La Modernité insécurisée, anthropologie des conséquences de la mondialisation Charlotte Bréda, Marie Deridder, Pierre-Joseph Laurent (Éds.), Paris, L’Harmattan

This collective and interdisciplinary work treats the reformulation of social and cultural fabrics brought about by globalization. It also underscores the transformations of the living environment and the methods of securing populations.

It has a five-part structure. The first analyzes the consequences of the process of globalization, on societies marked until now by a traditional lifestyle. The second is about the social effects of climate change. The third, centered on the shifts that interfere with peoples’ daily lives, underlines the social inventiveness of these individuals. The fourth addresses the reformulation of the relations between states and their institutions. Finally, this book dwells shortly on the transformations of the imagination. In doing so, it examines the ruses of identity put into place by populations to symbolize space and time, while these two dimensions are irreversibly distended.

Bréda Charlotte, Deridder Marie, Laurent Pierre-Joseph (Éds.), La Modernité insécurisée, anthropologie des conséquences de la mondialisation, Paris, L’Harmattan, 2013, 467 p.

PAC 109 – Oceans, Menaced Public Goods The Banning of Pulse Trawling in Europe in an Institutional Impasse

By Florian Hévelin

Translation: Lawrence Myers

Passage au crible n°109

Pixabay

On January 30, 2014, the fishing fleet of the French group Intermarché – la Scapêche – committed itself to no longer plunge its nets beyond 800 meters depth. Moreover, protection associations of marine diversity have access to data of Scapêche’s nine large trawling boats which fish in deep water. Intermarché amplifies the wave of private initiatives launched by large logos of the French distribution such as Casino, Auchan or Carrefour. Paradoxically, this commitment in favor of the conservation of deep-sea life takes place after Scapêche celebrated the European Parliament’s rejection on December 10, 2013, of a proposed law formulated beginning in July 2012, which aimed to ban bottom trawling. Defeated on the European front, environmental NGOs have nevertheless been able to force certain leaders to regulate their activities to prevent the destruction of the seabed. Sensitizing consumers to the environmental stakes, however, has become as important to NGOs as lobbying with European institutions.

Historical background
Theoretical framework
Analysis
References

Historical background

The conservation of the halieutic resource makes sense within the framework of the CFP (Common Fisheries Policy). In the 1970s, the first European regulations adopted on this topic did not attribute an ecological function to the CFP. In fact, they primarily concerned the creation of a sectorial organization, modeled on the CAP (Common Agricultural Policy), the financing of the modernization of production tools and the mutualization of national maritime spaces. While the exhaustion of fish reserves has attracted much attention since the 1960s, the CFP did not speak to the subject until 1938 in a text that has barely been altered since. Country by country, the dated texted fixes quotas of capture and imposes technical fishing norms on mesh size, the size of the catch or the motorization of ships.

The current debate on the ban on deep see fishing and the techniques associated with it does not, however, appear unprecedented. In a political context marked by the opening of European institutions to civil society, exchanges had resulted in 1998 in the ban of the usage of driftnets. The European Union aligned itself with the UN’s resolution carrying out Greenpeace’s international campaign in favor of dolphin protection. On the same occasion, private initiatives anticipating European legislation had emerged. Recall as an example, that Unilever had proposed to the WWF (World Wildlife Foundation) in 1997 – that is to say one year before the ban on driftnets took effect – the creation of a Marine Stewardship Council or MSC. But charged with delivering eco-labels, this authority has supposedly entered into direct competition with the European Commission that delivered the same labels. Today the eco-label that it will develop, MSC, monopolizes the market of ecological certification of fishing and paralyzes the European Union’s initiatives in this sector. From now on, the existing state of the balance of power within the European system obliges green NGOs campaigning for the ban on deep sea trawling, to guide their strategies primarily towards private governance of oceans.

Theoretical framework

1. The existence of an epistemic community. The expertise of green NGOs, recognized by the European Commission, expedites their lobbying and the placing on the agenda of their political propositions.
2. The privatization of policy. The regulation of bottom trawling takes the form of informal contracts between NGOs and producers/distributors of deep-sea fish in order to relieve the European governance deficit in the matter.

Analysis

The representation of environmental interests within the European Commission coincides with the creation of a branch dedicated to the environment (1973) and with progress of European law in this domain (Single European Act, 1986). The elevated cost of lobbying in Brussels has permitted the structuring of two types of networks. On the one hand, federative groups which bring together multiple national environmental associations working on common themes. In the framework of the fight against deep sea trawling, more than seventy of them are thus regrouped within the Deep Sea Conservation Coalition. On the other hand, since 1991, Green 10 coordinates the activity of lobbying of the 10 largest European and international NGOs (WWF, Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth, Birdlife International, etc.). From now on, consider them to be simple “non governmental organizations” (Nielson 1) that risk obscuring the “epistemic community” (Haas) that they represent for the European Commission. Responding to the need to better understand the current transformations of public action (internationalization and transnationalization) in general and the influence of environmental groups on public policy in particular, the concept of epistemic community is perfectly suited to the analysis of canals by which new ideas have been able to circulate from NGOs towards the current commissariat of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries. Amongst these organizations, the French association Bloom illustrates the manner in which private scientific production can gain recognition from the European Commission and gain legitimacy from placing political propositions on the agenda. The efficiency of its contribution indeed resides in the multidimensional critique of deep sea fishing, considered from the angle of sustainable development. Bloom has shown that: 1) This activity was not profitable and depended – notably in the French case – on subsidies given by States. 2) Employment in the fishing sector is only concerned for a fraction because only 2% of ships operating in the Northeast Atlantic remain stakeholders. 3) This fishing technique, considered “the most destructive in history”, drains ecosystems while it ultimately only catches three targeted fish species – roundnose grenadier, black saber and blue ling – and tosses hundreds of dead fish overboard.

The field of European lobbying is proving to be deeply asymmetrical. These NGOs take action in a terrain dominated by economic interest groups that dispose of considerable means including the ability to produce rival expertise. Yet, the majority of European parliamentarians and States targeted by the deep see trawling ban (France, Spain, Great Britain, Portugal) rallied to industrialization of fishing. Consequently, in the institutional impasse, ocean-defending NGOs have reinforced their investments to force the offer to conform oneself to a consumption ethic. The diffusion of best practices in the matter passes by the vulgarization of their knowledge. In this logic, Bloom organized a filmed conference, popularizing a cartoon (Pénélope Bagieu) and also established the ranking of the primary French supermarkets, Intermarché being awarded the dunce cap. Faced with the success of this strategy of show and shame, which reveals the strength of advertising, the big logos have had to negotiate with NGOs in order to recover their credibility. These NGOs have then symbolically paid back the voluntary commitments in favor of the protection of marine biodiversity. WWF, for example, published an article on its official site entitled “NGOs salute the engagement of Intermarché’s fleet”. This strategy of increasing companies’ brand image as proof of societal responsibility (show and fame) seems to be an integral part of the repertory of action of these non-State actors. But the privatization of European governance of oceans, considered in a temporary manner, could very well last in an international context characterized by anomie. In other words, oceans appear more than ever to be menaced public goods.

References

Berny Nathalie, « Le lobbying des ONG internationales d’environnement à Bruxelles », RFSP, 58 (1), 2008, pp. 97-121.
Haas Peter M., « Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination », International Organization, 46 (1), 1992, pp. 1-35.
Le Monde, « Pêche en eau profonde : Intermarché ne pêchera plus au-delà de 800 mètres », January 31, 2014.
Lequesne Christian, L’Europe bleue. A quoi sert une politique communautaire de la pêche ?, Paris, Sciences Po, 2001

PAC 108 – A Cooperative Rivalry The Failure to Mediate between Apple and Samsung

By Adrien Cherqui

Translation: Lawrence Myers

Passage au crible n°108

Apple SamsungSource: Flickr

February 19, 2014, marked the end of mediation between Apple and Samsung Mobile Communications during which the directors were supposed to negotiate an agreement. Let us recall that the attempt to compromise launched in January 2014 by the San Diego court, had incited the two groups to find an arrangement to avoid a new trial.

Historical background
Theoretical framework
Analysis
References

Historical background

According to the research firm IDC, more than one billion smartphones were sold in 2013, which is to say 38% more than in 2012. Three firms currently occupy the podium of global sales. In terms of parts of the market held in 2013, Samsung holds 31.3%; with 313.9 million units sold; Apple, which sold 153.4 million iPhones, conquered 15.3%. As for the third, the Chinese firm Huawei, it still fell far behind the latter with only 48.8 million sales or 4.9%.

Appearing on March 6, 1983, with the first cordless communication device offered by Motorola, the mobile technology sector built itself on innovation and development of new technical norms. The popularization of mobile telephones during the 1980s and the appearance of innovative standards like GSM (Global System for Mobile Communication), the 3G and from now on 4G, have made innumerable services possible such as the utilization of audiovisual content, applications and web surfing. These components are now fully operational in smartphones. Deeply transformed by these multiple changes, the telecommunications domain was historically organized around a few manufacturers. Several of them such as Nokia, Huawei, Samsung, LG and more recently Apple – with the 2007 release of the first iPhone which democratized these products – currently makes up a veritable oligopoly. The latter is characterized by exacerbated competition, notably in research and development. In this context, competitive dynamics result in an illegal use of patents belonging to rival groups.

The two giants, Samsung and Apple, have been confronting one another in court since April 2011 in several dossiers. The most emblematic ruling remains that of August 2012 during which a jury sentenced the South Korean Samsung to pay one billion dollars to Apple for the violation of patents relative to iPads and iPhones. In the course of these judicial proceedings, Samsung primarily blamed Apple for using technologies and technical norms that it had patented. For its part, Apple estimates that Samsung plagiarized the design of its iPads, as well as their user interface with the models Galaxy S and Galaxy Tab. But beyond competition which one could consider restricted to these two companies, the ongoing case is also targeting one of the competitors of Apple’s operating systems iOS: Google’s Android, used largely by Samsung.

More recently, in June 2013, the legal battle between the two major companies in mobile telephony, were brought before the USITC (United States International Trade Commission), a federal agency competent in matters of trade litigation. This authority recognized that the American company Apple had violated one of the property titles essential to Samsung. The USITC then prohibited importation, the sale and distribution by Apple of wireless communication tools and portable music devices. However, this decision was never carried out. In fact, on August 3, 2013, President Barack Obama and his administration censured the measure, a reaction that set off a strong response amongst Korean authorities.

Theoretical framework

1. The transnationalization of the mobile technology market. Transnational firms follow a distinctive production logic that allows room for cooperation in research and development. But the mutualization of resources, the reduction of costs and the growth of productivity condemn these competitors to more integration.
2. The structural power of transnational firms. Major actors of the global scene, certain high tech brands have the capacity to reconfigure themselves in a distinct sector, all the while imposing some of their choices. This structural change – to borrow Susan Strange’s expression – shapes and determines the structures of global economy within which other groups develop.

Analysis

Mobile telephony presents itself as a dynamic industry within which numerous economic operators interact. They possess resources that allow them to be at the point of convergence of three industries: mobile telephony, hardware and software. Globalization and the rise of new technologies cause companies to turn towards new economic models. Yet, such models imply the optimization of their growth, better reactivity and larger competiveness. Let us, however, note a production initially conceived for national markets, transformed today into a global market organization. This structural change encouraged by globalization has driven this industrial branch to its transnationalization and to the complex relationships that Samsung and Apple maintain.

Armed with experience superior to that of Apple, Samsung operates in all the stages of development of computers, tablets or smartphones. From the processor to the screen, passing by the software, it has the necessary production resources available to it for the protection of high tech devices and largely dominates the entire industry. While the South Korean group is showing itself to be a major competitor to the American Apple, logics of cooperation are paradoxically put into place. Let us recall that the A5 processor, designed by Apple and produced by Samsung, remains a central piece of the iPad 2 and the iPhone 4S. Besides the A8 microchip that the upcoming Apple devices will be equipped with will be made by the TSMC group (Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company).

However, the American firm is not for as much abandoning the South Korean group, which in the future will remain responsible for 30% to 40% of the production of this component, in order to prevent any shortage.

Interdependence currently characterizes the production of computer equipment used for the design of mobile telephones and tablets. In other words, Samsung delivers its technical know-how and its industrial capacities to Apple, while the latter offers Samsung a new market. This is alliance capitalism, a phenomenon well characterized in its time by John Dunning. Put another way, the duo rivalry-cooperation will from now on structure new inter firm relationships.

This production logic is accompanied by a circulation of the technologies that pertain to the redistribution of power within mobile telephony. The highly competitive characteristics of this sector have indeed driven to the use of certain patented standards, which have in turn become indispensable. From now on, this now common usage has been institutionalized. During the first lawsuit in which Samsung was opposed to Apple, the former made particular reference to patents linked to 3G transmissions, considered standard essential patents. Still, this practice resembles what sociologist Ulrich Beck called private law and which here applies to technical norms, which shows the relative powerlessness of the state actor and defies the concept of the Legislator State.

References

Balzacq Thierry, Ramel Frédéric (Éds.), Traité de relations internationales, Paris, Presses de Science Po, 2013.
Laroche Josepha (Éd.), Passage au crible, l’actualité internationale 2012, Paris, L’Harmattan, 2013. Coll. Chaos International.
Le Monde, «Brevets : Apple et Samsung échouent à s’entendre aux États-Unis», Feburary 23, 2014
Mosca Marco, «Les tops et les flops du marché des smartphones en 2013», Challenges, January 28, 2014
Strange Susan, Stopford John, Henley John S., Rival States, Rival Firms: Competition for World Market Shares, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991.
Strange Susan, Le Retrait de l’État. La dispersion du pouvoir dans l’économie mondiale, trad., Paris, Temps Présent, 2011.
Strange Susan, « States, Firms and Diplomacy », International Affairs, 68 (1), 1992, pp. 1-15.

PAC 107 – The Protection of Intellectual Property as a Monopolistic Weapon The Sale by Google of Motorola Mobility to Lenovo

By Robin Baraud

Translation: Lawrence Myers

Passage au crible n°107

Pixabay

On Wednesday, January 29, 2014, Google announced the sale of Motorola to Lenovo for only 2.91 billion dollars, while the group had acquired it in 2012 for 12.5 billion. This resale of a pioneer of mobile telephony, which has not been corrected despite the significant job cuts, at first seems therefore to be an ill-fated transaction. But this observation must be tempered since only 2,000 of the 17,000 patents held by Motorola will ultimately be ceded to Lenovo. Besides, the latter will benefit from use agreements for part of the 15,000 others.

Historical background
Theoretical framework
Analysis
References

Historical background

Lenovo acquired international renown with its purchase of IBM’s laptop computer department in 2005. The cost of the operation proved to be equal to more than two times its own value. After having achieved the integration of this service and having changed directors – both with difficulty – in mid-May 2013, Lenovo attained the status of first producer in the world in this sector. From the beginning of this acquisition, the company was seeking a transfer of technologies as well as of the IBM image, in part thanks to the name ThinkPad, already well implanted in western markets.

About 70% of smartphones sold in the world today are equipped with an operating system developed by Android. Google makes this system available to its manufacturers as a software base; manufacturers are then able to make a certain number of modifications, which allow for adaptation to the needs of their products. Google’s partners – including the Taiwanese company HTC, the Japanese company Sony or the South-Korean company Samsung – were worried about the purchase of Motorola in 2012, fearing that the brand would eventually become the lone distributor of their products. In 2010, Google had begun to release in partnership with its manufacturers – first of all HTC, then Samsung, Asus and LG – a line of top-end model smartphones and tablets at low prices, using a non-modified operating system by Android. It was therefore logical for these firms to see Google’s strategy as a way to exclude them.

In the war that Google waged against its principal competitors, it nonetheless used the patents that it had acquired with Motorola. On February 27, 2012, it lost a major lawsuit against Apple. In the proceedings, it asked for the removal of the iPad and the iPhone, since Apple had used certain industrial properties belonging to Motorola. It clearly understood, however, the power of their control. With the sale of each one of its Android terminals, manufacturers must pay Microsoft a sum of 5 to 15 dollars to pay back the use of inventions patented by Microsoft.

From now on, thanks to the acquisition of Motorola Mobility, Lenovo has passed from the fifth to the third rank of world smartphones producers, behind Apple and Samsung. Already well-established in China on the low-end market, it currently foresees also investing in the mid-range market in order to make its appearance in American, or even European markets, starting in 2014. In this situation, Motorola’s brand image and its already-significant presence could facilitate its access. In other words, the technology transfer seems to be of secondary importance in this transaction. While on the other hand it had determined on Thursday, January 23, 2014, the purchase of an aging server farm for 2.3 billion dollars. For reasons similar to those of the Motorola Mobility dossier, Lenovo had shown Blackberry ambitions in November 2013. However, Canadian authorities had forbidden these aims, fearing that the company may become Chinese.

Theoretical framework

1. Intellectual property as a weapon of transnational competition. The deregulation of world trade was realized in parallel to the homogenization of national legislation in matters of protection of intellectual property. This concept allows firms that hold patents to legally prohibit their competitors from producing goods – material or immaterial – equivalent to theirs.
2. Research by transnational firms for a return on their monopoly. For an economic actor finding itself in a situation of monopoly, by definition no competition in its business sector is to be feared. Hence, it no longer seeks to win comparative advantages, but rather strives to unilaterally perpetuate its dominance. In fact, resisting the toughness of competitive logic always proves to be costly; this is why it appears rational to establish a monopoly to bolster its profits.

Analysis

The regime for the protection of intellectual property defended by the WTO authorizes the establishing of monopolies on patented technology. The objective involves assuring remuneration to companies on their investments in research and development. This regulatory measure of the global economy, which attempts to encourage innovation and progress, confirms the nonexistence of the ideal type of perfect competition. In the mobile telephone sector, these provisions have favored the emergence of an oligopoly composed of transnational firms. They benefit from such financial means that they hold or negotiate the utilization of numerous indispensable patents for the development of competitive products. These titles of industrial property useful for the production of portable telephones can be classed into two main categories. On the one hand, those which concern the physical part of the device, on the other hand, those relative to the software assuring their operation. However, the current competition between smartphones primarily concerns this second group. Despite the marginal contributions to existing technology – unlocking by tactile recognition by Apple for example –, the improvement of performances of the material components of the telephone remain limited due to battery life, an aspect difficult to develop.

Google has positioned itself exclusively in the realm of software development and therefore makes use of the situation. In order to set themselves apart, smartphone manufacturers using Android have developed more and more elaborate accessories. Proposed by certain smartphones, the suspension of the telephone’s sleep mode while the user is looking at the screen is an example one such strategy by Samsung. But this practice progressively hides the software base Android which becomes difficult for the consumer to recognize. This appears problematic for Google, since the products that assure its collection and analysis of personal data (Gmail, Google Maps, Google Calendar, etc.), which make its economic model viable, cease, consequently, to be highlighted. Its principal objective continues to be the establishing of a norm around which its products, like Microsoft was able to do with its computer operating systems. The interest in a global framework of this type is linked to the fact that it would be difficult to compete in so far as a large majority of users have adopted it. In other words, the conditions for a return on monopoly have been brought together.

By acquiring the Motorola patents, Google has reinforced its monopolistic capacity on the development of smartphone operating systems. Its advantage appears to be twofold. First of all, from now on, it holds the possibility of putting its primary competitors in a difficult situation by rendering innovation efforts more difficult and more costly. Otherwise, it accentuates the dependence of its partners on its Android operating system. Beyond the Motorola brand, Lenovo also possesses precious technological knowledge and benefits from the good integration of its new branch into the American market. As China is a member of the WTO, it is indeed indispensable for companies currently in China to purchase their entrance into protected markets by numerous patents, like with mobile telephony.

References

Andreff Wladimir (Éd.), La mondialisation, stade suprême du capitalisme ? Mélanges en hommage à Charles-Albert Michalet, Paris, PUN, 2013.
Chiu Justin, “Worldwide Anarchy in the Mobile Phone Market Patent War between Smartphone Manufacturers”:
Le Monde, « Google revend Motorola au chinois Lenovo mais garde les brevets », January 30, 2014, [March 2014].

Combining Social and Financial Performance: A Paradox?

Written by: Florent Bédécarrats, Research Coordinator, CERISE, France ; Silivia Baur, Research Fellow, CERISE, France ; Cécile Lapenu, Director, CERISE, France. With Assistance from: Mathias, Ph D Candidate, Ecole polytechnique, CREST, France

2011 Global Microcredit Summit
Commissioned Workshop Paper November 14-17, 2011 – Valladolid, Spain

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