spearhead. Besides, the free exercise of the Internet consolidates the competition advantages of its large firms which are already fully developed. Finally, its defence of the Internet brings it support and recognition from Western opinions, freedom militants but also silent internet users in emerging countries. Consequently, it gains the implicit consent of a hegemonic type which contributes to the expansion of its international system.
This study leads us to establish relationships between the evolution of international institutions and the structuration of the global sphere. Only a systemic perspective makes it possible to identify these links, which allows us to introduce politics in these governmental transformations which are reportedly only functional.
References
Cox Robert W., Sinclair Timothy J., Approaches to World Order, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996.
Garber Megan, “How the UN’s ‘Game-Changing’ Internet Treaty Failed”, Atlantic online, 14 Dec. 2012.
Gill Stephen, Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International Relations, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993.
“Global Internet Diplomacy” The New York Times, 14 Dec. 2012.
ICANN, Nominative Committee. Final Report, 2012, available at the page: http://nomcom.icann.org.
Kelley Lee, Global Telecommunications Regulation: A Political Economy Perspective, London, Pinter, 1996.
IUT, Final Acts. Conference on International Telecommunications, 3-14 Dec. 2012, available at the page: www.itu.int/en/wcit-12.
Koppell Jonathan, “Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers”, in: Held David, Hale Thomas, The Handbook of Transnational Governance: Institutions and Innovations, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2011, pp. 176-182.
Rosenau James N., Turbulence in World Politics: a Theory of Change and Continuity, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1990.
“UN Telecom Treaty Approved Against U.S. Web-Censorship Concerns”, The Washington Post, 13 Dec. 2012.
1. Garber Megan, “How the UN’s ‘Game-Changing’ Internet Treaty Failed”, Atlantic online, 14 Dec. 2012.
2. David Held, Thomas Hale, The Handbook of Transnational Governance: Institutions and Innovations, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2011, p. 12.
